THE  STRATEGY 
OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 


•B 

N- 


Half-tone  reduction  from  the  copyrighted  steel  plate  etching  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee.    By 
permission  of  the  John  A.  Lowell  Bank  Note  Company,  Boston,  Mass. 


THE  STRATEGY 
OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 


BY 


J.  J.  BOWEN 

Formerly  Member  of  the  First  Com  pany 
of  Richmond  Howitzers 


ILLUSTRATED 


NEW  YORK 
THE  NEALE  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1914 


Copyright,  1914.  by 
THE  NEALE  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 


• 


^ 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 

THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 
CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    BULL  RUN n 

II  WHY  THE  CONFEDERATES  DID  NOT  TAKE  WASH 

INGTON 17 

III  BULL  RUN  IN  RICHMOND     ,: 22 

IV  BEAUREGARD'S  PLAN 27 

V    THE  QUARREL  ABOUT  JOHNSTON'S  RANK     .      .31 

VI    "  WITHIN  HEARING  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  GUNS  "    .  33 

VII    THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  DAVIS  AND  LEE  .     .  37 

VIII    MANASSAS  TO  SEVEN  PINES 40 

PART  II 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862 

I    SEVEN  DAYS 49 

II     SECOND  MANASSAS .  61 

III  SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)       .     .     .     .     .     .  73 

IV  FREDERICKSBURG 92 

PART  III 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1863 

I    CHANCELLORSVILLE .  103 

II    GETTYSBURG 133 

III    GETTYSBURG        ..........  165 

PART  IV 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

I    FROM  THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES     ....  191 

II    THH  SIEGE  OF  RICHMOND 239 

III  THE  RETREAT 249 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Portrait  of  Robert  E.  Lee Frontispiece 

FACING 
PAGE 

Portrait  of  J.  J.  Bowen II 

Portrait  of  Robert  E.  Lee 13 

Portrait  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston 17 

Portrait  of  G.  P.  T.  Beauregard 27 

Portrait  of  Lee  and  His  Horse  "  Traveller "    .      .      .40 

Portrait  of  Jefferson  Davis 43 

Portrait  of  Abraham  Lincoln 45 

Portrait  of  Thomas  J.  Jackson 103 

Portrait  of  Robert  E.  Lee 133 

Portrait  of  George  G.  Meade 139 

Portrait  of  James  Longstreet 143 

Portrait  of  R.  S.  Ewell 146 

Portrait  of  John  B.  Hood 165 

Portrait  of  Carl  Schurz 179 

Portrait  of  Wade  Hampton 187 

Portrait  of  U.  S.  Grant 191 

Portrait  of  J.  E.  B.  Stuart 199 

Portrait  of  William  T.  Sherman 207 

Portrait  of  John  C.  Fremont 223 

Portrait  of  John  C.  Breckinridge 247 

Valentine's  Recumbent  Figure  of  Lee 255 


PART  I 
THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 


(FROM  A  DAGUERREOTYPE  TAKEN  IN  RICHMOND  IN  1862) 


THE  STRATEGY 
OF  ROBERT   E.   LEE 

CHAPTER  I 

BULL   RUN 

PROBABLY  no  army  that  ever  fought  a  battle  re 
ceived  so  little  credit  as  McDowell's.  Northern 
writers  called  it  "  raw  troops,"  and  European 
military  men  improved  on  this  and  dubbed  both  armies 
"  mobs,"—  Von  Moltke,  "  bush-whackers." 

According  to  the  authorities,  both  armies  were  ready 
to  run,  but  McDowell's  got  the  start. 

The  Confederate  army  comprised  many  old,  well- 
drilled  organizations, —  such  as  the  Washington  Artil 
lery,  of  New  Orleans;  the  ist  regiment,  from  Richmond, 
and  many  others, —  while  the  Federal  army  was  the  reg- 
gular  U.  S.  army  in  its  artillery, —  a  very  important 
feature, —  and  it  comprised  also  some  regular  cavalry 
and  infantry. 

Infantry,  other  than  the  regular,  was  made  up  of  the 
three-month  men,  who  were  fairly  well  trained.  It  is 
true  they  were  raw  as  far  as  actual  fighting  was  con 
cerned,  but  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  regular  army 
at  the  present  time. 

If  the  Confederate  army  was  ready  to  run,  there  was 
tno  indication  of  it  on  the  front ;  men  were  chasing  shells 

ii 


;3, ;  ;THE;  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

for  relics  and  went  at  a  double  quick,  when  the  order 
came,  to  the  fight  on  the  left. 
Beauregard  says: 

"  It  was  a  point  made  at  the  time  at  the  North  that 
just  as  the  Confederate  troops  were  about  to  break  and 
flee  the  Federal  troops  anticipated  them  by  doing  so, 
being  struck  into  this  precipitation  by  the  arrival  upon 
their  flank  of  the  Shenandoah  forces,  .  .  .  errors  that 
have  been  repeated  by  a  number  of  writers  and  by  an 
ambitious  but  superficial  French  author.  The  battle  of 
Manassas  was  like  any  other  battle,  progression  and  de 
velopment  from  the  deliberate  counter-employment  of 
the  military  resources  in  hand,  affected  by  incidents  as 
always,  but  of  a  kind  very  different  from  those  referred 
to.  My  line  of  battle,  which  twice  had  not  only  resisted 
the  enemy's  attacks,  but  had  taken  the  offensive  and 
driven  him  back  in  disorder,  was  becoming  momentarily 
stronger  from  the  arrival,  at  last,  of  the  reinforcements 
provided  for;  and  if  the  enemy  had  remained  on  the 
field  till  the  arrival  of  Ewell  and  Holmes,  they  would 
have  been  so  strongly  outflanked  that  many  who  escaped 
would  have  been  destroyed  or  captured." 

There  is  abundant  evidence  of  the  fact  that  both  armies 
fought  well. 

From  Beauregard's  report  of  the  battle : 

"  It  was  now  between  half  past  two  and  three  o'clock; 
a  scorching  sun  increased  the  oppression  of  the  troops 
exhausted  from  incessant  fighting, —  many  of  them  hav 
ing  been  engaged  since  morning. 

"  Fearing  lest  the  Federal  offensive  should  secure  too 
firm  a  grip,  and  knowing  the  fatal  result  that  might 


AS  BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  OF  ENGINEERS   IN  THE  UNITED 
STATES    ARMY 


Facing  page   13 


BULL  RUN  13 

spring  from  any  grave  infraction  of  my  line,  I  deter 
mined  to  make  another  effort  for  the  recovery  of  the  pla 
teau,  and  ordered  a  charge  of  the  entire  line  of  battle, 
including  the  reserves,  which  at  this  crisis  I  myself  led 
into  action. 

"  The  movement  was  made  in  such  keeping  and  dash 
that  the  whole  plateau  was  swept  clear  of  the  enemy, 
.  .  .  leaving  in  our  possession  the  most  of  Ricketts' 
and  Griffin's  batteries,  the  men  of  which  were  mostly 
shot  down  where  they  bravely  stood  by  their  guns." 

Bee  and  Bartow,  who  met  the  initial  attack,  were  both 
killed,  and  their  four  regiments  lost  658  men.  They 
were  driven  back  half  a  mile,  but  recovered  it  and  fought 
steadily  all  day. 

Captain  J.  B.  Fry,  assistant  adjutant  general  on  Mc 
Dowell's  staff,  says: 

"  On  the  plateau  Beauregard  says  the  disadvantage  of 
his  smooth  bore  guns  was  reduced  by  shortness  of  range. 

"  The  short  range  was  due  to  the  Federal  advance, 
and  the  several  struggles  for  the  plateau  were  at  close 
quarters  and  gallant  on  both  sides." 

No  matter  how  well  troops  fight,  they  are  sure  to  be 
beaten  if  badly  handled  by  their  officers,  and  that  was  the 
trouble  with  the  Federal  army. 

Longstreet  says: 

"  Had  a  prompt,  energetic  general  been  in  command 
when,  on  the  2Oth,  his  order  of  battle  was  settled  upon, 
the  division  under  Tyler  would  have  been  deployed  in 
front  of  Stone  Bridge  as  soon  after  nightfall  as  dark 
ness  could  veil  the  march,  and  the  divisions  under  Hunter 
and  Heintzelman,  following,  would  have  been  stretched 


14  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

along  the  lateral  roads  in  bivouac  so  as  to  be  prepared 
to  cross  Sudley's  Ford  and  put  in  a  good  day's  work 
on  the  morrow. 

"  McDowell's  army  posted  as  it  should  have  been,  a 
march  at  daylight  would  have  brought  the  column  to 
the  Henry  House  before  seven  o'clock,  dislodged  Evans, 
busied  with  Tyler's  display  at  the  bridge  without  a 
chance  to  fight,  and  brought  the  three  divisions  united 
in  gallant  style  along  the  turnpike,  with  little  burning 
of  powder.  Thus  prepared  and  organized,  the  compact 
battle  order  of  20,000  men  would  have  been  a  fearful 
array  against  Beauregard's  fragmentary  left,  and  by 
the  events  as  they  passed  would  have  assured  McDowell 
of  victory  hours  before  Kirby  Smith  and  Elzey,  of  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  arrived  upon  the  field." 

Instead  of  this  disposition  the  turning  column  had  to 
march  twelve  miles,  starting  at  midnight.  This  was  a 
pretty  trying  prelude  to  an  all  day's  fight  under  a  July 
sun. 

Captain  Fry,  McDowell's  chief  of  staff,  says : 

"  He  (McDowell)  reached  the  scene  of  the  actual  con 
flict  somewhat  earlier  than  Beauregard,  and  seeing  the 
enemy  driven  across  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch,  and 
behind  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  at  once  sent  a  swift 
courier  to  Tyler  with  orders  to  press  the  attack  at  Stone 
Bridge. 

"  Tyler  acknowledged  he  received  this  order  at 
eleven  o'clock.  It  \vas  Tyler's  division  upon  which 
McDowell  relied  for  the  decisive  fighting  of  the  day. 

"  He  knew  the  march  of  the  turning  column  would 
be  fatiguing,  and  when  by  a  sturdy  fight  it  had  cleared 
the  turnpike  for  the  advance  of  Tyler's  division,  it  had 


BULL  RUN  15 

in  fact  done  more  than  its  fair  share  of  the  work.  But 
Tyler  did  not  attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  Stone 
Bridge,  which  after  eight  o'clock  was  defended  by  only 
four  companies  of  infantry,  though  he  admitted  that  by 
the  plan  of  battle,  when  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  had 
attacked  the  enemy  in  the  vicinity  of  the  bridge,  he  was 
to  force  the  passage  of  Bull  Run  at  that  point,  and  at 
tack  the  enemy  in  flank. 

"  Soon  after  McDowell's  arrival  at  the  front  Burn- 
side  rode  up  to  him  and  said  his  brigade  had  borne  the 
battle,  that  it  was  out  of  ammunition,  and  that  he 
wanted  permission  to  withdraw,  refit,  and  fill  cartridge 
boxes.  McDowell,  in  the  excitement  of  the  occasion, 
gave  reluctant  consent,  and  the  brigade,  which  certainly 
had  done  nobly,  marched  to  the  rear,  stacked  arms,  and 
took  no  further  part  in  the  fight. 

"  The  batteries  of  Ricketts  and  Griffin,  by  their  fine 
discipline,  wonderful  daring,  and  matchless  skill,  were 
the  prime  features  in  the  fight.  The  battle  was  not  lost 
till  they  were  lost.  When  in  their  advanced  position, 
just  after  the  infantry  supports  had  been  driven  in  over 
the  slope,  a  fatal  mistake  occurred.  A  regiment  came 
out  of  the  woods  on  Griffin's  right,  and  as  he  was  in  the 
act  of  opening  upon  it  with  canister  he  was  deterred  by 
the  assurance  of  Major  Barry,  chief  of  artillery,  that 
it  was  a  regiment  sent  by  Heintzelman  to  support  the 
battery.  A  moment  more,  and  the  doubtful  regiment 
proved  its  identity  by  a  deadly  volley,  and,  as  Griffin 
states  in  his  report,  every  cannoneer  was  cut  down,  and 
a  large  number  of  horses  killed,  leaving  the  battery 
(which  was  without  support  except  in  name)  perfectly 
helpless.  The  effect  upon  Ricketts  was  equally  fatal. 
He,  desperately  wounded,  and  Ramsey,  his  lieutenant, 
killed,  lay  in  the  wreck  of  the  battery. 


16  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  After  the  arrival  of  Howard's  brigade,  McDowell, 
for  the  last  time,  pressed  up  the  slope  to  the  plateau, 
forced  back  the  Confederate  line,  and  regained  posses 
sion  of  the  Henry  and  Robinson  Houses,  and  of  the 
lost  batteries. 

"  But  there  were  no  longer  cannoneers  to  man  or 
horses  to  move  the  guns  that  had  done  so  much.  By 
the  arrival  upon  this  part  of  the  field  of  his  own  re 
serves  and  Kirby  Smith's  brigade  of  Johnston's  army, 
about  half  past  three,  Beauregard  extended  his  left  to 
outflank  McDowell's  shattered,  shortened  and  discon 
nected  lines,  and  the  Federals  left  the  field  about  half 
past  four. 

"  Until  then  they  had  •  fought  wonderfully  well  for 
raw  troops.  There  were  no  fresh  forces  on  the  field 
to  support  or  encourage  them,  and  the  men  seemed  to 
be  seized  simultaneously  by  the  conviction  that  it  was 
no  use  to  do  anything  more,  and  they  might  as  well  start 
home." 

McDowell's  defeat  was  due  to  his  faulty  disposition 
on  the  night  of  the  2Oth,  the  failure  of  Tyler  to  force 
the  crossing  at  Stone  Bridge,  and  Major  Barry's  mis 
take.  The  raw  troops  were  not  to  blame  for  any  of  these 
things.  After  the  battle  some  of  the  commands  lost 
cohesion,  and  the  men  drifted  to  Washington  where 
their  camps  were  located. 

For  this  they  may  be  censured,  but  not  for  the  real 
disaster, —  the  loss  of  the  battle.  Any  troops  would 
have  lost  it  under  the  circumstances. 


Facing   page    17 


CHAPTER  II 

WHY   THE   CONFEDERATES  DID   NOT   TAKE 
WASHINGTON 

IT  is  needless  to  say  there  was  great  rejoicing  in  Rich 
mond  over  the  victory;  but  the  city  was  already  a 
military  camp,  and  there  was  a  mingled  feeling  of 
disappointment  among  the  soldiers  who  had  not  been  in 
the  battle  for  fear  the  war  had  ended  without  glory 
for  them. 

Furloughs  were  granted  lavishly ;  the  city  was  full  of 
officers  from  the  army,  and  much  discussion  of  the  bat 
tle  ensued.  At  first  it  was  considered  a  complete  and 
decisive  victory,  and  Beauregard  was  hailed  as  the  young 
Napoleon.  It  was  not  long,  however,  before  it  dawned 
on  the  ingenious  mind  of  some  one  that  Washington 
ought  to  have  been  captured,  and  this  illusion  spread 
until  it  is  probably  the  accepted  opinion  of  the  world 
to-day. 

General  Upton,  in  his  plea  for  a  regular  army  of 
large  proportions,  says  that  Washington  was  saved  from 
capture  by  the  "  indecision  of  a  band  of  insurgents."  It 
would  be  difficult,  however,  to  establish  indecision  where 
there  was  no  diversity  of  opinion,  and  it  is  easy  to  show 
there  was  none.  Longstreet,  in  his  "  Manassas  to  Ap- 
pomattox,"  written  long  after  the  event,  appears  to  have 
caught  the  infection  also. 

He  says : 

17 


i8  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  Beauregard's  mistake  was  in  failing  to  ride  promptly 
after  his  five  o'clock  order  and  handling  his  column 
while  in  action.  As  events  actually  occurred,  he  would 
have  been  in  overwhelming  numbers  against  McDowell's 
reserve  and  supply  depot.  His  adversary,  so  taken  by 
surprise,  would  not  have  been  difficult  to  conquer. 

".  .  .  Supplies  of  subsistence,  ammunition,  and  for 
age,  passed  as  we  marched  through  the  enemy's  camp 
toward  Centerville,  seemed  ample  to  carry  the  Confeder 
ate  army  on  to  Washington.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  Through  the  abandoned  camps  of  the  Federals 
we  found  their  pots  and  kettles  over  the  fire,  with  food 
cooking;  quarters  of  beef  hanging  on  the  trees,  and 
wagons  by  the  roadside  loaded,  some  with  bread  and 
general  provisions,  others  with  ammunition.  When 
within  artillery  range  of  the  retreating  column  passing 
through  Centerville,  the  infantry  was  deployed  on  the 
side  of  the  road,  under  cover  of  the  forest,  so  as  to 
give  room  for  the  batteries  ordered  into  action  to  open, 
Bonham's  brigade  on  the  left,  the  others  on  the  right. 

"  As  the  guns  were  about  to  open  there  came  a  mes 
sage  that  the  enemy,  instead  of  being  in  precipitate  re 
treat,  was  marching  around  to  attack  the  Confederate 
right.  With  this  report  came  orders,  or  reports  of  or 
ders,  for  the  brigades  to  return  to  their  positions  behind 
the  Run.  I  denounced  the  report  as  absurd,  claimed  to 
know  a  retreat  such  as  was  before  me,  and  ordered  that 
the  batteries  open  fire,  when  Major  Whiting,  of 
General  Johnston's  staff,  rising  in  his  stirrups,  said,  '  In 
the  name  of  General  Johnston,  I  order  that  the  batteries 
shall  not  open/  I  enquired,  '  Did  General  Johnston 
send  you  to  communicate  that  order  ?  '  Whiting  replied, 
'  No;  but  I  take  the  responsibility  to  give  it.'  I  claimed 
the  privilege  of  responsibility  under  the  circumstances, 


WHY  WASHINGTON  ESCAPED  CAPTURE      19 

and  when  in  the  act  of  renewing  the  order  to  fire, 
General  Bonham  rode  to  my  side  and  asked  that  the 
batteries  should  not  open.  As  the  ranking  officer  pres 
ent,  this  settled  the  question.  By  that  time,  too,  it  was 
near  night." 

I  do  not  know  what  Longstreet  saw,  but  our  battery 
was  the  battery  attached  to  Bonham's  brigade.  We 
did  not  get  anywhere  near  Centerville,  saw  no  retreat 
ing  column,  and  no  pots  and  kettles,  provisions  nor 
wagons. 

The  infantry  was  faced  to  the  right  because  it  was 
rumored  the  enemy  was  on  that  flank;  but  the  battery 
remained  in  column  in  the  road.  After  a  wait  of  short 
duration  we  returned  to  our  position  behind  the  Run. 

But  even  if  the  attack  had  been  made,  the  probabil 
ities  are  that  it  would  have  failed,  for  Captain  Fry  says 
that  McDowell  had  at  Centerville  Miles's  division, 
Richardson's  brigade,  three  regiments  of  Runyon's  di 
vision,  and  Hunt's,  Tidball's,  Ayres',  and  Green's  regular 
batteries,  and  one  or  two  fragments  of  batteries,  making 
in  all  about  twenty  guns. 

If,  as  Longstreet  says  in  speaking  about  the  battle  on 
the  left,  "  before  the  loss  of  his  artillery  he  (McDowell) 
was  the  Samson  of  the  fight,"  it  is  tolerably  clear  that 
he  would  have  met  a  warm  reception  at  Centerville. 

Then  the  idea  of  relying  on  what  could  be  picked  up 
on  the  road  in  the  way  of  supplies  and  ammunition  is 
absurd. 

Captain  Fry  says  that  one  reason  McDowell  decided 
on  the  retreat  from  Centerville  was  that  he  was  short 
of  provisions. 

Johnston  says  in  his  report  of  the  battle : 

"  At  twenty  minutes  before  five,  when  the  retreat  of 


20   THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

the  enemy  toward  Centerville  began,  I  sent  orders  to 
Brigadier  General  Bonham  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Lay  of 
his  staff,  who  happened  to  be  with  me,  to  march  with  his 
own  and  Longstreet's  brigade  (which  were  nearest  Bull 
Run  and  the  stone  bridge)  by  the  quickest  route  to  the 
turnpike,  and  form  them  across  it  to  intercept  the  re 
treat  of  the  Federal  troops. 

"  But  he  found  so  little  appearance  of  rout  in  those 
troops  as  to  make  the  execution  of  his  instructions  seem 
impracticable,  so  the  two  brigades  returned  to  their 
camps." 

Davis  says: 

"  He  (Beauregard)  stated  that  because  of  false  alarms 
which  reached  him  he  had  ordered  the  troops  referred 
to  (Elzey's  and  Early's)  from  the  left  to  the  right  of 
our  line,  so  as  to  be  in  position  to  repel  the  reported 
movement  of  the  enemy  against  that  flank." 

So  that  instead  of  Beauregard's  riding  with  his  five- 
o'clock  order,  he  was  busy  with  his  dispositions  to  repel 
the  reported  advance  of  the  enemy  on  his  right  flank. 

Nor  was  there  any  subsequent  intention  of  advanc 
ing  on  Washington. 

General  Johnston  says : 

"  Having  left  the  field  after  ten  o'clock  and  ridden 
in  the  dark  slowly,  it  was  about  half  past  eleven  when 
I  found  the  President  and  General  Beauregard  together 
in  the  latter's  headquarters  at  Manassas.  We  three 
conversed  an  hour  or  more  without  referring  to  pursuit 
or  advance  on  Washington.  .  .  . 

"And  one  conference  he,  the  President,  had  with  me 


WHY  WASHINGTON  ESCAPED  CAPTURE     21 

that  day  (the  22d)  proved  conclusively  that  he  had  no 
thought  of  sending  an  army  against  Washington,  for  in 
it  he  offered  me  the  command  in  West  Virginia." 

Mr.  Davis  says: 

"  On  the  night  of  the  22d  I  had  a  second  conference 
with  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard.  All  the  rev 
elations  of  the  day  were  of  the  most  satisfactory  char 
acter  as  to  the  completeness  of  the  victory.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  The  generals,  like  myself,  were  all  content  with 
what  had  been  done.  I  propounded  to  them  the  enquiry 
as  to  what  it  was  practicable  to  do.  Both  generals  op 
posed  an  advance,  alleging  unpreparedness  and  the 
certainty  of  resistance,  not  only  from  troops  at  Wash 
ington,  but  from  Patterson's  army." 

Davis  concludes :  "  Thus  it  was,  and  so  far  as  I 
know,  for  the  reasons  stated  above,  that  an  advance  to 
the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  was  not  contemplated  as 
the  immediate  sequence  of  the  victory  at  Manassas." 

And  so  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  question  "  Why  the 
Confederates  did  not  take  Washington  ?  "  is  "  Because 
they  never  thought  of  it."  It  was  not  in  the  program. 
That  is  a  good  and  sufficient  reason,  as  cities  are  not 
captured  unintentionally. 

Another  reason  is  that  it  was  impregnable  to  any  force 
the  Confederates  could  bring  against  it. 

Cameron  telegraphed  to  New  York : 

"  Our  works  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  are 
impregnable,  being  well  manned  with  reinforcements. 
The  capital  is  safe." 

The  capture  of  Washington  was  not  even  discussed 
in  the  army  at  that  time,  nor  for  that  matter  at  any 
subsequent  time. 


CHAPTER  III 

BULL   RUN   IN   RICHMOND 

WHILE  Manassas,  or  Bull  Run,  was  a  Confeder 
ate  victory,  it  was  a  blessing  in  disguise  to  the 
North.  Out  of  it  came  the  quarrels  between  Davis, 
Johnston,  and  Beauregard, —  sores  that  never  healed, 
—  and  as  those  generals  were  the  popular  heroes, 
of  whom  much  was  expected  but  never  realized,  and  as 
they  were  retained  in  the  service  until  the  end  and  were 
always  balky  horses,  it  is  clear  that  the  effect  was  most 
disastrous. 

In  addition  to  the  balky  and  sometimes  insubordinate 
conduct  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard  in  the  field  they 
had  their  adherents  in  Congress,  and  these  gave  the  ad 
ministration  no  end  of  trouble.  In  fact  the  battle  of 
Bull  Run  inaugurated  a  conflict  in  Richmond  that  con 
tributed  not  a  little  to  the  downfall  of  the  Confederacy. 

The  first  manifestation  of  trouble  was  over  the  absurd 
idea  that  Washington  could  have  been  captured;  and 
as  it  was  not  captured,  somebody  blundered. 

It  surely  could  not  be  Beauregard,  the  young  Napo 
leon,  nor  Johnston  who  came,  like  Blucher,  to  his  aid; 
so  it  must  be  Davis,  who  arrived  on  the  field  just  as 
the  battle  ended,  and  in  time  to  restrain  the  impetuous 
generals. 

Mr.  Davis  says: 

"  When  the  smoke  of  battle  had  lifted  from  the  field 
of  Manassas,  and  the  rejoicing  over  the  victory  had 

22 


BULL  RUN  IN  RICHMOND  23 

spread  over  the  land  and  spent  its  exuberance,  some  who, 
like  Job's  warhorse,  '  sniffed  the  battle  from  afar/  but 
in  whom  the  likeness  there  ceased,  censoriously  asked 
why  the  fruits  of  the  victory  had  not  been  gathered  by 
the  capture  of  Washington. 

"  Then  some  indiscreet  friends  of  the  generals  com 
manding  in  that  battle,  instead  of  the  easier  task  of 
justification,  chose  the  harder  one  of  exculpation  for 
the  inferred  failure.  This  ill-advised  zeal,  combined, 
perhaps,  with  malice  against  me,  induced  the  allegation 
that  the  President  had  prevented  the  generals  from  mak 
ing  an  immediate  and  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  routed 
enemy.  This,  as  the  other  stories  had  been,  was  left 
to  the  correction  which  time,  it  was  hoped,  would  bring; 
the  sooner,  because  it  was  expected  to  be  refuted  by  the 
reports  of  the  commanding  generals  with  whom  I  had 
conferred  on  that  subject  immediately  after  the  battle. 
After  considerable  time  had  elapsed,  it  was  reported  to 
me  that  a  member  of  Congress,  who  had  served  on  that 
occasion  as  a  volunteer  aid  to  General  Beauregard,  had 
stated  in  the  House  of  Representatives  that  I  had  pre 
vented  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  after  his  defeat  at  Ma- 
nassas. 

'  This  gave  to  the  rumor  such  official  character  and 
dignity  as  seemed  to  me  to  entitle  it  to  notice  not  here 
tofore  given.  Wherefore  I  addressed  General  Johnston 
the  following  inquiry,  which,  though  restricted  to  the 
allegation,  was  of  such  a  tenor  as  left  it  to  his  option  to 
state  all  the  facts  connected  with  the  slander,  if  he  should 
choose  to  do  me  that  justice,  or  should  see  the  public 
interest  involved  in  the  correction,  which,  as  stated  in 
my  letter  to  him,  was  that  which  gave  it,  in  my  estima 
tion,  its  claim  to  consideration,  and  had  caused  me  to 
address  him  on  the  subject: 


24  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  '  RICHMOND,  VA.,  NOVEMBER  3,  1861. 
" '  GENERAL  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

" '  Commanding  Department  of  the  Potomac. 

"  '  SIR  :  Reports  have  been  and  are  being  widely  cir 
culated  that  I  prevented  General  Beauregard  from 
pursuing  the  enemy  after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and 
had  subsequently  restrained  him  from  advancing  upon 
Washington  city. 

" '  Though  such  statements  may  have  been  made 
merely  for  my  injury,  and  in  that  view  might  be  post 
poned  to  a  more  convenient  season,  they  have  served  to 
create  distrust,  to  excite  disappointment,  and  must  embar 
rass  the  administration  in  its  further  efforts  to  reinforce 
the  armies  of  the  Potomac,  and  generally  to  provide  for 
the  public  defense.  For  these  public  considerations  I 
call  upon  you,  as  the  commanding  general,  and  as  a 
party  to  all  the  conferences  held  by  me  on  July  2ist  and 
22d,  to  say  whether  I  obstructed  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
after  the  victory  of  Manassas,  or  have  ever  objected  to 
an  advance  or  other  active  operations  which  it  was 
feasible  for  the  army  to  undertake. 
"  '  Very  respectfully  yours,  6-c., 

" '  JEFFERSON  DAVIS/ 

"  '  HEADQUARTERS,  CENTERVILLE,  , 
"  '  November  10,  1861. 
"  '  To  His  EXCELLENCY, 

" '  The  President 

"  *  SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  receive  your  letter  of  the 
3d  instant,  in  which  you  call  upon  me  as  the  commanding 
general,  and  as  a  party  to  all  the  conferences  held  by 
you  on  the  2ist  and  22d  of  July,  to  say  whether  you  ob 
structed  the  pursuit  after  the  victory  of  Manassas,  or 
have  ever  objected  to  an  advance  or  other  active  opera- 


BULL  RUN  IN  RICHMOND  25 

tions  which  it  was  feasible  for  the  army  to  undertake. 

" '  To  the  first  question  I  reply,  No ;  the  pursuit  was 
"  obstructed  "  by  the  enemy's  troops  at  Centerville,  as  I 
have  stated  in  my  official  report.  In  that  report  I  have 
also  said  why  no  advance  was  made  upon  the  enemy's  cap 
ital,  as  follows:  The  apparent  freshness  of  the  United 
States  troops  at  Centerville,  which  checked  our  pursuit ; 
the  strong  forces  occupying  the  works  near  Georgetown, 
Arlington,  and  Alexandria;  the  certainty,  too,  that 
General  Patterson,  if  needed,  would  reach  Washington 
with  his  army  of  more  than  thirty  thousand  men  sooner 
than  we  could;  and  the  condition  and  inadequate  means 
of  the  army  in  ammunition,  provisions,  and  transporta 
tion  prevented  any  serious  thought  of  advance  upon  the 
capital. 

" '  To  the  second  inquiry  I  reply  that  it  has  never 
been  feasible  for  the  army  to  advance  farther  than  it 
has  done  to  the  line  of  Fairfax  C.  H.,  with  its  advanced 
posts  at  Munson's  and  Mason's  Hills.  After  a  con 
ference  at  Fairfax  C.  H.  with  the  three  senior  general 
officers  you  announced  it  to  be  impracticable  to  give  the 
army  the  strength  which  those  officers  considered  neces 
sary  to  enable  it  to  assume  the  offensive.  Upon  which 
I  drew  it  back  to  its  present  position. 

"  '  Most  respectfully, 

"  *  Your  obt.  svt, 

"  '  J.  E.  JOHNSTON.'  ' 

It  will  be  seen  that  Johnston  admits  that  Davis  did 
not  hold  him  back  from  Washington  immediately  after 
Bull  Run,  but  that  several  months  afterward  he  refused 
to  give  him  the  men  to  capture  that  city, —  and  hence 
it  was  not  captured. 

Davis  wrote  to  Beauregard: 


26     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  OCTOBER  30,  1861. 
"  GENERAL  BEAUREGARD,  Manassas,  Va. 

"  SIR  :  Yesterday  my  attention  was  called  to  various 
newspaper  publications,  purporting  to  have  been  sent 
from  Manassas,  and  to  be  a  synopsis  of  your  report  of 
the  battle  of  July  2ist  last,  in  which  it  is  represented  that 
you  have  been  overruled  by  me  in  your  plan  for  a  battle 
with  the  enemy,  south  of  the  Potomac,  for  the  capture 
of  Baltimore  and  Washington,  and  the  liberation  of 
Maryland.  I  inquired  for  your  long  expected  report,  and 
to-day  it  has  been  submitted  for  my  inspection. 

"  With  much  surprise  I  find  that  the  newspaper 
statements  were  sustained  by  the  text  of  the  report.  I 
was  surprised,  because  if  we  differ  in  opinion  as  to  the 
measures  and  purposes  of  contemplated  campaigns,  such 
facts  could  have  no  proper  place  in  the  report  of  a  battle ; 
further,  because  it  seemed  to  be  an  attempt  to  exalt 
yourself  at  my  expense;  and,  especially,  because  no  such 
plan  as  that  described  was  submitted  to  me.  .  .  . 

"  Very  respectfully  yours, 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 


GENERAL  G.  P.  T.  BEAUREGARD 


Facing  page  27 


B 


CHAPTER  IV 
BEAUREGARD'S  PLAN 

EAUREGARD'S  report  was : 


"  GEN'L  S.  COOPER, 

"  Adjutant  and  Inspector  General,  Richmond. 

"...  I  proposed  that  General  Johnston  should  unite, 
as  soon  as  possible,  the  bulk  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenan- 
doah  with  that  of  the  Potomac,  then  under  my  com 
mand,  leaving  only  sufficient  force  to  garrison  his  strong 
works  at  Winchester,  and  to  guard  the  five  defensive 
passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  thus  hold  Patterson  in 
check.  At  the  same  time  General  Holmes  was  to 
march  hither  with  all  his  command  not  essential  for 
the  defense  of  the  position  at  Acquia  Creek.  These 
junctions  having  been  made  at  Manassas,  an  immediate 
impetuous  attack  of  our  combined  armies  upon  Mc 
Dowell  was  to  follow,  as  soon  as  he  approached  my 
advanced  position  in  and  around  Fairfax  C.  H.,  with 
the  inevitable  result,  as  I  submitted,  of  his  complete 
defeat  and  the  destruction  and  capture  of  his  army. 
This  accomplished,  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah, 
under  General  Johnston,  increased  writh  a  part  of  my 
forces  and  rejoined,  as  he  returned,  by  the  detachments 
left  to  hold  the  mountain  passes,  was  to  march  back 
rapidly  into  the  Valley,  fall  upon  and  crush  Patterson 
with  a  superior  force,  wheresoever  he  might  be  found. 

"  This,  I  confidently  intimated,  could  be  done  within 

27 


28  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

fifteen  days  after  General  Johnston  should  march  from 
Winchester  to  Manassas.  Meanwhile  I  was  to  occupy 
the  enemy's  works  on  this  side  of  the  Potomac,  if, 
as  I  anticipated,  he  had  been  so  routed  as  to  enable 
me  to  enter  them  with  him;  or  if  not,  to  retire  again 
for  a  time  within  the  line  of  Bull  Run  with  my  main 
force. 

"  Patterson  having  been  virtually  destroyed,  then 
General  Johnston  would  reinforce  General  Garnett  suf 
ficiently  to  make  him  superior  to  General  McClellan, 
his  opponent,  and  able  to  defeat  that  officer. 

"  This  done,  General  Garnett  was  to  form  an  im 
mediate  junction  with  General  Johnston,  who  was  forth 
with  to  cross  the  Potomac  into  Maryland  with  his  whole 
force,  rouse  the  people  as  he  advanced  to  the  recovery 
of  their  political  rights  and  the  defense  of  their  homes 
and  families  from  an  offensive  invader,  and  then 
march  to  the  investment  of  Washington,  in  the  rear, 
while  I  resumed  the  offensive  in  front. 

"  This  plan  of  operation,  you  are  aware,  was  not  ac 
ceptable  at  the  time,  from  considerations  which  appeared 
so  weighty  as  more  than  to  counterbalance  the  pro 
posed  advantages." 

He  says  nothing  in  his  report  of  being  restrained 
from  capturing  Washington  as  an  immediate  sequence 
of  the  battle  of  Manassas,  but  wanted  everybody  to 
know  that  he  could  have  captured  it  before  the  battle, 
and  that,  as  Davis  failed  to  avail  himself  of  his  plan, 
Washington  and  Baltimore  were  not  captured;  and 
Maryland  was  not  liberated. 

It  will  be  seen  that  both  generals  magnanimously  ad 
mit  that  Davis  did  not  restrain  them  from  capturing 
Washington  immediately  after  the  battle;  but  they  both 


BEAUREGARD'S  PLAN  29 

would  have  captured  it,  one  before  and  the  other  after 
the  battle,  if  Davis  had  in  one  case  approved  of  an  ab 
surd  plan,  and  in  the  other  provided  troops  that  he  could 
not  arm. 

Beauregard  refused  to  make  any  change  in  his  re 
port,  so  Congress  did  it, —  that  is,  left  out  the  "  plan." 

Beauregard's  plan  may  appear  to  the  military  critics 
involved  and  complicated,  but  with  the  cooperation  of 
the  enemy  it  would  have  been  perfectly  practical.  Pat 
terson  would  have  obligingly  allowed  Johnston  to  de 
tach  a  part  of  his  11,000  men  to  hold  Winchester  and 
the  five  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  then,  with  the 
remainder  of  his  army,  join  Beauregard  at  Manassas. 
He  would  not  have  molested  the  little  detachments  at 
Winchester  and  the  mountain  passes. 

The  "  immediate  and  impetuous  "  attack  on  McDowell 
would  certainly  not  have  been  objectionable  to  that  of 
ficer,  and  no  doubt  he  would  have  delighted  in  the  "  com 
plete  defeat  and  the  destruction  and  capture  of  his 
army." 

Then  General  Johnston  would  have  been  received  on 
his  return  to  the  Valley  with  open  arms  by  his  old  friend 
Patterson,  who  would  have  been  "  crushed  "  on  schedule 
time.  Being  "virtually  destroyed,"  he  would  not  have 
objected  —  in  fact  could  not  —  to  the  reinforcement  of 
Garnett  and  the  destruction  of  McClellan,  though  at  that 
time  Garnett  was  in  rapid  retreat  before  McClellan, 
and  was  a  few  days  later  killed  and  his  small  force  dis 
persed.  McClellan  beaten  and  disposed  of,  Garnett's 
junction  with  Johnston  would  have  been  easy,  and  the 
crossing  of  the  Potomac  by  the  combined  armies,  a 
pleasant  excursion. 

Once  in  Maryland  the  hunger  for  political  rights 
would  have  been  different  from  what  it  was  when  we 


3o   THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

tried  it  in  1862  and  1863,  and  the  brave  Marylanders, 
to  oblige  Beauregard,  would  have  sung  "  Maryland, 
My  Maryland,"  while  Johnston  invested  Washington  in 
rear,  and  Beauregard  in  front. 

Thus  the  Federal  armies  would  have  been  disposed 
of,  Washington  and  Baltimore  captured,  Maryland 
liberated,  and  Beauregard  another  and  greater  Napoleon. 

Elaborate  and  complicated  plans  on  schedule  time 
never  had  any  terrors  for  Beauregard. 

Before  the  battle  of  Manassas  he  suggested  that  John 
ston  should  leave  the  railroad  thirty-five  miles  from  Ma 
nassas,  and  fall  on  McDowell's  rear,  while  he,  on  hearing 
his  guns,  would  attack  in  front. 

The  result  would  have  been  as  Johnston  says : 

"  McDowell  would  have  disposed  of  me  in  two  hours 
and  could  then  have  turned  his  attention  to  Beauregard, 
who  would  have  been  coming  up." 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    QUARREL   ABOUT   JOHNSTON'S   RANK 

THE  armies  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard  were  com 
bined  after  the  battle,  and  Johnston  was  in  com 
mand,  but  things  did  not  run  smoothly  between  the 
generals,  nor  between  them  and  the  Richmond  author 
ities.  Only  three  days  after  the  battle  Johnston  wrote 
to  the  War  Department : 

"  Lieutenant  Colonel  Maury  reported  to  me  this 
morning  as  assistant  adjutant  general,  being  assigned 
to  that  place  by  General  Lee.  I  had  already  selected 
Major  Rhett  .  .  .  and  can  admit  the  power  of  no  of 
ficer  of  the  army  to  annul  my  order  on  the  subject,  nor 
can  I  admit  the  claim  of  any  officer  to  the  command 
of  the  forces,  being  myself  the  ranking  general  of  the 
Confederate  army." 

Davis  indorsed  this  letter  "  Insubordinate,"   and  the 
quarrel  over  Johnston's  rank  ensued. 
In  one  of  his  lengthy  letters  he  says : 

"The  effect  of  the  course  pursued  is  this:  It  trans 
fers  me  from  the  position  of  first  in  rank  to  that  of 
fourth.  ...  It  is  plain  that  this  is  a  blow  aimed  at 
me  alone.  ...  It  seeks  to  tarnish  my  fame,  as  a  soldier 
and  as  a  man,  earned  by  more  than  thirty  years  of  labor 
ious  and  perilous  service.  I  had  but  this,  the  scars  of 

31 


32  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

many  wounds  all  honestly  taken  in  my  front  and  in 
the  front  of  battle,  and  my  father's  Revolutionary  sword. 
It  was  delivered  to  me  from  his  venerable  hand,  without 
a  stain  of  dishonor.  The  blade  is  still  unblemished/' 
etc.,  etc. 

Davis  replied: 

"  I  have  just  received  and  read  your  letter  of  the 
1 2th  inst.  The  language  is,  as  you  say,  unusual,  its 
arguments  and  statements  utterly  one-sided,  and  its  in 
sinuations  as  unfounded  as  they  are  unbecoming." 

Beauregard  gave  almost  as  much  trouble. 

Differences  led,  as  Mrs.  Davis  says  in  her  "  Memoirs," 
"  to  an  estrangement  between  Beauregard  and  the 
authorities  at  Richmond,  which  apparently  widened  as 
the  war  progressed." 

Both  generals  were  spoiled  by  the  battle. 

The  administration  was  already  unpopular.  Mr, 
Hunter,  of  Virginia,  quit  the  cabinet  for  fear,  his 
enemies  said,  that  identification  with  the  administration 
might  jeopardize  his  chances  for  the  next  presidential 
term. 

Beauregard  loomed  up  also  as  presidential  "  timber." 


B 


CHAPTER  VI 
"WITHIN  HEARING  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  GUNS" 

EAUREGARD  wrote  to  the  editor  of  the  Richmond 
Whig: 


"  CENTERVILLE,  VA., 
("  Within  hearing  of  the  enemy's  guns), 

"  November  3,   1861. 

"  To  THE  EDITOR  :  My  attention  has  been  called  to 
an  unfortunate  controversy  now  going  on  relative  to 
the  publication  of  a  synopsis  of  my  report  of  the  battle 
of  Manassas.  None  can  regret  more  than  I  do  this 
publication,  which  was  made  without  my  knowledge  or 
authority.  The  President  is  the  sole  judge  of  when  and 
what  parts  of  the  reports  of  a  commanding  officer 
should  be  made  public.  I,  individually,  do  not  object 
to  delaying  its  publication  as  long  as  the  War  Depart 
ment  should  think  it  necessary  or  proper  for  the  success 
of  our  cause.  Meanwhile,  I  entreat  my  friends  not 
to  trouble  themselves  about  refuting  the  slanders  and 
calumnies  aimed  at  me.  Alcibiades  on  a  certain  occasion 
resorted  to  a  singular  method  to  occupy  the  minds  of 
his  traducers;  let,  then,  that  synopsis  answer  the  same 
purpose  for  me  in  this  instance. 

"If  certain  minds  cannot  understand  the  difference 
between  patriotism,  the  highest  civic  virtue,  and  office 
seeking,  the  lowest  civic  occupation,  I  pity  them  from 
the  bottom  of  my  heart.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  I  prefer 

33 


34  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

the  respect  and  esteem  of  my  countrymen  to  the  ad 
miration  and  envy  of  the  world.  I  hope  for  the  sake 
of  our  cause  and  country  to  be  able,  with  the  assistance 
of  a  kind  Providence,  to  answer  my  calumniators  with 
new  victories  over  our  natural  enemies ;  but  I  have  noth 
ing  to  ask  of  the  country,  the  Government,  nor  my 
friends,  except  to  afford  me  all  the  aid  they  can  in  the 
great  struggle  we  are  now  engaged  upon. 

"  I  am  not  and  never  expect  to  be  a  candidate  for 
any  civic  office  in  the  gift  of  the  people  or  the  Executive. 
The  acme  of  my  ambition  is,  after  having  cast  my  mite 
in  the  defense  of  our  sacred  cause,  and  assisted  to  the 
best  of  my  ability  in  securing  our  rights  and  independence 
as  a  nation,  to  retire  to  private  life  (my  means  permit 
ting),  never  again  to  leave  my  home  unless  to  fight 
anew  the  battles  of  my  country. 
"  Respectfully 

'  Your  most  obedient  servant, 
"G.  T.  BEAUREGARD." 

:e  Within  hearing  of  the  enemy's  guns "  is  a  good 
second  to  Pope's  "  Headquarters  in  the  saddle." 

Mrs.  Davis  says: 

"  Now  for  the  first  time  there  appeared  to  be  an  or 
ganized  party  in  opposition  to  the  administration. 

"  This  might  have  been  weakened  by  daily  social  inter 
course  and,  habituated  as  we  were  to  giving  numerous 
entertainments  of  an  official  character,  we  should  gladly 
have  kept  up  the  custom ;  but  during  every  entertainment, 
without  exception,  either  the  death  of  a  relation  was 
announced  to  a  guest,  or  a  disaster  to  the  Confederacy 
was  telegraphed  to  the  President.  He  was  a  nervous 


NEAR  THE  ENEMY  35 

dyspeptic  by  habit.  ...  He  said  he  could  do  either  one 
duty  or  the  other,  give  entertainments  or  administer  the 
Government,  and  he  fancied  he  was  expected  to  per 
form  the  latter  service  in  preference!  And  so  we 
ceased  to  entertain  except  at  formal  receptions,  or 
informal  dinners  and  breakfasts  given  to  as  many  as 
Mr.  Davis's  health  permitted  us  to  invite.  In  the  even 
ing  he  was  too  exhausted  to  receive  visitors. 

"  The  Examiner  sent  forth  a  wail  of  regret  over  the 
parsimony  of  the  administration.  It  touched  feelingly 
upon  the  deprivation  of  the  young  people  of  Richmond 
in  not  being  received  in  the  evening,  the  assumption  of 
'  superior  dignity  of  the  satraps,'  etc.,  etc. 

"  This  became  a  fierce  growl  as  it  contemplated  the 
awful  contingency  of  the  '  President's  getting  rich  on 
his  savings/.  .  .  So,  little  by  little,  Congress  became 
alienated,  or  at  least  a  large  portion  of  them,  with  a  few 
of  the  military  men. 

"  The  President  let  the  conviction  gnaw  at  his  vitals 
in  silence.  He  used  to  say  with  a  sigh :  '  If  we  suc 
ceed,  we  shall  hear  nothing  of  the  malcontents;  if  we 
do  not,  then  I  shall  be  held  accountable  by  the  majority 
of  friends  as  well  as  of  foes.  I  will  do  my  best,  and 
God  will  give  me  strength  to  bear  whatever  comes  to 


me." 


An  historian,  speaking  of  Davis,  says: 

"  His  temperament  was  obstinate  and  domineering. 

"He  soon  made  all  branches  of  the  Government 
subservient  to  his  will,  although  there  were  both  a 
Congress  and  a  Supreme  Court.  He  was  the  State. 

"  And  this  unfortunate  disposition  alienated  from  him 
some  of  the  ablest  men  of  the  South,  men  who  were 


36  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

ardent  supporters  of  the  independence  of  their  section, 
and  whose  self-sacrificing  spirit  could  not  be  challenged." 

The  general  impression  that  Davis  was  to  blame  for 
the  alienation  of  some  of  the  ablest  men,  including  Beau- 
regard  and  Johnston,  and  that  he  was  "  domineering 
and  obstinate,"  has  no  foundation  in  fact. 

To  the  contrary,  he  was  most  considerate  of  the  feel 
ings  of  those  with  whom  he  was  associated  in  the  Govern 
ment,  and  with  the  generals  in  the  field,  as  the  corre 
spondence  between  them  abundantly  demonstrates. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   RELATIONS   BETWEEN   DAVIS  AND   LEE 

THE  relations  between  Davis  and  Lee  were  of  the 
most  intimate  and  friendly  character  throughout 
the  war,  a  fact  no  doubt  due  to  the  difference  between 
the  "  able  men  alienated  "  and  Lee,  who  remained  loyal 
to  Davis  even  after  the  absurd  act  of  Congress,  passed 
after  the  war  had  practically  ended,  empowering  Lee 
to  ignore  Davis  and  resurrect  the  Confederacy. 

After  the  war  Davis  wrote  to  the  War  Department 
at  Washington  for  some  papers,  and  the  officer  who 
forwarded  them  wrote : 

"  The  official  records  when  published  will  not  add  to, 
but  greatly  detract  from,  General  Johnston's  reputation. 
I  can  hardly  conceive  how  you  could  so  long  have  borne 
with  the  snarly  tone  of  his  letters,  which  he  wrote  at 
all  times,  and  on  all  pretexts." 

Davis  was  not  a  tactful  man  like  Lincoln,  and  there 
fore  could  not  handle  the  opposition  in  the  same  masterly 
manner. 

That  he  was  conscious  of  this  early  in  the  war  is 
shown  by  the  following  extract  from  one  of  his  letters 
of  the  i6th  of  May,  1862,  to  Mrs.  Davis: 

"...  I  have  no  political  wisH  beyond  the  success  of 

37 


38  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

our  cause,  no  personal  desire  but  to  be  relieved  from 
further  connection  with  office." 

He  was  an  idealist,  while  Lincoln  was  the  embodi 
ment  of  common  sense. 

Dr.  Craven,  post  surgeon  at  Fortress  Monroe,  says 
in  his  diary: 

"  No.  8  ...  Mr.  Davis  is  remarkable  for  the  kind 
liness  of  his  nature  and  fidelity  to  friends.  Of  none 
of  God's  creations  does  he  seem  to  speak  unkindly,  and 
the  same  fault  found  with  Mr.  Lincoln, —  unwillingness 
to  sanction  the  military  severities  essential  to  maintain 
discipline, —  is  the  fault  I  have  heard  most  strongly  urged 
against  Mr.  Davis.  .  .  . 

"  There  were  moments,  while  speaking  on  religious 
subjects,  in  which  Mr.  Davis  impressed  me  more  than 
any  professor  of  Christianity  I  ever  heard.  .  .  ." 

General  Morris  Schaff,  in  the  Atlantic,  April,  1908, 
says: 

"  There  must  have  been  a  great  personal  charm  in 
Jefferson  Davis  notwithstanding  his  rather  austerely 
courtly  address;  and  it  has  occurred  to  me  that  in  it, 
next  to  the  almost  irresistible  influence  of  marriage  ties, 
may  be  found  the  explanation  of  the  fact  that  a  number 
of  Northern  men,  his  personal  friends,  like  Huse  of 
Massachusetts,  Cooper  of  New  York,  Ives  of  Con 
necticut,  Gorges  and  Collins  of  Pennsylvania,  broke  the 
natural  bonds  of  home  and  blood  and  fought  for  the 
Confederacy.  A  Southern  friend  who  visited  him  at 
Beauvoir  a  few  years  before  he  died  referred  to  this 
rare  trait  of  his  nature,  and  went  on  to  describe  his 


DAVIS  AND  LEE  39 

home,  shaded  by  pines  and  live  oaks,  with  their  drapery 
of  swaying  moss,  and  he  told  me  of  the  way  his  broad 
porch  overlooked  the  still  and  peaceful  waters  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  I  wonder  if,  as  his  eye  rested  out  on 
that  stretch  of  sea  where  now  and  then  a  solitary  pelican 
winged  heavily  into  view,  he  thought  of  his  cadet  days 
on  the  banks  of  the  Hudson  and  contrasted  their  peace 
•with  the  dead  hopes  of  his  old  age.  He  was  a  great 
man.  ." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

MANASSAS  TO    SEVEN   PINES 

COLONEL  MOSBY,  in  his  "  Stuart's  Cavalry  in  the 
Gettysburg  Campaign/'  says: 

"  I  dined  with  General  Lee  at  his  headquarters,  near 
Petersburg,  about  six  weeks  before  the  surrender.  He 
told  me  then  that  he  had  been  opposed  to  General 
Johnston's  withdrawing  to  the  Peninsula,  and  had  writ 
ten  to  him  while  he  was  on  the  Rapidan,  advising  him 
to  move  back  toward  the  Potomac.  He  thought  that 
if  he  had  done  this,  McClellan  would  have  been  recalled 
to  the  defense  of  Washington." 

Thus  early  in  the  game  did  Lee  realize  that  the  only 
hope  of  Confederate  success  lay  in  keeping  the  army  out 
of  the  last  ditch,  and  that  the  only  way  in  which  that 
could  be  done  was  to  threaten  Washington. 

But  Johnston  did  not  heed  Lee's  advice. 

His  usual  mania  for  retreat  had  seized  him,  though 
McClellan  was  hibernating,  torpid,  and  had  no  thought 
of  molesting  him. 

Davis  became  alarmed  at  the  loss  of  guns  and  sub 
sistence  stores  in  case  of  a  hasty  retreat. 

"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  February  28,  1862. 
"GENERAL  J.   E.  JOHNSTON:  .  .  .  The  heavy  guns 
at  Manassas  and  Evansport,  needed  elsewhere,  and  re 
ported  to  be  useless  in  their  present  position,   would 

40 


MANASSAS  TO  SEVEN  PINES  41 

necessarily  be  abandoned  in  a  hasty  retreat.     I  regret 
that  you  find  it  impossible  to  move  them. 

"  The  subsistence  stores  should,  when  removed,  be 
placed  in  position  to  answer  your  future  wants. 

"...  I  need  not  urge  on  your  consideration  the  value 
to  our  country  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war ;  you  know 
the  difficulty  with  which  we  have  obtained  our  small  sup 
ply;  that  to  furnish  heavy  artillery  to  advanced  posts 
we  have  exhausted  the  supplies  here  which  were  designed 
for  the  armament  of  the  city  defenses.  Whatever  can 
be,  should  be  done  to  avoid  the  loss  of  these  guns. 

".  .  .  Recent  disasters  have  depressed  the  weak,  and 
are  depriving  us  of  the  aid  of  the  wavering.  Traitors 
show  the  tendencies  heretofore  concealed,  and  the  selfish 
grow  clamorous  for  local  and  personal  interests.  At 
such  an  hour  the  wisdom  of  the  trained  and  the  steadi 
ness  of  the  brave  possess  a  double  value.  The  military 
paradox  that  impossibilities  must  be  rendered  possible 
had  never  better  occasion  for  its  application.  .  .  . 
"  Very  truly  and  respectfully  yours, 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

He  writes  again  on  the  6th  urging  him  to  save  the 
ordnance  stores,  etc. 

Johnston  began  to  extricate  the  troops  from  winter 
quarters  on  the  7th,  and  after  much  confusion  got  them 
on  the  retreat  on  the  9th. 

On  the  loth  of  March,  Davis,  unadvised  of  Johnston's 
retreat,  telegraphed  to  him: 

"  Further  assurance  given  me  this  day  that  you  shall 
be  promptly  reinforced,  so  as  to  enable  you  to  maintain 
your  position  and  resume  first  policy  when  the  roads 
will  permit." 

The  first  policy  was  to  be  aggressive. 


42  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Davis  and  McClellan  thought  the  roads  were  not 
good  enough  for  an  advance,  but  Johnston  thought  they 
would  do  very  well  for  a  retreat. 

Davis  received  no  official  notice  of  the  retreat  until 
the  i 5th. 

He  writes  to  Johnston  under  that  date : 

".  .  .  It  is  true  I  have  had  many  and  alarming  re 
ports  of  great  destruction  of  ammunition,  camp  equipage, 
and  provisions,  indicating  precipitate  retreat ;  but  having 
heard  of  no  cause  for  such  a  sudden  movement,  I  was 
at  a  loss  to  believe  it." 

General  Early,  speaking  of  the  needless  loss  due  to 
a  hurried  and  foolish  retreat,  says : 

"  A  very  large  amount  of  stores  and  provisions  had 
been  abandoned  for  want  of  transportation,  and  among 
the  stores  was  a  very  large  quantity  of  clothing,  blankets, 
etc.,  which  had  been  provided  by  the  States  south  of 
Virginia  for  their  own  troops.  .  .  . 

"  The  loss  of  stores  at  this  point,  and  at  White  Plains, 
on  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad,  where  a  large  amount 
of  meat  had  been  salted  and  stored,  was  a  very  serious 
one  to  us.  .  .  ." 

Johnston  halted  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock  in  a  position  of  great  strength. 

Early  in  April  McClellan  and  his  army  of  about  100,- 
ooo  men  landed  on  the  lower  peninsula.  Johnston 
moved  down  to  Yorktown  and  the  line  of  the  Warwick 
river  to  opposite  him.  But,  as  usual,  he  promptly  advised 
a  retreat. 


Facing    page    43 


MANASSAS  TO  SEVEN  PINES  43 

"  RICHMOND,  VA.,  MAY  i,  1862. 
"  GENERAL  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

"  Yorktown,  Va. 

"  Accepting  your  conclusion  that  you  must  soon  re 
tire,  arrangements  are  commenced  for  the  abandonment 
of  the  Navy  Yard,  and  the  removal  of  public  property 
both  from  Norfolk  and  this  Peninsula. 

"  Your  announcement  to-day  that  you  would  with 
draw  to-morrow  night  takes  us  by  surprise,  and  must 
involve  enormous  losses,  including  unfinished  gun 
boats.  Will  the  safety  of  your  army  allow  more  time? 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

But  Johnston  did  not  value  gunboats  as  McClellan 
did,  and  withdrew  his  army  from  the  lines  of  the  War 
wick  river  on  the  night  of  the  3d. 

He  checked  McClellan's  advance  at  Williamsburg; 
then  fell  back  on  Richmond. 

Lee,  who  was  military  adviser  to  the  President,  wrote 
to  Jackson,  who  was  in  command  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley : 

"  I  cannot  pretend  at  this  distance  to  direct  operations 
depending  on  circumstances  unknown  to  me,  and  re 
quiring  the  exercise  of  direction  and  judgment  as  to 
time  and  execution." 

Jackson  replied: 

"  Now,  it  appears  to  me,  is  the  golden  opportunity 
for  striking  a  blow.  Until  I  hear  from  you  I  will  watch 
an  opportunity  for  attacking  one  exposed  point." 

Lee  could  not  furnish  the  reinforcements  that  Jack 
son  intimated  he  would  like,  but  he  gave  him  a  free  hand 
in  the  Valley. 


44  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

On  the  8th  of  May  Jackson  defeated  Milroy  and 
Schenk  at  McDowell. 

On  the  1 7th  of  May  Lincoln  ordered  McDowell  at 
Fredericksburg  to  march  to  McClellan,  and  ordered 
McClellan  to  extend  his  right  accordingly.  On  the  23d 
of  May  he  visited  McDowell  to  perfect  arrangements  for 
this  march. 

That  same  day,  the  23d,  Jackson  defeated  Banks  at 
Front  Royal. 

The  next  day,  the  24th,  Lincoln  countermanded  his 
order  for  McDowell's  march,  and  ordered  him  to  send 
20,000  men  to  capture  Jackson. 

On  Sunday,  the  25th,  at  daybreak  Jackson  routed 
Banks  at  Winchester,  and  chased  him  across  the  Poto 
mac. 

Banks  wrote : 

"  There  never  were  more  grateful  hearts  in  the  same 
number  of  men  than  when  midday  of  the  26th  we  stood 
on  the  opposite  shore." 

Lincoln  and  Stanton  were  now  dreadfully  alarmed  for 
the  safety  of  Washington. 

Stanton  telegraphed  to  the  governors  of  the  States: 

"  Intelligence  from  various  quarters  leaves  no  doubt 
that  the  enemy  in  great  force  are  marching  on  Washing 
ton.  You  will  please  organize  and  forward  immediately 
all  the  militia  and  volunteer  force  in  your  State." 

Lincoln   seized   the    railroad;    even   the    New    York 
Seventh  was  brought  out. 
He  dispatched  to  McClellan : 

"  I  think  the  time  is  near  when  you  must  either  attack 


^jjj^ 


MANASSAS  TO  SEVEN  PINES  45 

Richmond,  or  give  up  the  job  and  come  to  the  defense 
of  Washington." 

Stanton  wrote: 

"  Our  condition  is  one  of  considerable  danger,  as  we 
are  stripped  to  supply  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  now 
have  the  enemy  here." 

So  that  Jackson,  with  17,000  men,  gave  Washington 
its  first  scare  and  prevented  30,000  men  in  the  Valley, 
and  40,000  at  Fredericksburg,  from  reinforcing  McClel- 
lan. 

Mr.  Davis  says: 

"  Seeing  no  preparation  for  keeping  the  enemy  at  a 
distance,  and  kept  in  ignorance  of  any  plan  for  such 
purpose,  I  sent  for  General  R.  E.  Lee,  then  at  Richmond 
in  general  charge  of  army  operations,  and  told  him  why 
and  how  I  was  dissatisfied  with  the  condition  of  affairs." 

Lee  called  on  Johnston,  and  said  Johnston  proposed 
to  attack  McClellan  on  the  next  Thursday;  but  he  did 
not.  On  the  3ist  of  May,  Johnston  did  attack.  As 
suming  that  high  water  in  the  Chickahominy  would  wash 
McClellan's  bridges  away  and  in  no  way  interfere  with 
the  movements  of  his  own  army,  he  attacked  the  left  of 
McClellan's  army  that  was  on  the  Richmond  side  of  the 
swamp. 

The  result  was  exactly  the  reverse  of  his  expectations. 
McClellan's  bridges  were  not  washed  away,  and  here  is 
what  General  Rhodes  says  of  his  advance  over  one  of 
the  creeks  he  had  to  cross : 


46  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  The  progress  of  the  brigade  was  delayed  by  the 
washing  away  of  the  bridges,  which  forced  the  men  to 
wade  in  water  waist  deep,  and  a  large  number  were 
entirely  submerged.  .  .  . 

"  The  ground  was  covered  with  thick  undergrowth, 
and  the  soil  very  marshy.  It  was  with  great  difficulty 
that  either  horses  or  men  could  get  over  it,  guided  as 
they  were  only  by  the  firing  in  front.  Only  five  com 
panies  of  the  5th  Alabama  emerged  from  the  woods 
under  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry." 

Johnston  had  some  success,  captured  some  guns  and 
prisoners,  but  with  a  loss  of  7000  of  the  best  soldiers 
the  Confederacy  ever  had. 

The  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  or  Seven  Pines,  was  a  mis 
take  in  conception  and  a  botch  in  execution.  The  enemy 
was  comfortably  entrenched,  while  our  men  had  to 
flounder  through  swamps  and  tangled  underbrush. 

Davis  was  as  helpless  as  a  child.  On  the  3d  of  June 
lie  wrote  to  Mrs.  Davis: 

"  If  the  Mississippi  troops  lying  in  camp  when  not  re 
treating  under  Beauregard  were  at  home,  they  would 
probably  keep  a  section  of  the  river  free  for  our  use, 
and  closed  against  Yankee  gunboats. 

"  It  is  hard  to  see  incompetency  losing  opportunity, 
and  wasting  hard  gotten  means,  but  harder  still  to  bear 
is  the  knowledge  that  there  is  no  available  remedy." 

The  West  Point  fetish  was  strong  in  the  army. 


PART  II 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862 


CHAPTER  I 

SEVEN   DAYS 

ON  June  i,  1862,  Lee  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  army,  Johnston  having  been  wounded  in  his 
battle  of  Seven  Pines  (Fair  Oaks). 
Davis  says : 

"  Our  army  was  in  line  in  front  of  Richmond,  but 
without  intrenchments.  General  Lee  immediately  con 
structed  earthworks.  They  were  necessarily  feeble  be 
cause  of  our  deficiency  in  tools.  It  seemed  to  be  the 
intention  of  the  enemy  to  assail  Richmond  by  regular 
approaches,  which  our  numerical  inferiority  and  want  of 
proper  utensils  made  it  improbable  that  we  should  be 
able  to  resist 

"  The  day  after  General  Lee  assumed  command,  I 
was  riding  out  to  the  army  and  I  found  him  in  a  house 
in  consultation  with  a  number  of  his  general  officers. 
Their  tone  was  despondent,  and  one  especially  pointed 
out  the  inevitable  consequences  of  the  enemy's  advance 
by  throwing  out  boyaux  and  constructing  successive 
parallels." 

I  think  it  will  be  admitted  that  when  Lee  took  com 
mand  of  the  army  in  the  backyards  of  Richmond  pros 
pects  were  far  from  flattering. 

Besides  fighting  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  and  a  few 
minor  engagements  terminating  with  the  ill-conceived 

49 


50  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

and  badly  executed  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  the  army  had 
done  nothing  but  retreat.  Disasters  in  the  southwest 
were  only  relieved  by  an  occasional  dispatch  from  Beau- 
regard  announcing  a  "  brilliant  retreat."  If  Lee  re 
mained  in  his  intrenchments  the  city  would  be  McClellan's 
by  gradual  approaches  and  big  guns. 

In  Napoleon's  famous  "  Supper  of  Beaucaire,"  his 
first  literary  work  of  ability,  he  writes  as  follows : 

"  It  is  an  axiom  of  military  science  that  the  army 
which  remains  behind  its  intrenchments  is  beaten;  ex 
perience  and  theory  agree  on  this  point." 

As  the  brilliant  idea  of  abandoning  Richmond  had 
not  occurred  to  Lee,  his  only  alternative  was  to  seize 
the  initiative.  He  would  call  Jackson  from  the  Valley; 
but  before  doing  this  he  would  give  Washington  a  scare. 
He  sent  two  brigades  to  reinforce  Jackson,  ordering 
him  at  the  same  time  to  move  quickly  to  Ashland,  then 
down  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  news 
as  to  the  reinforcement  reached  Washington  and  Mc- 
Clellan  about  the  same  time.  Lincoln  withheld  troops 
from  McClellan  for  the  defense  of  Washington,  and 
McClellan  thought  Lee  had  more  men  than  he  had  any 
use  for. 

On  the  26th  Lee,  after  leaving  30,000  men  under 
Magruder  for  the  defense  of  Richmond,  crossed  the 
Chickahominy  at  the  upper  bridges.  A.  P.  Hill  attacked 
the  enemy  at  Beaver  Dam, —  McClellan's  extreme  right, 
—  and  was  repulsed  with  considerable  loss ;  but  on  the 
next  day,  the  2/th,  Lee  beat  McClellan  in  the  great  bat 
tle  of  Gaines's  Mill. 

Longstreet  says : 

"  It  was  a  little  after  2  p.  m.  when  A.  P.  Hill  put  all 


SEVEN  DAYS  51 

his  force  into  action  and  pressed  his  battle  with  a  great 
zeal  and  courage,  but  he  was  alone.  .  .  ." 

Speaking  of  the  final  charge  after  sunset,  which  swept 
the  Federal  line  from  the  field,  Longstreet  says: 

".  .  .  The  position  was  too  strong  to  doubt  that  it  was 
only  the  thinning  fire  as  the  battle  progressed  that  made 
it  assailable ;  besides,  the  repulse  of  A.  P.  Hill's  repeated, 
desperate  assaults  forcibly  testified  to  the  fact.  It  was, 
nevertheless,  a  splendid  charge,  by  peerless  soldiers. 

".  .  .  Five  thousand  prisoners  were  turned  over  to 
General  Lee's  provost  guard,  a  number  of  batteries  and 
many  thousand  small  arms  to  the  Ordnance  Department 
by  my  command. 

"  The  Confederate  commanders,  except  A.  P.  Hill, 
claimed  credit  for  the  first  breach  in  General  Porter's 
lines,  but  the  solid  ranks  of  prisoners  delivered  to  the 
general  provost  guard,  and  the  several  batteries  captured 
and  turned  over  to  the  Ordnance  Department,  show  the 
breach  to  have  been  made  by  the  columns  of  Anderson, 
Pickett,  and  Hood's  two  regiments. 

"The  troops  of  the  gallant  A.  P.  Hill,  that  did  as 
much  and  as  effective  fighting  as  any,  received  little  of 
the  credit  properly  due  them.  It  was  their  long  and 
steady  fight  that  thinned  the  Federal  ranks  and  caused 
them  so  to  foul  their  guns  that  they  were  out  of  order 
when  the  final  struggle  came.  .  .  ." 

McClellan  dispatched  to  the  Secretary  of  War  from 
Savage  station : 

"  I  now  know  the  full  history  of  the  day.  On  this 
side  of  the  river  (the  right  bank)  we  repulsed  several 


52  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

strong  attacks;  on  the  left  bank  our  men  did  all  that 
men  could  do,  all  that  soldiers  could  accomplish,  but  they 
were  overwhelmed  by  vastly  superior  numbers,  even  after 
I  brought  my  last  reserves  into  action.  The  loss  on 
both  sides  is  terrible.  .  .  .  The  sad  remnants  of  my  men 
behave  as  men.  ...  I  have  lost  this  battle  because  my 
force  was  too  small.  ...  I  feel  too  earnestly  to-night. 
I  have  seen  too  many  dead  and  wounded  comrades  to 
feel  otherwise  than  that  the  government  has  not  sus 
tained  this  army.  If  you  do  not  do  so  now,  the  game 
is  lost.  If  I  save  this  army  now,  I  tell  you  plainly  that 
I  owe  no  thanks  to  you  nor  to  any  other  person  in 
Washington.  You  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this 
army." 

Lincoln  replied : 

"  Save  your  army  at  all  events ;  will  send  reinforce 
ments  as  fast  as  we  can.  ...  If  you  have  had  a  drawn 
battle  or  a  repulse,  it  is  the  price  we  pay  for  the  enemy's 
not  being  in  Washington.  We  protected  Washington 
and  the  enemy  concentrated  on  you.  Had  we  stripped 
Washington  he  would  have  been  upon  us  before  the  troops 
could  have  gotten  to  you.  12.20  a.  m.,  June  28." 

Joe  Johnston  wrote  to  Beauregard,  August  4,  1862: 

"  I  am  not  sure  you  are  right  in  regarding  the  success 
of  McClellan's  '  strategic  movement '  as  evidence  of 
skill.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  due  rather  to  our  having  lost 
two  days  immediately  after  the  principal  fight,  that  of 
Friday  (Gaines's  Mill,  June  27)  and  many  hours  after 
ward,  especially  on  Tuesday  (Malvern  Hill,  July  i).  I 
was  told  that  the  action  on  that  day  commenced  about 
6  o'clock  p.  m.,  but  one  and  one-half  or  two  miles  from 


SEVEN  DAYS  53 

the  field  of  Monday's  engagement.  It  is  said,  too,  that 
a  large  portion  of  our  army  was  idle  on  each  of  those 
days. 

"The  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  (Tuesday)  was  but  fif 
teen  or  twenty  miles  from  the  middle  of  McClellan's 
position  on  the  Chickahominy.  The  result  of  that  action 
terminated  the  pursuit.  It  seems  to  me  the  *  partial 
results '  were  due  to  a  want  of  the  *  bulldog  tenacity ' 
you  give  us  credit  for. 

"  If  the  enemy  had  been  pressed  vigorously  on  Satur 
day  and  Sunday  (January  28-29),  ne  must  have  been 
ruined,  could  never  have  fixed  himself  securely  on  James 
river.  He  left  his  position  on  the  Chickahominy  with 
out  our  knowledge,  because  the  wide  interval  by  which 
he  escaped  was  not  observed  by  cavalry  as  it  should  have 
been.  ...  I  must  confess  that  the  advantages  gained 
by  what  is  termed  the  Seven  Days'  fighting  are  not  very 
evident  to  me/' 


Lee  explains  in  the  following  report  why  McClellan 
escaped.  The  reason  would  occur  to  any  one  who  knows 
the  Chickahominy  country.  Johnston  ought  to  have 
known  it  after  his  disastrous  experience  at  Seven  Pines. 

Lee  in  his  report  said: 

"  Under  ordinary  circumstances  the  Federal  army 
should  have  been  destroyed.  Its  escape  was  due  to  the 
causes  already  stated.  Prominent  among  these  is  the 
want  of  correct  and  timely  information.  This  fact,  at 
tributable  chiefly  to  the  character  of  the  country,  enabled 
General  McClellan  skillfully  to  conceal  his  retreat,  and 
to  add  much  to  the  obstructions  with  which  nature  had 
beset  the  way  of  our  pursuing  column." 


54  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Lee  did  not  know  after  the  battle  of  Gaines's  Mill 
whether  McClellan  would  fall  back  on  his  base  on  the 
Pamunkey  or  whether  he  would  seek  a  new  one  on  the 
James,  or,  in  fact,  whether  he  would  retreat  at  all  or 
not. 

McClellan  held  the  country  in  his  rear.  It  was 
wooded  and  swampy,  and  with  a  strong  rear-guard  he 
easily  masked  his  movements.  His  gunboats  also  com 
manded  the  James  river. 

Johnston  appears  to  have  thought  there  was  no  fight 
ing  except  at  Gaines's  Mill,  Frazier's  Farm,  and  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  whereas  it  was  a  continuous  fight  all  the  way. 

General  Franklin  says : 

"  My  experience  during  the  period  generally  known  as 
the  '  Seven  Days '  was  with  the  Sixth  and  Second  corps. 
During  the  whole  time  between  June  26  and  July  2  there 
was  not  a  night  in  which  the  men  did  not  march  almost 
continually,  nor  a  day  on  which  there  was  not  a  fight.'* 

Major  General  McCall,  who  was  taken  prisoner,  in 
his  report  of  the  battle  of  Frazier's  Farm,  says : 

"  Soon  after  this  a  most  determined  charge  was  made 
on  Randol's  battery  by  a  full  brigade  advancing  in 
wedge  shape,  without  order,  but  in  perfect  recklessness. 
Somewhat  similiar  charges  had  been  previously  made  on 
Cooper's  and  Kern's  batteries  by  single  regiments  with 
out  success,  they  having  recoiled  before  the  storm  of 
canister  hurled  against  them.  A  like  result  was  antici 
pated  in  Randol's  battery,  and  the  4th  regiment  was 
requested  not  to  fire  until  the  battery  had  done  with  them. 
Its  gallant  commander  did  not  doubt  his  ability  to  re 
pel  the  attack,  and  his  guns  did  indeed  mow  down  the 


SEVEN  DAYS  55 

advancing  host,  but  still  the  gaps  were  closed  and  the 
enemy  came  in  on  a  run  to  the  very  muzzles  of  the  guns. 
"  It  was  a  perfect  torrent  of  men,  and  they  were  in 
his  battery  before  the  guns  could  be  removed,  and  the 
enemy,  rushing  past,  drove  the  greater  part  of  the  4th 
regiment  before  them.  I  had  ridden  into  the  regiment 
and  endeavored  to  check  them,  but  with  only  partial  suc 
cess." 

But  General  Johnston  thought  he  ought  to  have  been 
reinstated  in  command  when  he  recovered  from  his 
wound. 

Mrs.  Davis  says: 

"  Upon  General  Johnston's  recovery  from  the  wound 
he  received  at  Seven  Pines  he  had  been  assigned,  on 
November  24,  1862,  to  the  command  of  a  geographical 
department,  including  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Missis 
sippi,  Alabama,  Georgia,  and  North  Carolina.  Mrs. 
Johnston  and  I  were  very  intimate  friends,  and  the  day 
before  his  departure  I  went  to  see  them.  General  John 
ston  seemed  ill  and  dispirited.  In  answer  to  a  hope 
expressed  by  me  that  he  would  have  a  brilliant  campaign, 
he  said,  '  I  might,  if  I  had  Lee's  chances  with  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia,'  from  which  I  inferred  he  was 
very  averse  to  leaving  Virginia." 

Lord  Wolseley  published  a  friendly  criticism  of  Lee 
in  Macmillan's  Magazine,  upon  which  a  Northern  writer 
in  the  Century  Magazine  of  June,  1887,  comments.  It 
will  serve  to  show  that  Lee's  reputation  has  suffered 
more  at  the  hands  of  his  friends  than  at  those  of  his 
foes. 

The  comment  is  as  follows : 


56     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

".  .  .  .  Lord  Wolseley  has  cultivated  the  belief  that 
Lee's  strategy  and  tactics  were  always  'everything  that 
could  be  desired  up  to  the  moment  of  victory,  but  there 
his  action  seemed  to  stop  abruptly.'  True,  the  Con 
federates  were  not  Titans.  They  seemed  never  to  be 
wound  up  for  more  than  a  week  or  more  of  hard  march 
ing  on  scant  rations,  followed  by  two  or  three  days  of 
continuous  battle,  usually  against  superior  numbers, 
which  left  them  at  the  end  without  fresh  reserves.  After 
a  terrible  and  exhausting  victory  a  longing  for  rest 
seemed  to  overcome  them.  General  Lee  could  not 
furnish  physical  strength  to  his  men  from  his  own  sinews, 
but  he  did  know  how  to  fight  them  to  a  shadow  and 
then  how  to  keep  them  going  on  something  that  from 
the  other  side  of  the  line  looked  like  very  thin  hope. 
Once,  as  Lord  Wolseley  recollects,  but  with  vagueness 
as  to  its  events,  there  were  seven  days  of  continuous 
fighting  near  Richmond.  Lee,  with  sublime  daring, 
dashed  his  columns  time  and  again  upon  McClellan's 
superior  but  separated  forces.  His  losses  were  fright 
ful,  but  the  bravery  and  energy  displayed  by  his  troops 
were  tremendous.  .  .  ." 

Longstreet  says: 

"  Passing  in  critical  review  the  events  of  the  cam 
paign,  they  fail  to  display  a  flaw  as  it  was  projected 
by  the  Confederate  chief." 

McClellan  is  criticised  for  not  attacking  Magruder. 
Davis  says: 

"  I  pointed  out  to  him  (Lee)  that  our  force  and  in 
trenched  line  between  that  left  wing  (of  the  Union 


SEVEN  DAYS  57 

Army)  and  Richmond  was  too  weak  for  a  protracted 
resistance,  and  if  McClellan  was  the  man  I  took  him 
for  ...  as  soon  as  he  found  that  the  bulk  of  our  army 
was  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  he  would 
not  stop  to  try  conclusions  there,  but  would  immediately 
move  upon  his  objective  point,  the  city  of  Richmond." 

Lee  replied: 

"If  you  will  hold  him  as  long  as  you  can  at  the  in- 
trenchments  and  then  fall  back  on  the  detached  works 
around  the  city,  I  will  be  upon  the  enemy's  heels  before 
he  gets  there." 

Lee  had  evidently  considered  an  attack  on  Magruder 
and  was  prepared  for  it. 

Lieut.  Col.  G.  F.  R.  Henderson,  in  his  "  Life  of  Stone 
wall  Jackson,"  says: 

"  McClellan  forgot  that  in  war  it  is  impossible  for  a 
general  to  be  absolutely  certain.  It  is  sufficient,  accord 
ing  to  Napoleon,  if  the  odds  in  his  favor  are  three  to 
two;  and  if  he  cannot  discover  from  the  attitude  of  his 
enemy  what  the  odds  are,  he  is  unfitted  for  supreme 
command." 

The  "  attitude  "  that  Lee  was  in  the  habit  of  assum 
ing  was  the  very  thing  that  impressed  his  enemy  with 
the  idea  that  his  army  was  about  twice  as  large  as  it 
really  was. 

If  Napoleon  could  determine  the  strength  of  his 
enemy  by  his  "  attitude,"  it  is  clear  that  he  had  no  Lees 
to  deal  with. 


58  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Then  Napoleon  was  never  in  the  Chickahominy 
swamp. 

Moreover,  in  reporting  to  the  Directory,  he  habitually 
underestimated  his  own  forces,  and  exaggerated  those 
of  the  enemy, —  just  as  McClellan  did. 

McClellan  erred  in  overestimating  the  strength  of 
Lee's  army.  Whether  he  ought  to  have  known  it  or 
not  depends,  not  on  any  cut  and  dried  rule  of  Napoleon's, 
but  on  conditions  and  environments. 

When  he  heard  that  Lee  had  sent  troops  North,  he 
telegraphed  to  the  President : 

"If  10,000  or  15,000  men  have  left  Richmond  to 
reinforce  Jackson,  it  illustrates  their  strength  and  con 
fidence." 

This  interpretation  was  certainly  more  probable  than 
any  other,  and  generals,  like  other  people,  must  base 
their  policy  on  probabilities  rather  than  improbabilities. 

The  Confederacy  was  young  and  fresh  at  that  time, 
and  troops  were  coming  up  from  the  South.  McClellan 
had  no  means  of  determining  how  many  were  coming, 
and  Allan  Pinkerton,  McClellan's  chief  of  secret  service, 
estimated  Lee's  army  at  180,000  men. 

If  McClellan  had  divined  that  Lee,  instead  of  sending 
troops  to  the  Valley  to  reinforce  Jackson,  was  calling 
Jackson  to  Richmond  to  reinforce  himself,  he  would  have 
been  little  less  than  a  seer. 

Lee  took  command  of  the  army  on  the  ist  of  June. 
Mr.  Davis  says  the  tone  of  the  general  officers  was  des 
pondent. 

McClellan's  splendid  army  of  100,000  men  was  in  sight 
of  Richmond.  On  July  2  that  army  had  been  driven 
to  Harrison's  Landing,  and  was  under  shelter  of  its 
gunboats. 


SEVEN  DAYS  59 

When  Lee  assumed  the  offensive  he  should  have  had, 
according  to  Napoleon's  figures  of  three  to  two,  150,- 
ooo  men.  Instead  he  had  80,000. 

Lee  said  in  his  report : 

"  The  siege  of  Richmond  was  raised,  and  the  object 
of  a  campaign,  which  had  been  prosecuted  after  months 
of  preparation  at  an  enormous  expenditure  of  men  and 
money,  completely  frustrated. 

"  More  than  10,000  prisoners,  including  officers  of 
high  rank,  52  pieces  of  artillery,  and  upward  of  35,- 
ooo  stands  of  small  arms  were  captured.  The  stores 
and  supplies  of  every  description  that  fell  into  our  hands 
were  great  in  amount  and  volume,  but  small  in  com 
parison  with  those  destroyed  by  the  enemy." 

Davis  wrote  to  Mrs.  Davis  on  the  6th  of  July: 

".  .  .  Our  success  has  been  so  remarkable  that  we 
should  be  grateful.  .  .  ." 

"  Our  success  "  was  not  accomplished  without  heavy 
loss  and  a  bad  repulse  at  Malvern  Hill.  That  position 
was  one  of  extraordinary  strength.  The  flanks  rested 
on  ground  that  was  impregnable  and  defended  by  gun 
boats.  The  front  was  accessible  only  by  narrow  roads 
through  swamps  and  woods,  and  the  hill  itself  offered 
positions  for  all  McClellan's  powerful  artillery,  including 
his  siege  guns. 

The  only  excuse  for  the  attack  is  that  no  opportunity 
for  striking  a  defeated  and  retreating  enemy  should  be 
neglected. 

But  contrast  the  conditions  when  Lee  assumed  com 
mand  with  those  one  month  afterward,  and  "  our  sue- 


60  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

cess "    was    not    only    "  remarkable "    but    well-nigh 
miraculous. 

Of  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General 
Franklin  says : 

"  They  had  been  soldiers  less  than  a  year,  yet  their 
conduct  could  not  have  been  more  soldierly  had  they 
seen  ten  years  of  service.  No  such  material  for  soldiers 
was  ever  in  the  field  before.  .  .  ." 

The  same  can  be  said  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  Both  armies  were  composed  of  the  best  fight 
ing  material  of  their  respective  sections. 

Both  armies  were  at  their  best. 

Lincoln  called  for  300,000  three  years'  men. 

Seward  explained  that  reinforcements  were  necessary 
to  follow  up  the  "  recent  successes  of  the  Federal  arms." 

But  the  Northern  people  soon  found  that  McClellan 
had  been  defeated  and  driven  to  the  shelter  of  his  gun 
boats  on  the  James. 

There  was  a  panic  in  Wall  Street  and  gloom  every 
where. 


CHAPTER  II 

SECOND    MANASSAS 

LEE  had  disposed  of  one  puzzle  only  to  be  con 
fronted  by  another,  and  while  he  was  considering 
it  the  army,  after  its  floundering  campaign  in  the  woods 
and  swamps  of  the  Peninsula,  got  a  few  days  of  needed 
rest. 

Looking  down  the  river  he  saw  McClellan,  with  90,- 
ooo  men,  only  a  day's  march  from  Richmond.  He  was 
safe  there  with  his  gunboats,  and  said,  it  is  reported, 
that  "  there  ought  to  be  a  gunboat  in  every  family." 

Looking  north  he  saw  the  bloodthirsty  Pope,  with 
43,000  men,  occupying  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock 
river,  threatening  the  railroad  at  Gordonsville. 

McClellan  at  Harrison's  Landing  was  calling  for  rein 
forcements  to  resume  the  offensive,  and  Pope  issued  the 
following  order  of  the  day,  which  was  calculated  to  scare 
Lee  or  any  other  man: 

"July  14. 

"  I  have  come  to  you  from  the  west,  where  we  have 
always  seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies;  from  an  army 
whose  business  it  has  been  to  seek  the  adversary  and 
to  beat  him  when  he  was  found.  ...  I  presume  I  have 
been  called  here  to  pursue  the  same  course  and  to  lead 
you  against  the  enemy.  It  is  my  purpose  to  do  so,  and 
that  speedily.  ...  I  desire  you  to  dismiss  from  your 
minds  certain  phrases  which  I  am  sorry  to  find  so  much 

61 


62  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

in  vogue  with  you.  I  hear  constantly  of  '  taking  strong 
positions  and  holding  them,'  of  '  lines  of  retreat/  and  of 
1  bases  of  supplies.'  Let  us  discard  such  ideas.  The 
strongest  position  a  soldier  should  desire  to  occupy  is 
one  from  which  he  can  most  easily  advance  against  the 
enemy.  Let  us  study  the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of 
our  opponent  and  leave  our  own  to  take  care  of  them 
selves. 

"  Let  us  look  before  us  and  not  behind.  Success  and 
glory  are  in  the  advance ;  disaster  and  shame  lurk  in  the 
rear." 

The  army  narrowly  escaped  a  spanking. 

Lee  now  had  a  problem  on  hand  that  would  have 
taxed  the  ability  of  Napoleon.  If  he  remained  at  Rich 
mond  it  meant  a  siege  by  an  army  of  at  least  150,000 
men,  and  Lee  did  not  like  sieges.  He  did  not  fancy 
the  defensive,  so  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  take  the 
initiative  against  Pope. 

He  thought  the  move  would  threaten  Washington  and 
draw  McClellan  away  from  Richmond.  Accordingly,  on 
the  1 3th  of  July  he  ordered  Jackson  with  his  own  and 
Swell's  division  to  Gordonsville.  Then  he  sent  A.  P. 
Hill  and  his  division,  and  ordered  Jackson  to  move  on 
the  enemy,  while  he  remained  with  Longstreet's  corps, 
Hill's  and  Anderson's  divisions  of  infantry,  and  Stuart's 
cavalry,  to  watch  McClellan,  who  still  had  90,000  men  in 
a  day's  march  of  Richmond. 

Jackson's  move  had  the  desired  effect.  On  the  3d  of 
August  Halleck  telegraphed  to  McClellan : 

"It  is  determined  to  withdraw  your  army  from  the 
Peninsula  to  Acquia  Creek.  You  will  take  immediate 
action  to  this  effect." 


SECOND  MANASSAS  63 

McClellan  sent  this  telegram  in  reply  to  General  Hal- 
leek: 

"  Your  telegram  has  caused  me  the  greatest  pain  I 
ever  experienced,  for  I  am  convinced  that  the  order  to 
withdraw  this  army  to  Acquia  Creek  will  prove  disas 
trous  to  our  cause.  I  fear  it  will  be  a  fatal  blow.  .  .  . 

"  This  army  is  now  in  excellent  discipline  and  condi 
tion.  .  .  .  With  the  assistance  of  our  gunboats  I  con 
sider  our  communication  as  now  secure.  .  .  .  Here, 
directly  in  front  of  this  army,  is  the  heart  of  the  rebel 
lion.  It  is  here  that  all  our  resources  should  be  collected 
to  strike  the  blow  which  will  determine  the  fate  of  the 
nation.  All  points  of  secondary  importance  ought  to  be 
abandoned,  and  every  available  man  brought  here;  a  de 
cided  victory  here  and  the  military  strength  of  the  re 
bellion  is  crushed.  It  matters  not  what  partial  reverses 
we  may  meet  elsewhere.  Here  is  the  true  defense  of 
Washington.  It  is  here  on  the  banks  of  the  James  that 
the  fate  of  the  Union  should  be  decided.  ...  I  entreat 
that  this  order  be  rescinded." 

Halleck's  reply  was : 

"  The  order  of  the  withdrawal  will  not  be  rescinded. 
You  will  be  expected  to  execute  it  with  all  possible 
promptness." 

On  the  5th  of  August,  Hooker  drove  the  Confederate 
detachments  from  Malvern  Hill,  and  McClellan  wired  to 
Halleck  from  that  point: 

"  This  is  a  very  advantageous  position  to  cover  an  ad 
vance  on  Richmond,  and  only  fourteen  and  three-quarter 
miles  distant,  and  I  feel  confident  that  with  reinforce 
ments  I  could  march  this  army  there  in  five  days." 


64  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 
Halleck  promptly  replied  to  this  communication: 
"  I  have  no  reinforcements  to  send  you." 

On  the  Qth  of  August  Jackson  defeated  Banks  at  Cedar 
Run.  Banks  being  largely  reinforced,  Jackson,  after 
resting  on  the  field  two  days  and  sending  his  accustomed 
dispatch,  "  God  blessed  our  army  with  another  victory," 
fell  back  on  Gordonsville. 

Halleck,  fearing  that  Pope  and  Burnside  would  be  de 
stroyed  and  Washington  captured,  wired  to  McClellan : 

"  There  must  be  no  further  delay  in  your  movements. 
That  which  has  already  occurred  was  entirely  unex 
pected  and  must  be  satisfactorily  explained." 

On  the  1 3th  of  August  Lee  ordered  Longstreet  and 
two  brigades  under  Hood  to  Gordonsville,  and  he  himself 
followed  on  the  i5th. 

This  left  about  30,000  troops  in  Richmond,  while 
McClellan  had  81,000  at  Harrison's  Landing. 

Halleck  telegraphed  to  McClellan  that  the  enemy  was 
fighting  Pope,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  get  troops  in 
front  of  Washington  as  soon  as  possible.  McClellan 
went  to  Fortress  Monroe  to  beg  Halleck  to  allow  him  to 
relieve  Pope  by  attacking  Richmond.  Halleck  answered 
at  1.40  a.  m.,  August  14 :  "  There  is  no  change  of  plans ! 
You  will  send  up  your  troops  as  rapidly  as  possible,"  and 
then  went  to  bed. 

Lee,  becoming  convinced  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear 
from  McClellan,  ordered  Stuart  with  the  greater  part  of 
his  cavalry  and  R.  H.  Anderson  with  his  division  to  join 
him  at  Gordonsville.  The  divisions  of  D.  H.  Hill  and 
McLaws  followed,  but  they  were  not  in  time  to  partici 
pate  in  the  operations  against  Pope. 


SECOND  MANASSAS  65 

On  the  24th  of  August  McClellan  reported  at  Acquia 
Creek. 

Lee  started  Jackson  with  25,000  men  on  the  25th  of 
August  on  a  forced  march  to  the  rear  of  Pope's  army. 
He  took  nothing  but  ammunition  wagons,  marched 
twenty-five  miles  the  first  day  to  Salem,  passed  through 
White  Plains,  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  Gainesville,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  26th  was  at  Bristow  Station  on  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad. 

He  was  now  between  Pope  and  Washington.  He  cap 
tured  two  railroad  trains  at  Bristow,  and  an  eight-gun 
battery,  horses,  provisions,  and  Pope's  depot  of  supplies 
at  Manassas.  As  his  men  had  scant  rations  on  the 
march,  Pope's  good  things  were  highly  appreciated. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  Lee  followed  Jack 
son  with  Longstreet's  command,  less  one  division  left  on 
the  Rappahannock. 

On  the  27th  McClellan  reported  at  Alexandria. 

That  night  Pope  ordered  the  concentration  of  his  army 
at  Manassas.  In  his  order  to  McDowell  he  said:  "If 
you  will  move  promptly  and  rapidly,  we  will  bag  the 
whole  crowd." 

But  Jackson,  not  wishing  to  be  bagged,  moved  to  a 
position  near  Bull  Run,  and  hid  in  an  old  railroad  cut 
and  the  woods,  to  await  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  who 
was  hurrying  to  his  aid. 

Pope  thought  Jackson  was  in  a  bad  fix  and  would  run 
away  as  soon  as  he  could.  He  put  his  columns  in  mo 
tion  to  catch  him,  and  their  marches  and  countermarches 
puzzled  Jackson  and  led  to  the  battle  of  the  28th. 

Of  it  Longstreet  says : 

"  As  King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  was  march 
ing  by  (on  the  road  to  Centerville)  Jackson  thought  to 


66  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

come  out  from  his  lurking-place  to  learn  the  meaning  of 
the  march.  The  direction  of  the  move  again  impressed 
him  that  Pope  was  retreating,  and  that  his  escape  to  the 
north  side  of  Bull  Run  would  put  his  army  in  a  position 
of  safety  before  Lee  could  join  him. 

"  It  was  late,  the  sun  had  set,  but  Jackson  was  moved 
to  prompt  action,  as  the  only  means  of  holding  Pope  for 
Lee's  arrival.  He  was  in  plain  view  of  the  white  smoke 
of  the  rifles  of  my  infantry  as  they  climbed  over  the  Bull 
Run  mountains,  seven  miles  away,  and  in  hearing  of  our 
artillery  as  the  boom  of  the  big  guns,  resounding  along 
the  rock-faced  cliffs,  gathered  volume  to  offer  salutations 
and  greetings  for  the  union  of  comrades  and  commands. 
He  changed  the  front  of  his  right  division,  and,  noting 
the  movement  of  Siegel's  troops  along  the  Newmarket 
road,  called  out  Ewell  with  his  brigades  under  Lawton 
and  Trimble,  and  in  addition  to  the  artillery  of  these  com 
mands  used  the  horse  artillery  of  Pelham.  As  formed, 
the  new  line  was  broadside  against  the  turnpike,  its  left  a 
little  way  from  Groveton. 

"  The  ground  upon  which  the  action  occurred  had  been 
passed  an  hour  before  by  the  division  commander,  Gen 
eral  Hatch,  who  saw  no  indication  of  the  presence  of  a 
foe.  As  the  division  marched,  the  column  was  made  up 
of  the  brigades  of  Hatch,  Gibbon,  Doubleday,  and  Pat 
rick.  The  action  fell  against  the  brigade  commanded  by 
General  Gibbon,  who,  taking  it  for  a  cavalry  annoyance 
to  cover  retreat,  opened  against  it,  and  essayed  aggres 
sive  fight,  till  he  found  himself  engaged  against  a  formid 
able  force  of  infantry  and  artillery.  He  was  assisted  by 
part  of  Doubleday's  brigade,  and  asked  for  other  assist 
ance,  w*hich  failed  to  reach  him  till  night  came  and  ended 
the  contest.  His  fight  was  desperate  and  courageous 
against  odds,  but  he  held  it  and  his  line  till  dark.  .  .  . 


SECOND  MANASSAS  67 

General  Doubleday  joined  the  fight  with  his  brigade,  and 
reported  his  loss  nearly  half  the  troops  engaged.  Gen 
eral  Gibbon  called  it  '  a  surprise/  And  well  he  might, 
after  his  division  commander  had  just  passed  over  the 
route  and  failed  to  find  any  indication  of  the  lurking  foe. 
General  Jackson  reported,  *  The  conflict  here  was  firm 
and  sanguinary/  He  failed  to  give  his  number  lost,  but 
acknowledges  his  severe  loss  in  the  division  commanders, 
General  Ewell  losing  a  leg,  and  Taliaferro  severely 
wounded.  During  the  night  the  Federal  commander  re 
ported  to  his  subordinates  that  McDowell  had  '  inter 
cepted  the  retreat  of  Jackson/  and  ordered  concentration 
of  the  army  against  him;  whereas  it  was,  of  course, 
Jackson  who  had  intercepted  McDowell's  march.  He 
seems  to  have  been  under  the  impression  that  he  was 
about  to  capture  Jackson,  and  inclined  to  lead  his  subor 
dinates  to  the  same  opinion. 

"Of  the  time,  Major  Edward  Pye  reported:  'We 
were  sent  forward  toward  evening  to  pursue  the  enemy, 
who  were  said  to  be  retreating.  Found  the  enemy,  but 
did  not  see  them  retreat.  A  deadly  fire  from  three  sides 
welcomed  and  drove  us  back/  ' 

Jackson  was  asleep  in  a  fence  corner,  having  been  up 
all  the  previous  night,  when  the  scouts  reported  the  march 
of  King's  column.  He  sprang  up  and  ran  for  his  horse, 
buckling  his  sword  on  as  he  went  and  shouting  hurried 
orders  for  the  attack  to  his  aids.  He  thought  Pope  was 
trying  to  give  Lee  the  slip  as  he  did  on  the  Rapidan. 

Pope,  afraid  that  Jackson  would  escape,  ordered  Siegel 
to  attack  early  on  the  morning  of  the  2Qth  and  bring 
him  to  a  stand. 

From  Hill's  report : 

"  The  enemy  prepared  for  a  last  and  determined  at- 


68  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

tempt.  Their  serried  masses,  overwhelming  superiority 
of  numbers,  and  bold  bearing  made  the  chances  of  vic 
tory  to  tremble  in  the  balance ;  my  own  division  exhausted 
by  seven  hours  of  unremitted  fighting,  hardly  one  round 
of  ammunition  per  man  remaining,  and  weakened  in  all 
things  except  its  unconquerable  spirit. 

"  Casting  about  for  help,  fortunately  it  was  here  re 
ported  to  me  that  the  brigades  of  Generals  Lawton  and 
Early  were  near-by,  and,  sending  to  them,  they  promptly 
moved  to  my  front  at  the  most  opportune  moment,  and 
this  last  charge  met  the  disastrous  fate  that  had  befallen 
those  preceding." 

Jackson's  fight  was  desperate  against  heavy  odds. 
Longstreet  arrived  and  was  in  position  by  noon,  and  Lee 
desired  him  to  turn  the  Federal  left  and  so  relieve  the 
heavy  pressure  against  Jackson.  But  Longstreet  was 
balky  and  advised  a  reconnaissance. 

When  his  troops  fell  back  from  the  reconnaissance,  it 
looked  like  a  retreat.  On  the  morning  of  the  3Oth  Pope 
wired  to  Washington  that  "  the  enemy  was  retreating  to 
the  mountains."  He  reported : 

"  General  Hooker  estimates  the  loss  of  the  enemy  as  at 
least  two  to  one,  and  General  Kearney  as  at  least  three  to 
one." 

He  did  not  know  that  Longstreet  had  come  up.  That 
afternoon  he  attacked  in  heavy  force,  but  the  battle  of 
Second  Manassas  ended  in  his  defeat. 

That  night  he,  and  not  Jackson,  was  retreating. 

Franklin  says  that  when  he  reached  the  Warrenton 
turnpike,  about  six  o'clock,  he  found  it  "  filled  with  flee 
ing  men,  artillery,  and  wagons,  all  leaving  the  field  in  a 
panic.  It  was  a  scene  of  terrible  confusion." 


SECOND  MANASSAS  69 

General  Porter  wrote  to  General  McOellan  as  follows : 

"  I  was  whipped,  as  was  the  whole  army,  badly.  .  .  . 
I  have  had  no  dinner  nor  supper  to-day,  and  no  chance  for 
any  to-morrow." 

"  August  29,  1862,  2 130  p.  m. 

"What  news  from  direction  of  Manassas?  What 
news  generally? 

"A.  LINCOLN/' 

This  was  to  McClellan,  who  had  no  news,  but  plenty 
of  advice. 

"  August  29,  1862,  2.45  p.m. 

"  I  am  clear  that  one  of  two  courses  should  be  adopted : 
first,  to  concentrate  all  our  available  forces  to  open  com 
munication  with  Pope;  second,  to  leave  Pope  to  get  out 
of  his  scrape  and  at  once  use  all  our  means  to  make 
the  capital  perfectly  safe.  .  .  . 

"  CEO.   B.   McCLELLAN, 

"  Major  General." 

"  CENTERVILLE,  August  31,  1862. 
"  Our  troops  are  all  here  and  in  position,  though  much 
used   up   and    worn   out.  ...  I    should    like    to    know 
whether  you  feel  secure  about  Washington,  should  this 
army  be  destroyed. 

"JNO.  POPE, 

"  Major  General." 

Halleck  writes  to  McClellan : 

"  I  think  you  had  better  place  Sumner's  corps  as  it  ar 
rives  near  the  fortification  and  particularly  at  the  Chain 


70  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

bridge.  .  .  .  Use  Tyler's  and  Cox's  brigades  and  the 
new  troops  for  the  same  purpose,  if  you  need  them." 

Rhodes  says: 

"  McClellan  did  not  *  regard  Washington  as  safe 
against  the  rebels/  '  If  I  can  quietly  slip  over  there/ 
he  said,  in  a  letter  to  his  wife,  *  I  will  send  your  silver 
off/ 

".  .  .  In  view  of  the  '  great  danger  to  Washington/ 
the  general-in-chief  asked  Dix  at  Fort  Monroe  to  send 
as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  capital  as  large  a  part  of 
the  remainder  of  Keyes's  corps  as  could  be  spared,  and 
urged  Burnside  to  hasten  forward  his  troops. 

"  A  number  of  gunboats  were  ordered  up  the  river, 
and  anchored  at  different  points  in  proximity  to  the  city, 
and  a  war  steamer  was  brought  to  the  Navy  Yard. 

"  All  the  clerks  and  employees  of  the  civil  departments 
and  all  employees  in  the  public  buildings  were  called  to 
arms  for  the  defense  of  the  capital.  The  sale  of  spirit 
uous  liquors  at  retail  within  the  District  of  Columbia  was 
prohibited.  Excitement  and  alarm  held  undisputed 
sway." 

I  know  of  no  adverse  criticism  of  Lee  in  this  cam 
paign.  Even  Longstreet  is  complimentary.  He  says : 

"  Jackson's  march  to  Bristow  and  Manassas  Junction 
was  hazardous,  or  seemed  so,  but  in  view  of  his  peculiar 
talent  for  such  work  (the  captured  dispatch  of  General 
Pope  giving  information  of  his  affairs)  and  Lee's  skill, 
it  seemed  the  only  way  open  for  progressive  maneuver. 
The  strength  of  the  move  lay  in  the  time  it  gave  us  to 
make  issue  before  all  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could 
unite  with  the  army  of  General  Pope.  His  (Lee's)  game 


SECOND  MANASSAS  71 

of  hide  and  seek  about  Bull  Run,  Centerville,  and  Ma- 
nassas  Plains  was  grand." 

Lee's  original  plan  was  to  catch  Pope  napping  on  the 
Rapidan;  but  Pope  was  informed  of  it  by  a  captured 
letter  from  Lee  to  Stuart,  and  immediately  fell  back  be 
hind  the  Rappahannock. 

Lee  was  looking  on  from  Clark's  mountain,  and  said 
to  Longstreet :  "  General,  we  little  thought  the  enemy 
would  turn  his  back  upon  us  thus  early  in  the  campaign." 

Lee  crossed  the  Rapidan  and  tried  to  pass  the  Rappa 
hannock  to  fall  upon  Pope  before  he  could  receive  rein 
forcements  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  Pope's 
artillery,  heavy  rains,  and  a  high  river  prevented  him. 

In  the  sparring  along  the  Rappahannock  Pope  did  very 
well,  but  Lee's  unconventional  strategy  and  Jackson's 
queer  antics  decided  the  campaign  against  him. 

There  is  much  of  the  usual  cheap  criticism  of  Pope, — 
what  he  ought  to  have  done,  and  so  on.  No  doubt  he 
would  have  done  those  things  if  he  had  known  as  much 
as  the  critics  knew,  after  the  event,  regarding  Lee's  in 
tentions  and  movements.  It  was  highly  probable  that 
Jackson  had  made  a  raid  on  Manassas  similar  to  that 
made  by  Stuart  around  McClellan's  army  at  Richmond, 
and  was  retiring. 

Rhodes  says,  referring  to  Lee : 

"  An  ordinary  general  might  'have  been  satisfied  with 
the  capture  of  stores  and  the  alarm  created  in  Washing 
ton.  .  .  ." 

So  thought  Pope.  He  made  his  disposition  on  that 
probability,  rather  than  on  the  improbability  that  Jack 
son  had  gone  into  hiding  to  wait  for  Lee. 


72  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

When  he  sent  his  dispatch  of  the  3Oth  he  was  still  of 
the  opinion  that  Jackson  was  retreating. 
Longstreet  says : 

"  He  was  misled  by  reports  of  his  officers  and  others 
to  believe  that  the  Confederates  were  in  retreat,  and 
planned  his  movements  upon  false  premises." 

In  generalship  Pope  probably  did  as  well  as  any  man 
would  have  done  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  the 
campaign,  and  as  for  dislodging  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  from  position,  Grant  failed  to  do  that  at  Spott- 
sylvania  and  Cold  Harbor,  though  he  had  greater  odds 
in  his  favor  than  Pope  had. 

Lee  captured  30  guns,  many  thousand  small  arms, 
7,000  prisoners,  and  2,000  wounded,  besides  Jackson's 
captures  at  Manassas  and  Bristow. 

Pope's  aggregate  on  the  28th  was  70,000  men;  Lee's, 
49,000.  Pope's  losses  were  15,000  men,  and  Lee's,  10,- 
ooo. 

Lee  was  now  where  he  had  advised  Johnston  to  stay, 
—  in  position  to  threaten  Washington.  But  it  cost  him 
about  30,000  men  to  get  there.  Add  the  7,000  that 
Johnston  lost  at  Seven  Pines  and  the  ordnance,  clothes, 
and  stores  of  subsistence  lost  by  his  retreats,  and  the  con 
clusion  is  inevitable  that  he  blundered  in  not  trying,  at 
any  rate,  to  follow  Lee's  advice. 


CHAPTER  III 

SHARPSBURG    (ANTIETAM) 

LONGSTREET  says   it  was  Lee's   "deliberate  and 
urgent  advice  to  President  Davis  to  join  him  and 
be  prepared  to  make  a  proposal  for  peace  and  independ 
ence  from  the  head  of  a  conquering  army."     This  is  one 
of  Longstreet's  many  dreams. 

So  far  from  wishing  Davis  to  join  him  Lee  wrote  to 
him  as  follows: 

"  HEADQUARTERS  NEAR  FREDERICKTOWN,  MD., 

"  September  9,  1862. 
"  His  EXCELLENCY,  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. 

"  MR.  PRESIDENT  :  I  have  just  received  your  letter  of 
the  7th  instant,  from  Rapidan,  informing  me  of  your  in 
tention  to  come  on  to  Leesburg.  While  I  should  feel  the 
greatest  satisfaction  in  having  an  interview  with  you  and 
in  consulting  you  upon  all  subjects  of  interest,  I  cannot 
but  feel  great  uneasiness  for  your  safety,  should  you  un 
dertake  to  reach  me.  You  will  not  only  encounter  the 
hardships  and  fatigues  of  a  very  disagreeable  journey, 
but  also  run  the  risk  of  capture  by  the  enemy. 

"I  send  my  aide-de-camp,  Major  Taylor,  back  to  ex 
plain  to  you  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the  journey, 
which  I  cannot  recommend  you  to  undertake.  I  am  en 
deavoring  to  break  up  the  line  through  Leesburg,  which 
is  no  longer  safe,  and  turn  everything  off  from  Culpeper 
Court  House  toward  Winchester. 

73 


74  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"...  I  must  therefore  advise  you  do  not  make  an 
attempt  that  I  cannot  but  regard  as  hazardous. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  high  respect,  your  obe 
dient  servant, 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

Davis  abandoned  the  idea  of  going  to  Lee  before  he 
received  his  letter.  Lee's  real  reason  for  the  campaign 
he  states  clearly  in  the  following  letter,  and  his  account 
of  the  condition  of  the  army  proves  that  he  did  not  ex 
pect  to  achieve  Confederate  independence. 

"  HEADQUARTERS,   ALEXANDRIA  AND  LEESBURG  ROAD, 

"  NEAR  DRAINESVILLE,  September  3,  1862. 
"  His  EXCELLENCY,  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. 

"  MR.  PRESIDENT  :  .  .  .  After  the  enemy  had  disap 
peared  from  the  vicinity  of  Fairfax  Court  House  and 
taken  the  road  to  Alexandria  and  Washington,  I  did  not 
think  it  would  be  advantageous  to  follow  him  farther.  I 
had  no  intention  of  attacking  him  in  his  fortifications 
and  am  not  prepared  to  invest  them.  If  I  possessed  the 
necessary  munitions,  I  should  be  unable  to  supply  pro 
visions  for  the  troops.  I  therefore  determined,  while 
threatening  the  approaches  to  Washington,  to  draw  the 
troops  into  Loudoun,  where  forage  and  some  provisions 
can  be  procured,  menace  their  possession  of  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley,  and,  if  found  practicable,  to  cross  into 
Maryland.  The  purpose,  if  discovered,  will  have  the 
effect  of  carrying  the  enemy  north  of  the  Potomac,  and 
if  prevented  will  not  result  in  much  evil. 

"  The  army  is  not  properly  equipped  for  an  invasion 
of  the  enemy's  territory.  It  lacks  much  of  the  material 
of  war,  is  feeble  in  transportation,  the  animals  being 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  ^5 

much  reduced,  and  the  men  are  poorly  provided  with 
clothing  and  in  thousands  of  instances  are  destitute  of 
shoes.  Still,  we  cannot  afford  to  be  idle,  and,  though 
weaker  than  our  opponents  in  men  and  military  equip 
ment,  must  endeavor  to  harass  if  we  cannot  destroy  them. 
I  am  aware  that  the  movement  is  attended  with  much 
risk,  yet  I  do  not  consider  success  impossible,  and  shall 
endeavor  to  guard  it  from  loss.  As  long  as  the  army  of 
the  enemy  is  employed  on  this  frontier  I  have  no  fears 
for  the  safety  of  Richmond. 

".  .  .  .  What  occasions  most  concern  is  the  fear  of 
getting  out  of  ammunition.  I  beg  you  will  instruct  the 
Ordnance  Department  to  spare  no  pains  in  manufacturing 
a  sufficient  amount  of  the  best  kind.  .  .  .  If  the  Quarter 
master's  Department  can  furnish  any  shoes,  it  would  be 
the  greatest  relief.  We  have  entered  upon  September, 
and  the  nights  are  becoming  cool. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  high  respect,  your  obe 
dient  servant, 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

There  is  not  a  word  in  this  letter  referring  to  the  prob 
ability  or  possibility  of  conquering  Confederate  inde 
pendence,  or  of  any  definite  end  other  than  to  harass  the 
enemy  and  keep  him  on  the  northern  frontier. 

It  had  cost  Lee  dearly  to  get  his  army  out  of  the  last 
ditch  at  Richmond,  and  if  he  remained  idle  it  would  be 
but  a  little  time  before  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would 
be  trying  to  put  him  back  in  it. 

Longstreet  says : 

"  Riding  together  before  we  reached  Frederick,  the 
sound  of  artillery  fire  came  from  the  direction  of  Point  of 


76  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Rocks  and  Harper's  Ferry,  from  which  General  Lee  in 
ferred  that  the  enemy  was  concentrating  forces  from  the 
Valley,  for  defense  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  proposed  to 
me  to  organize  forces  to  surround  and  capture  the  works 
and  garrison.  I  thought  it  a  venture  not  worth  the 
game,  and  suggested,  as  we  were  in  the  enemy's  country 
and  presence,  that  he  would  be  advised  of  any  move  that 
we  made  in  a  few  hours  after  it  was  set  on  foot ;  that  the 
Union  army,  though  beaten,  was  not  disorganized;  that 
we  knew  a  number  of  their  officers  who  could  put  it  in 
order  and  march  against  us,  if  they  found  us  exposed, 
and  make  serious  trouble  before  the  capture  could  be  ac 
complished  ;  that  our  men  were  worn  by  very  severe  and 
protracted  service  and  in  need  of  repose ;  that  as  long  as 
we  had  them  in  hand  we  were  masters  of  the  situation, 
but  dispersed  into  many  fragments  our  strength  must  be 
greatly  reduced.  As  the  subject  was  not  continued,  I 
supposed  that  it  was  a  mere  expression  of  passing 
thought  until  the  day  after  we  reached  Frederick,  upon 
going  over  to  headquarters,  I  found  the  front  of  the 
general's  tent  closed  and  tied.  Upon  inquiring  of  a 
member  of  the  staff,  I  was  told  that  he  was  inside  with 
General  Jackson.  As  I  had  not  been  called,  I  turned  to 
go  away,  when  General  Lee,  recognizing  my  voice,  called 
me  in.  The  plan  had  been  arranged.  .  .  ." 

According  to  Longstreet,  the  capture  of  Harper's 
Ferry  was  optional  and  ought  not  to  have  been  attempted. 

The  following  reasons  will  explain  why  it  was  neces 
sary. 

Lee  wrote  to  Davis  from  Frederick,  September  9 : 

"  I  shall  move  in  the  direction  I  originally  intended, 
toward  Hagerstown  and  Chambersburg,  for  the  purpose 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  77 

of  opening  communication  through  the  Valley  in  order 
to  procure  sufficient  supplies  of  flour." 

Both  Long  and  Taylor  of  Lee's  staff  say  that  when  he 
got  to  Frederick  he  thought  Harper's  Ferry  had  been 
abandoned,  as  it  should  have  been.  As  it  was  still  gar 
risoned  by  11,000  men,  it  was  not  safe  to  leave  it  on  his 
new  line  of  communication,  and  that  is,  of  course,  suffi 
cient  reason,  even  if  there  had  been  no  other,  for  taking 
it. 

Longstreet  says  that  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  it  was 
left  alone.  But  it  was  not  exactly  left  alone. 

Early 's  operations  cleared  the  Valley  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry  crossed  over  to  Mary 
land  Heights. 

Colonel  Mosby  says : 

".  .  .  One  benefit  of  Stuart's  crossing  at  Seneca  was 
that  it  practically  eliminated  French's  corps  in  the  cam 
paign,  and  put  it  on  the  defensive,  to  guard  the  line  of 
the  Potomac  and  the  rear  of  Meade's  army.  It  had  been 
the  garrison, —  11,000, —  at  Harper's  Ferry,  but,  when 
that  place  was  abandoned,  it  was  added  to  Meade's  com 
mand.  But  Stuart's  appearance  created  such  a  sensa 
tion  that  Meade  sent  4,000  men  to  guard  the  canal  and 
7,000  were  kept  at  Frederick.  They  were  no  more  help 
to  Meade  in  the  battle  than  if  they  had  stayed  above  the 
clouds  on  Maryland  Heights.  .  .  ." 

Early's  operations  moved  the  garrison  to  the  Maryland 
side,  and  Stuart's  put  it  on  guard  in  Meade's  rear. 
Longstreet  says : 

"  All  the  Confederates  had  to  do  was  to  hold  the  army 
in  hand  and  draw  the  enemy  to  a  good  field.  .  .  .  The 


78  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Confederates,  if  held  in  hand  and  refreshed  a  little,  could 
have  made  their  grandest  success." 

There  is  no  reason  why  the  success  would  have  been 
any  "  grander  "  than  the  success  at  Manassas.  The  same 
reason  that  Lee  gives  for  not  following  Pope  would  have 
been  even  stronger  for  not  following  McClellan,  for  his 
line  of  communication  would  have  been  longer  and  in 
fact  impossible. 

Then  Lee  had  no  such  good  reason  for  fighting  at 
Antietam  or  on  Longstreet's  "  good  field  "  as  he  had  for 
fighting  Second  Manassas,  where  he  fought  to  break  up 
the  combination  against  Richmond. 

Longstreet  says : 

"  If  the  Southern  army  had  been  carefully  held  in 
hand,  refreshed  by  easy  marches  and  comfortable  sup 
plies,  the  proclamation  (of  emancipation)  could  not  have 
found  its  place  in  history. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  the  Southern  President  would 
have  been  in  Maryland  at  the  head  of  his  army,  with  his 
manifesto  of  peace  and  independence." 

If  the  army  had  been  held  in  hand  it  would  hardly  have 
done  more  in  Maryland  with  60,000  men  than  it  did  at 
Richmond  with  80,000,  and  that  was  a  victory  at  Gaines's 
Mill  and  a  repulse  at  Malvern  Hill. 

As  for  the  proclamation,  Lincoln  repeatedly  declared 
it  was  a  war  measure  pure  and  simple,  and  designed  ex 
clusively  to  weaken  the  South  and  strengthen  the  North, 
so  that  it  would  have  been  more  necessary  in  defeat  than 
in  victory. 

It  is  true  Lincoln  was  holding  the  proclamation  for  a 
victory;  but  a  repetition  of  Gaines's  Mill  and  Malvern 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  79 

Hill  would  hardly  have  prevented  him  from  issuing  it, 
especially  as  he  claimed  a  victory  at  Malvern  Hill. 

When  McClellan  became  possessed  of  the  "  lost  order  " 
acquainting  him  with  Lee's  plans, —  the  scattering  of  his 
columns  to  capture  Harper's  Ferry  and  to  oppose  his  ap 
proach, —  he  dispatched  to  Mr.  Lincoln : 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  FREDERICK, 

"  Sept.  13,  1862,  12  m. 
("Received  2.35  a.m.,  Sept.  14.) 
"  To  THE  PRESIDENT  :  I  have  the  whole  rebel  force 
in  front  of  me,  but  am  confident  and  no  time  shall  be 
lost.  I  have  a  difficult  task  to  perform,  but  with  God's 
blessing  will  accomplish  it.  I  think  Lee  has  made  a  gross 
mistake,  and  that  he  will  be  severely  punished  for  it.  The 
army  is  in  motion  as  rapidly  as  possible.  I  hope  for  a 
great  success,  if  the  plans  of  the  rebels  remain  unchanged. 
We  have  possession  of  Catactin.  I  have  all  the  plans  of 
the  rebels,  and  will  catch  them  in  their  own  trap,  if  my 
men  are  equal  to  the  emergency.  I  now  feel  that  I  can 
count  on  them  as  of  old.  All  forces  of  Pennsylvania 
should  be  placed  to  cooperate  at  Chambersburg.  My  re 
spects  to  Mrs.  Lincoln.  Received  most  enthusiastically  by 
the  ladies.  Will  send  you  trophies.  All  well  and  with 
God's  blessing  will  accomplish  it. 

"  GEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN." 

This  must  have  been  very  comforting  in  view  of  the 
state  of  the  public  mind  in  the  North. 
Rhodes  says : 

"  The  feeling  in  the  North  approached  consternation. 
That  Lee  should  threaten  Washington  and  Baltimore, 
then  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia,  while  Bragg  threat- 


80  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

ened  Louisville  and  Cincinnati,  was  piling  up  a  menace 
that  shook  the  nerves  of  the  coolest  men. 

".  .  .  The  dispatches  from  Governor  Curtin  at  Harris- 
burg  manifest  concern  for  that  capital;  he  called  out  50,- 
ooo  militia  for  the  defense  of  the  State.  The  words 
which  came  from  Philadelphia  were  such  as  the  citizens 
of  a  wealthy  city  utter  in  time  of  panic." 

S.  H.  Gay  wrote  from  New  York  city :  "  There  is  the 
deepest  anxiety  here,  and  a  most  ominous  state  of 
affairs/' 

Though  McClellan  telegraphed  to  Lincoln  on  the  I3th, 
'  The  army  is  in  motion  as  rapidly  as  possible,"  and  "  I 
have  all  the  plans  of  the  rebels  and  will  catch  them  in 
their  own  trap,"  he  did  not  progress  very  rapidly.  Lee 
sent  D.  H.  Hill  to  the  mountain  gaps,  and  McClellan  had 
to  fight  to  get  through. 

On  the  1 7th,  however,  he  did  catch  the  rebels  in  their 
own  trap. 

Colonel  Douglass,  aide-de-camp  on  Jackson's  staff, 
gives  the  following  account  of  the  battle : 

".  .  .  The  first  onset,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  i/th, 
told  what  the  day  would  be.  The  impatient  Hooker, 
with  the  divisions  of  Meade,  Doubleday,  and  Ricketts, 
struck  the  first  blow,  and  Jackson's  old  division  caught  it 
and  struck  back  again.  Between  such  foes  the  battle 
soon  waxed  hot.  Step  by  step  and  marking  each  step 
with  dead,  the  thin  Confederate  line  was  pushed  back  to 
the  wood  around  the  Dunker  church.  Here  Lawton, 
Starke  (commanding  in  place  of  Jones,  already 
wounded),  and  D.  H.  Hill,  with  part  of  his  division,  en 
gaged  Meade.  And  now  in  turn  the  Federals  halted  and 
fell  back,  and  left  their  dead  by  the  Dunker  church. 
Next  Mansfield  entered  the  fight,  and  beat  with  resist- 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  81 

less  might  on  Jackson's  people.  The  battle  here  grew 
angry  and  bloody.  Starke  was  killed,  Lawton  wounded, 
and  nearly  all  their  general  and  field  officers  had  fallen; 
the  sullen  Confederate  line  again  fell  back,  killing  Mans 
field  and  wounding  Hooker,  Crawford,  and  Hartsuff. 

"  And  now  D.  H.  Hill  led  in  the  rest  of  his  division; 
Hood  also  took  part  to  the  right  and  left,  front  and  rear, 
of  the  Dunker  church.  The  Federal  line  was  again  driven 
back,  while  artillery  added  its  din  to  the  incessant  rattle 
of  musketry.  Then  Sumner,  with  the  fresh  division  of 
Sedgwick,  re-formed  the  Federal  line  and  renewed  the 
offensive.  Hood  was  driven  back,  and  Hill  partly;  the 
Dunker  Church  was  passed,  the  field  south  of  it  entered, 
and  the  Confederate  left  turned.  Just  then  McLaws, 
hurrying  from  Harper's  Ferry,  came  upon  the  field,  and 
hurled  his  men  against  the  victorious  Sedgwick.  He 
drove  Sedgwick  back  into  the  Dunker  wood,  and  beyond 
it,  into  the  open  ground.  Farther  to  our  right  the  pendu 
lum  of  battle  had  been  swinging  to  and  fro,  with  D.  H. 
Hill  and  R.  H.  Anderson  hammering  away  at  French  and 
Richardson,  until  the  sunken  road  became  historic  as 
'  Bloody  Lane.'  Richardson  was  mortally  wounded,  and 
Hancock  assumed  command  of  his  division. 

"  For  a  while  there  was  a  lull  in  the  storm.  It  was 
early  in  the  day,  but  hours  are  fearfully  long  in  battle. 
About  noon  Franklin,  with  Slocum  and  W.  F.  Smith, 
marched  upon  the  field  to  join  the  unequal  contest. 
Smith  tried  his  luck  and  was  repulsed.  Sumner  then 
ordered  a  halt.  Jackson's  fight  was  over,  and  a  strange 
silence  reigned  around  Dunker  Church. 

"  General  Lee  had  not  visited  the  left  that  day.  As 
usual  he  trusted  to  Jackson  to  fight  his  own  battle,  and 
work  out  salvation  in  his  own  way.  How  well  he  did 
it,  against  the  ablest  and  fiercest  of  McClellan's  lieuten 
ants,  history  has  told. 


82  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"During  all  this  time  Longstreet,  stripped  of  his 
troops, —  sent  to  the  help  of  Jackson, —  held  the  right 
almost  alone,  with  his  eye  on  the  center.  He  was  now 
called  into  active  work  on  his  own  front,  for  there  were 
no  unf ought  troops  in  Lee's  army  at  Sharpsburg;  every 
soldier  on  that  field  tasted  battle. 

"  General  Burnside,  with  his  corps  of  fourteen  thou 
sand  men,  had  been  lying  all  day  beyond  the  bridge 
which  now  bears  his  name.  Ordered  to  cross  at  eight 
o'clock,  he  managed  to  get  over  at  one,  and  by  three 
was  ready  to  advance.  He  moved  against  the  hill  which 
D.  R.  Jones  held  with  his  little  division  of  2500  men. 
Longstreet  was  watching  this  advance.  Jackson  was  at 
General  Lee's  headquarters  on  a  knoll  in  rear  of  Sharps- 
burg.  A.  P.  Hill  was  coming,  but  had  not  arrived,  and 
it  was  apparent  that  Burnside  must  be  stayed,  if  at  all, 
with  artillery. 

"  I  saw  Burnside's  heavy  line  move  up  the  hill,  and 
the  earth  seemed  to  tremble  beneath  their  tread.  It  was 
a  splendid  and  fearful  sight,  but  for  them  to  beat  back 
Jones's  feeble  line  was  scarcely  war.  The  artillery  tore, 
but  did  not  stay  them.  They  pressed  forward  until 
Sharpsburg  was  uncovered,  and  Lee's  line  of  retreat  was 
at  their  mercy.  But  then,  just  then,  A.  P.  Hill,  pictur 
esque  in  his  red  battleshirt,  with  three  of  his  brigades, 
2500  men,  who  had  marched  that  day  seventeen  miles 
from  Harper's  Ferry  and  had  waded  the  Potomac,  ap 
peared  upon  the  scene.  Tired  and  footsore,  the  men 
forgot  their  woes  in  that  supreme  moment,  and,  with 
no  breathing  time,  braced  themselves  to  meet  the  coming 
shock.  They  met  it  and  stayed  it.  The  blue  line  stag 
gered  and  hesitated,  and,  hesitating,  was  lost.  At  the 
critical  moment  A.  P.  Hill  was  always  at  his  strongest. 
Quickly  advancing  his  battle-flags,  his  line  moved  for- 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  83 

ward,  Jones's  troops  rallied  on  him,  and  in  the  din  of 
musketry  and  artillery,  on  either  flank  the  Federals  broke 
over  the  field.  Hill  did  not  wait  for  his  other  bri 
gades,  but  held  the  vantage  gained  until  Burnside 
was  driven  back  to  the  Antietam  and  under  the  shelter 
of  heavy  guns.  The  day  was  done.  Again  A.  P. 
Hill,  as  at  Manassas,  Harper's  Ferry,  and  elsewhere, 
had  struck  with  the  right  hand  of  Mars.  No  wonder 
that  both  Lee  and  Jackson,  when,  in  the  delirium  of 
their  last  moments  on  earth,  they  stood  again  to  battle, 
saw  the  form  of  A.  P.  Hill  leading  his  column  on;  but 
it  is  a  wonder  and  a  shame  that  the  grave  of  this  valiant 
Virginian  in  Hollywood  cemetery  has  not  a  stone  to  mark 
it  and  keep  it  from  oblivion. 

"  The  battle  at  Sharpsburg  was  the  result  of  unfore 
seen  circumstances  and  not  of  deliberate  purpose.  It 
was  one  of  the  bloodiest  of  the  war,  and  a  defeat  for 
both  armies.  The  prestige  of  the  day  was  with  Lee, 
but  when  on  the  night  of  the  i8th  he  recrossed  into 
Virginia,  although,  as  the  Comte  de  Paris  says,  he  left 
not  a  single  trophy  of  his  nocturnal  retreat  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  he  left  the  prestige  of  the  result  with  Mc- 
Clellan." 

From  Lee's  report  of  the  battle: 

"  This  great  battle  was  fought  by  less  than  40,000 
men  on  our  side,  all  of  whom  had  undergone  the  great 
est  labor  and  hardship  in  the  field  and  on  the  march. 
Nothing  could  surpass  the  determined  valor  with  which 
they  met  the  large  army  of  the  enemy,  fully  supplied 
and  equipped,  and  the  result  reflects  the  highest  credit  on 
the  officers  and  men." 

Lee  carried  60,000  men  to  Maryland ;  McClellan,  67,- 


84     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

ooo.  In  addition  to  McClellan's  army  there  were  12,- 
ooo  men  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Lee  was  short  20,000  men  at 
Antietam.  They  had  been  lost  in  the  engagements  at 
South  Mountain,  Cranipton's  Gap,  Maryland  Heights, 
and  on  the  long  marches,  which  were  continuous  and 
distressing. 

From  General  McLaws's  report : 

"  The  entire  command  was  very  much  fatigued. 
The  brigades  of  Generals  Kershaw  and  Barksdale  had 
been  engaged  on  Maryland  Heights  on  the  I2th,  I3th, 
and  1 4th,  and  on  the  I5th  had  been  marched  from  the 
Heights  to  the  line  of  battle,  up  the  Valley,  formed  to 
oppose  that  of  the  enemy  below  Crampton's  Gap. 
Those  of  Generals  Cobb,  Semmes,  and  Mahone  (Colonel 
Parsham)  had  been  engaged  and  badly  crippled  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  and  all  the  others  had  been  guarding 
important  points  under  very  trying  circumstances. 

"  A  large  number  had  no  provisions,  and  a  great 
portion  had  not  had  time  nor  opportunity  to  cook  what 
they  had.  All  the  troops  had  been  without  sleep  the 
previous  night,  except  while  waiting  in  line  for  the 
wagon  trains  to  pass  over  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Harper's 
Ferry/' 

McClellan  lost  11,657  men>  and  Lee's  loss,  including 
the  fighting  at  the  mountain  gaps  and  Harper's  Ferry, 
was  about  12,000. 

Lee  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry  11,000  infantry, 
three  companies  of  cavalry,  six  companies  of  artillery, 
forty-nine  pieces  of  artillery,  twenty-four  mountain 
howitzers,  and  11,000  small  arms. 

So  far  as  the  battle  itself  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing 
but  favorable  criticism  of  Lee's  generalship. 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  85 

Nearly  all  critics  agree  with  Rhodes,  who  says: 

"  While  Lee's  strategy  and  in  some  measure  his 
tactics  have  been  censured  by  Longstreet,  the  layman 
will  be  prone  to  agree  with  Allen  that  the  conduct  of 
the  battle  of  Antietam  itself  by  Lee  and  his  principal 
subordinates  seems  absolutely  above  criticism.  .  .  ." 

From  "Ropes'  Civil  War":  "Of  General  Lee's 
management  of  the  battle  there  is  nothing  but  praise 
to  be  said.  .  .  ." 

McClellan  has  been  censured  for  not  renewing  the  at 
tack  on  the  1 8th.  He  says  in  his  report: 

"  The  night,  however,  brought  grave  responsibilities 
—  whether  to  renew  the  attack  on  the  i8th,  or  to  defer 
it,  even  with  the  risk  of  the  enemy's  retirement,  was 
the  question  before  me.  After  a  night  of  anxious  de 
liberation  and  a  full  and  careful  survey  of  the  situation 
and  condition  of  our  army,  the  strength  and  position 
of  the  enemy,  I  concluded  that  the  success  of  an  attack 
on  the  1 8th  was  uncertain. 

"  At  that  moment, —  Virginia  lost,  Washington  men 
aced,  Maryland  invaded, —  the  national  cause  could  af 
ford  no  risk  of  defeat.  One  battle  lost  and  almost  all 
would  have  been  lost.  Lee's  army  might  then  have 
marched,  as  it  pleased,  on  Washington,  Baltimore,  Phil 
adelphia,  or  New  York." 

But  other  reasons  influenced  him  too.  It  was  the 
bloodiest  one-day  fight  of  the  war,  and  his  army  and 
his  nerves  were  badly  shaken.  He  says : 

"  The  troops  generally  were  greatly  overcome  by  the 
fatigue  and  exhaustion  of  the  severe  and  continuous 


86  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

fighting  on  the  I7th.  They  required  rest  and  refresh 
ment.  One  division  of  Sumner's  and  all  Hooker's 
corps  on  the  right  had,  after  fighting  most  valiantly  for 
several  hours,  been  overpowered  by  numbers,  driven 
back  in  great  disorder,  and  much  scattered,  so  that  they 
were  for  the  time  somewhat  demoralized. 

"  Some  of  the  new  troops  on  the  left,  although  many 
of  them  fought  well  during  the  battle  and  are  entitled 
to  great  credit,  were,  at  the  close  of  the  action,  driven 
back  and  their  morale  impaired. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  i8th  General  Burnside  re 
quested  that  another  division  be  sent  to  assist  him  in 
holding  his  position  on  the  far  side  of  the  Antietam, 
giving  the  impression  that  if  he  were  attacked  again 
that  morning  he  would  not  be  able  to  make  a  very  vig 
orous  resistance.  .  .  ." 

McClellan's  discretion  contrasts  strongly  with  Lee's 
recklessness  in  fighting  87,000  men  with  less  than  40,- 
ooo  tired  ones,  and  in  standing  all  day  on  the  i8th  in 
line  of  battle. 

The  diary  of  Gideon  Wells  says  that  at  the  cabinet 
meeting  June  17,  1863,  Lincoln  spoke  of  a  poem  mytho- 
logically  describing  McClellan  as  a  monkey  fighting  the 
rebellion  in  the  shape  of  a  serpent.  The  joke  was  that 
McClellan  kept  calling  for  "  more  tail  —  more  tail," 
which  Jupiter  furnished. 

Palfrey  says  of  McClellan: 

"  When  the  Confederacy  was  young  and  fresh  and 
rich,  and  its  armies  were  numerous,  he  fought  a  good, 
wary,  damaging,  respectable  fight  against  it." 

But  Jupiter  gave  to  Grant  "  more  tail  "  than  he  gave 
to  McClellan. 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  87 

If  Malvern  Hill  was  a  Federal  victory,  then  An- 
tietam  was  a  Confederate  victory.  At  Malvern  Hill 
McClellan  commanded  the  invading  army  —  at  Antietam 
Lee  commanded  it.  Lee's  repulse  at  Malvern  Hill  was 
not  more  decided  than  McClellan' s  at  Antietam,  nor  was 
it  as  bloody. 

McClellan  retreated  in  disorder  on  the  night  of  the 
battle,  and  subsequently  by  the  back  door  water  route 
to  Washington.  Lee  remained  in  line  the  day  after  the 
battle,  and  then  retired  in  order  to  Virginia.  As  usual, 
Longstreet  alleges  that  failure  of  the  campaign  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  Lee  did  not  take  his  advice,  and  Lee's 
worshipers  discover  a  mare's  nest  to  account  for  it. 

One  of  them,  who  was  on  his  staff,  says : 

"  What  a  fatality  was  there  for  General  Lee !  What 
an  advantage  to  the  Federal  commander  to  be  instantly 
made  aware  of  the  division  of  his  adversary's  army,  the 
wide  separation  of  his  columns,  and  to  have  the  detail 
of  his  plan  laid  bare.  There  is  no  parallel  to  it  in  his 
tory." 

There  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  "  lost  order  "  ac 
celerated  McClellan's  advance.  General  Pleasonton, 
who  made  the  first  battle,  that  at  Turner's  Pass  on  the 
1 4th,  had  not  heard  of  it. 

Anyhow  it  cuts  no  figure  in  the  results  of  the  cam 
paign.  Under  the  most  favorable  circumstances  Lee 
could  only  have  driven  McClellan  from  Longstreet's 
"  good  field." 

His  loss  would  have  been  as  great,  or  greater,  than 
it  was  at  Antietam,  and  he  would  have  been  too  weak 
to  push  him  from  the  strong  positions  in  his  rear  and 
lay  siege  to  Washington.  In  fact  if  he  had  not  lost  a 


88  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

man  he  could  not  have  laid  siege  to  Washington,  for  he 
was  not  equipped  nor  provisioned  for  it. 

The  trouble  with  Lee's  worshipers  is  that  they  are  al 
ways  making  excuses  for  his  failure  to  accomplish  im 
possibilities  foreign  to  his  strategy.  At  Antietam  it  is 
the  "lost  order";  at  Gettysburg,  Stuart. 

The  world  takes  no  heed  of  their  excuses,  and  so  the 
failures  which  originated  in  their  minds  are  largely  re 
sponsible  for  erroneous  historical  estimates  of  Lee. 

Lee  was  not  a  provincial  Southerner.  He  had  been 
in  the  United  States  army  all  his  life,  and  his  home 
was  at  Washington.  He  realized  from  the  first  what 
he  had  to  contend  with.  He  knew  that  his  re 
sources  in  men  and  material  would  not  enable  him 
to  conquer  independence  on  northern  soil.  Therefore  his 
only  alternative  was  to  prolong  the  war  until  the  North 
should  get  tired  of  it;  and  to  prolong  it,  it  was  necessary 
to  keep  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  far  away  from 
Richmond  as  possible,  and  the  only  way  in  which  that 
could  be  done  was  to  threaten  Washington.  All  his 
strategy,  involving  desperate  movements  and  battles,  was 
designed  to  accomplish  this  one  object  and  nothing  more. 
His  correspondence,  the  condition  of  the  army,  and  the 
conduct  of  his  campaigns  show  conclusively  the  single 
ness  of  his  purpose. 

The  same  staff  officer  says : 

"  It  looks  as  if  the  good  Lord  had  ordained  that  we 
should  not  succeed.  .  .  . 

"  To  me  it  is  as  if  He  who  controls  the  destinies 
of  men  and  of  nations  had  said:  You  people  of  the 
South  shall  be  sorely  tried;  but  the  blame  is  not  yours, 
and  therefore  to  you  shall  fall  the  honors, —  genius,  skill, 
courage,  fortitude,  endurance,  readiness  for  self-sacrifice, 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  89 

prowess  in  battle,  and  victory  against  great  odds.  But 
this  great  experiment  to  demonstrate  man's  capacity  for 
self-government,  with  its  cornerstone  of  universal 
freedom,  must  continue  with  undivided  front,  and  there 
fore  I  decree  to  the  other  side  determination,  persist 
ency,  numbers,  unlimited  resources,  and  ultimate  suc 
cess.  .  .  ." 

Here  we  have  the  "  good  Lord  "  as  umpire  of  the 
game.  He  slaps  the  North  on  the  back  and  awards  the 
gate  money,  and  then  bestows  the  usual  taffy  on  the 
South. 

It  does  seem  that  if  the  "  good  Lord  "  had  had  any 
thing  to  do  with  the  war  He  would  have  been  at  least 
as  merciful  as  are  the  umpires  in  the  prize  ring,  and 
would  have  stopped  it  before  any  one  was  killed. 

Out  of  puffery,  quackery,  cant,  and  hypocrisy  grows 
the  absurdity  that  the  practical,  common-sense,  dollar- 
worshiping  people  of  the  North  squandered  billions  of 
dollars  on  the  "  man's  capacity  for  self-government " 
humbuggery  and  negro  emancipation. 

Man  had  been  demonstrating  his  capacity,  or  rather  his 
incapacity,  for  self-government  ever  since  the  man  with 
the  arquebus  shot  a  hole  in  the  knight's  armor ;  otherwise 
there  would  have  been  no  war. 

Then  there  was  a  parallel  to  the  "  lost  order  "  episode, 
except  in  the  matter  of  result.  At  Antietam  they  were 
nil,  while  at  Metaurus  in  207  B.  C.  they  decided  the  fate 
of  the  world. 

Creasy  says : 

".  .  .  Meanwhile  Hasdrubal  had  raised  the  siege  of 
Placentia,  and  was  advancing  toward  Ariminum  on  the 
Adriatic,  and  driving  before  him  the  Roman  army  under 
Porcius.  Nor  when  the  Consul  Livius  had  come  up,  and 


90  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

united  the  second  and  third  armies  of  the  North,  could 
he  make  head  against  the  invaders.  The  Romans  still 
fell  back  before  Hasdrubal,  beyond  Ariminum,  beyond 
the  Metaurus,  and  as  far  as  the  little  town  of  Sena,  to 
the  southeast  of  that  river.  Hasdrubal  was  not  unmind 
ful  of  the  necessity  of  acting  in  concert  with  his  brother. 
He  sent  messengers  to  Hannibal  to  announce  his  march, 
and  to  propose  that  they  should  unite  their  armies  in 
South  Umbria,  and  then  wheel  around  against  Rome. 
Those  messengers  traversed  the  quarter  part  of  Italy  in 
safety;  but,  when  close  to  the  object  of  their  mission, 
were  captured  by  a  Roman  detachment ;  and  Hasdrubal' s 
letter,  detailing  his  whole  plan  of  the  campaign,  was  laid, 
not  in  his  brother's  hands,  but  in  those  of  the  commander 
of  the  Roman  armies  of  the  South.  Nero  saw  at  once 
the  full  importance  of  the  crisis.  The  two  sons  of  Ham- 
ilcar  were  now  within  two  hundred  miles  of  each  other, 
and  if  Rome  was  to  be  saved,  the  brothers  must  never 
meet  alive.  .  .  ." 

This  letter  enabled  Nero  to  destroy  Hasdrubal  and  his 
army  in  the  battle  of  Metaurus. 
Creasy  says: 

".  .  .  In  the  true  spirit  of  that  savage  brutality  which 
deformed  the  Roman  national  character,  Nero  ordered 
Hasdrubal's  head  to  be  flung  in  his  brother's  camp. 
Eleven  years  had  passed  since  Hannibal  had  gazed  on 
those  features. 

"  The  sons  of  Hamilcar  had  then  planned  their  system 
of  warfare  against  Rome,  which  they  had  brought  so 
nearly  to  successful  accomplishment.  Year  after  year 
had  Hannibal  been  struggling  in  Italy,  in  the  hopes  of 
one  day  hailing  the  arrival  of  him  whom  he  had  left  in 


SHARPSBURG  (ANTIETAM)  91 

Spain,  and  of  seeing  his  brother's  eye  flash  with  affection 
and  pride  at  the  junction  of  their  irresistible  hosts.  He 
now  saw  that  eye  glazed  in  death,  and  in  the  agony  of 
his  heart  the  great  Carthaginian  groaned  aloud  that  he 
recognized  his  country's  destiny." 


CHAPTER  IV 

FREDERICKSBURG 

IN  December,  1862,  Lee's  army  of  78,000  men  was  in 
winter  quarters  at  Fredericksburg,  and  Burnside's,  of 
113,000,  at  Falmouth  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
Rappahannock  river.  Burnside's  position  was  a  false 
one  from  which  to  launch  an  "  On  to  Richmond  "  cam 
paign. 

The  ground  of  Lee's  right  was  not  inviting,  and  on 
his  left  was  the  Wilderness.  The  water  route  was 
not  popular  after  McClellan's  failure,  so  Burnside  con 
cluded  to  cross  directly  in  his  front,  take  possession  of 
Fredericksburg,  and  attack  Lee  in  the  strongest  position 
he  ever  held. 

Lee  held  the  river  front  of  the  town  with  a  strong 
picket  line  that  gave  Burnside  considerable  trouble,  but 
he  finally  dislodged  it  with  a  furious  artillery  fire  that 
sent  the  bricks  flying  in  Fredericksburg. 

The  battle  itself  was  a  rather  one-sided  affair, —  easy 
for  Lee. 

Rhodes  says  of  it : 

"...  The  order  to  be  ready  came  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  the  1 3th;  the  word  of  attack  was  received  by  noon. 
The  Union  soldiers  advanced  over  the  plain  between  the 
town  and  the  stone  wall,  ground  which  Longstreet's 
superintendent  of  artillery  said :  '  We  cover  so  well  that 

we  will  comb  it  as  with  a  fine-tooth  comb.     A  chicken 

92 


FREDERICKSBURG  93 

could  not  live  on  that  field  when  we  open  on  it.'  The 
canal  interfered  with  their  deployment,  and  the  fire  was 
therefore  the  more  destructive.  But  generals  and  sol 
diers  had  their  orders,  and  forward  they  went.  No 
higher  courage  could  be  shown.  Intelligent  as  brave, 
they  felt  their  effort  hopeless,  yet  did  their  very  best 
to  carry  the  stone  wall.  Hancock  led  a  charge  of  5,000 
and  lost  two  out  of  every  five  of  his  veterans,  of  whom 
one  hundred  and  fifty-six  were  commissioned  officers, 
'  able  and  tried  commanders/  *  Six  times  did  the 
enemy,'  wrote  Lee,  '  notwithstanding  the  havoc  caused 
by  our  batteries,  press  on  with  great  determination  to 
within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  foot  of  the  hill,  but 
here  encountering  the  deadly  fire  of  our  infantry,  his 
columns  were  broken.'  '  Oh,  great  God ! '  cried  Couch, 
'  see  how  our  men,  our  poor  fellows,  are  falling !  It  is 
only  murder  now ! J  '  Fighting  Joe  Hooker,'  who  until 
that  day  had  never  seen  fighting  enough,  felt  that  he 
could  make  no  more  impression  upon  the  Confederate 
works  than  upon  *  the  side  of  a  mountain  of  rock.' 

"  Putting  spurs  to  his  horse,  he  rode  across  the  river 
and  begged  Burnside  to  desist  from  further  attack.  The 
commander  was  obstinate,  and  declared  that  the  work  of 
assault  must  go  on.  Humphreys,  '  the  knight  without 
reproach  or  fear,'  then  led  a  bayonet  charge  of  4,500 
troops,  who  had  never  been  in  battle  before.  The  stone 
wall  was  a  sheet  o»f  flame.  ...  In  brief  time  over  a 
thousand  men  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  column 
turned.  The  regiments  retired  slowly,  and  in  good 
order,  many  of  the  soldiers  '  singing  and  hurrahing.' 

"  The  next  day  Burnside  was  wild  with  grief.  '  Oh, 
those  men!  those  men  over  there!'  he  said,  pointing 
across  the  river  where  lay  the  dead  and  wounded,  *  I 
am  thinking  of  them  all  the  time.'  " 


94     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 
Brevet  Brigadier  General  Ames,  U.  S.  V.,  says  of  it: 

"  On  Saturday,  December  13,  our  brigade  had  been 
held  in  reserve ;  but  late  in  the  day  we  were  hurried  to  the 
battle  only  to  see  a  field  full  of  flying  men  and  the  sun 
low  in  the  west  shining  red  through  columns  of  smoke, 
six  deserted  field-pieces  on  a  slight  rise  of  ground  in 
front  of  us,  and  a  cheering  column  of  troops  in  regular 
march  disappearing  on  our  left.  But  the  day  was  then 
over  and  the  battle  lost,  and  our  line  felt  hardly  bullets 
enough  to  draw  blood  before  darkness  put  an  end  to  the 
uproar  of  all  hostile  sounds,  save  desultory  shell-firing. 
For  an  hour  or  two  afterward  shells  from  Marye's 
Heights  traced  bright  lines  across  the  black  sky  with  their 
burning  fuses.  Then,  by  command,  we  sank  down  in 
our  lines,  to  get  what  sleep  the  soggy  ground  and  the 
danger  might  allow  us. 

"  Experience  had  taught  us  that  when  the  silent  line 
of  fire  from  the  shells  had  flashed  across  the  sky  and 
disappeared  behind  us  the  scream  and  explosion  that  fol 
lowed  were  harmless,  but  still  it  required  some  effort  to 
overcome  the  discomfort  of  the  damp  ground,  and  the 
flash  and  report  of  bursting  shells,  and  to  drop  quietly 
asleep  at  an  order.  We  finally  slept,  but  we  were  roused 
before  midnight,  and  formed  into  line  with  whispered 
commands,  and  then  filed  to  the  right,  and  reaching  the 
highways,  marched  away  from  the  town.  There  were 
many  dead  horses  at  exposed  points  of  our  turning  and 
many  more  dead  men.  Here  stood  a  low  brick  house, 
with  an  open  door  in  its  gable  end,  from  which  shone 
a  light,  and  into  which  we  peered  when  passing.  Inside 
sat  a  woman,  gaunt  and  hard-featured,  with  crazy  hair 
and  a  Meg  Merrilies  face,  still  sitting  by  a  smoking  candle, 
though  it  was  nearly  two  hours  past  midnight.  But  what 


FREDERICKSBURG  95 

woman  could  sleep,  though  never  so  masculine  and 
tough  of  fiber,  alone  in  a  house  between  two  hostile 
armies, —  two  corpses  lying  across  her  doorstep,  and 
within,  almost  at  her  feet,  four  more!  So,  with  wild 
eyes  and  face  lighted  by  her  smoky  candle,  she  stared 
across  the  dead  barrier  into  the  darkness  outside, 
with  the  look  of  one  who  heard  and  saw  not,  and  to 
whom  all  sounds  were  a  terror. 

"  We  formed  in  two  lines  —  the  right  of  each  resting 
near  and  in  front  of  this  small  brick  house,  and  the  left 
extending  into  the  field  at  right  angles  with  the  highway. 
Here  we  again  bivouacked,  finding  room  for  our  beds 
with  no  little  difficulty,  because  of  the  shattered  forms 
of  those  who  were  here  taking  their  last  long  sleep.  We 
rose  early.  The  heavy  fog  was  penetrating  and  chilly, 
and  the  damp  turf  was  no  warm  mattress  to  tempt  us 
to  a  morning  nap.  So  we  shook  off  sloth  from  our 
moistened  bodies  willingly,  and  rolling  up  the  gray 
blankets,  set  about  breakfast.  The  bivouac  breakfast  is  a 
nearer  approach  to  its  civilized  congener  than  the  bivouac 
bed.  Coffee  can  be  made  hot  and  good  in  blackened  tins ; 
pork  can  be  properly  frizzled  only  on  a  stick  over  an 
open  fire;  hard  tack  is  a  better,  sweeter  morsel  than  the 
average  American  house-wife  has  yet  achieved  with  her 
saleratus,  sour  milk,  '  empt'in's,'  and  what-not ;  and  a  pipe 
—  who  can  estimate  what  that  little  implement  has  done 
for  mankind?  Certainly  none  better  than  those  who 
have  sought  its  solace  after  the  bivouac  breakfast  that 
succeeds  a  bivouac  bed,  in  December. 

"  We  now  began  to  take  note  through  the  misty  veil 
of  the  wreck  of  men  and  horses  cumbering  the  ground 
about  us,  and  a  slight  lifting  of  the  gray  fog  showed  us 
the  story  of  yesterday's  repeated  assaults  and  repeated 
failures.  When  our  pipes  were  exhausted  we  got  up  to 


96  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

inspect  and  criticise  the  situation.  Just  here  was  the 
wreck  of  a  fence,  which  seemed  to  have  been  the  high 
tide  mark  of  our  advance  wave  of  battle.  The  fence  was 
a  barrier  which,  slight  as  it  was,  had  turned  back  the 
already  wavering  and  mutilated  lines  of  assault.  Almost 
an  army  lay  about  us  and  scattered  back  over  the  plain 
toward  the  town.  Not  only  corpses,  but  many  of  the 
badly  wounded,  hardly  distinguishable  from  the  dead, 
were  here  too.  To  die,  groveling  on  the  ground  or  fallen 
in  the  mire,  is  dreadful  indeed.  The  pallid  faces,  and  the 
clammy  hands  clenching  their  muskets,  looked  ghastly 
by  the  foglight.  The  new,  bright  blue  overcoats  only 
made  the  sight  the  ghastlier. 

"  About  eighty  yards  in  front  the  plowed  field  was 
bounded  by  a  stone  wall,  and  behind  the  wall  were  men 
in  gray  uniforms  moving  carelessly  about.  This  picture 
is  one  of  the  most  distinct  memories  of  the  war, —  the 
men  in  gray  behind  this  wall,  talking,  laughing,  cooking, 
cleaning  muskets,  clicking  locks  —  there  they  were ! — 
Lee's  soldiers! — the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia!  We 
were  so  absurdly  near  this  host  of  yesterday's  victors 
that  we  seemed  wholly  in  their  hands  and  a  part  of  their 
great  mass ;  cut  off  and  remote  from  the  Federal  army, 
and  almost  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy, —  prisoners, 
of  course.  That  was  the  immediate  impression,  as  we 
stupidly  gazed  in  the  first  moment  of  the  awkward  dis 
covery. 

"  But  the  sharp  whistle  of  a  bullet  sounded  in  our 
ears,  and  a  rebel's  face  peered  through  the  puff  of  smoke, 
as  he  removed  the  rifle  from  his  shoulder;  then  rapidly 
half  a  dozen  more  bullets  whistled  by  us,  and  the  warning 
sent  us  all  to  earth. 

"  The  enemy  riddled  every  moving  thing  in  sight ; 
horses  tied  to  the  wheels  of  a  broken  gun-carriage  behind 


FREDERICKSBURG  97 

us ;  pigs  that  incautiously  came  grunting  from  across  the 
road ;  even  chickens  were  brought  down  with  an  accuracy 
of  aim  that  told  of  a  fatally  short  range,  and  of  a  better 
practice  than  it  would  have  been  wise  for  our  numbers 
to  face.  They  applauded  their  own  success  with  a  hilar 
ity  we  could  hardly  share  in,  as  their  chicken  shooting 
was  across  our  backs,  leaving  us  no  extra  room  for 
turning." 

Lee's  loss  was  5377  men;  and  Burnside's,  12,653,  tne 
flower  of  his  army. 

There  was  gloom  in  the  North.  Joseph  Medill,  of  the 
Chicago  Times,  wrote  to  Colfax : 

"  Our  people  all  have  the  blues.  The  feeling  of  utter 
hopelessness  is  stronger  than  at  any  time  since  the  war 
began.  The  terrible  bloody  defeat  of  our  brave  army 
at  Fredericksburg  leaves  us  almost  without  hope." 

Meigs  wrote  to  Burnside : 

"  As  day  after  day  has  gone  my  heart  has  sunk,  and 
I  see  greater  peril  to  our  nationality  in  the  present  con 
dition  of  affairs  than  at  any  time  during  the  struggle." 

Criticism  of  Lee  is  confined  to  his  failure  to  attack 
Burnside  after  his  repulse,  and  there  is  an  absurd  story 
that  Jackson  asked  the  army  surgeon  how  many  white 
bandages  he  could  furnish  for  the  men  to  wear  in  a  night 
attack. 

The  review  of  Lord  Wolseley's  friendly  criticism  of 
Lee  by  a  Northern  soldier,  already  referred  to,  says : 

"  Equally  remarkable  for  visionary  confidence  is  Lord 


98     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Wolseley's  next  question,  '  What  commander  could  wisH 
to  have  his  foe  in  a  tighter  place  than  Burnside  was  in 
after  his  disastrous  attack  upon  Lee  at  Fredericksburg? ' 
Lee  has  explained  in  his  reports,  in  effect,  that  he  was 
so  much  pleased  with  the  tight  boot  Burnside  was  wear 
ing,  so  long  as  Burnside  was  the  aggressor,  that  he  had 
no  thought  of  exchanging  footgear  with  the  enemy,  as 
he  surely  would  have  done  if  he  had  attacked  Burnside 
within  range  of  the  Union  cannon  on  Stafford  Heights, 
across  the  river.  So  secure  was  Burnside  at  the  town 
that  when  it  was  proposed,  on  deciding  to  recross  the 
river,  to  keep  hands  on  Fredericksburg,  the  council  of 
officers  believed  that  10,000  men  was  a  sufficient  force 
for  the  service." 

From  Lee's  report: 

".  .  .  The  attack  of  the  I3th  had  been  so  easily  re 
pulsed  and  by  so  small  a  part  of  our  army  that  it  was 
not  supposed  the  enemy  would  limit  his  efforts  to  an 
attempt  which,  in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  his  prepara 
tions  and  the  extent  of  his  force,  seemed  to  be  compara 
tively  insignificant.  Believing  therefore  that  he  would 
attack  us,  it  was  not  deemed  expedient  to  lose  the  ad 
vantage  of  our  position  and  expose  the  troops  to  the  fire 
of  his  inaccessible  batteries  beyond  the  river  by  advanc 
ing  against  him.  .  .  ." 

Burnside's  attacking  columns  were  repulsed,  but  his 
lines  at  Fredericksburg  were  intact;  and  on  Stafford 
Heights,  overlooking  Fredericksburg  from  the  opposite 
shore  of  a  narrow  river,  and  commanding  every  foot  of 
approach,  were  147  siege  and  heavy  field  guns.  They 
were  beyond  the  reach  of  Lee's  artillery.  Only  50,000 


FREDERICKSBURG  99 

men  of  Burnside's  army  had  been  engaged.  The  charge 
that  Lee  neglected  pursuit  when  possible  is  without  any 
foundation  in  fact.  He  had  followed  McClellan's  re 
treat  as  energetically  as  the  nature  of  the  country  per 
mitted,  and  was  repulsed  at  Malvern  Hill  under  fire  of 
McClellan's  gunboats.  At  Second  Manassas  there  was 
no  opportunity  to  pursue,  as  it  was  too  close  to  Wash 
ington. 

Lord  Wolseley  of  course  would  have  made  no  such 
criticism,  if  he  had  known  anything  about  the  topography 
of  the  field. 

Burnside  did  not  commit  such  an  awful  blunder  at 
Fredericksburg  as  he  is  charged  with.  Standing  at  Fal- 
mouth  he  saw  no  easy  way  to  Richmond.  A  flank  move 
ment  meant  an  extended  line  of  communication  and 
possible  trouble  from  heavy  rains  or  snows  at  that  sea 
son.  Lee's  line  across  the  river  could  be  quickly  and 
easily  reached,  and  success  there  would  have  made  seri 
ous  trouble  for  him  and  given  Burnside  an  advantageous 
position  from  which  to  operate  against  Richmond,  there 
being  no  strong  defensive  line  between  the  two  places. 
Then,  too,  at  the  worst,  he  could  only  suffer  a  repulse, 
as  his  guns  on  Stafford  Heights  would  protect  him  from, 
a  counter  attack. 


PART  III 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1863 


Facing  page   103 


CHAPTER  I 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 

AFTER  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  and  Burn- 
side's  "  mud  march  "  the  armies  settled  back  into 
winter  quarters. 

Longstreet  was  ordered  south  of  the  James  river,  as 
supplies  of  subsistence  were  more  easily  obtained  there, 
and  he  would  be  in  position  to  oppose  troops  that  might 
be  sent  from  the  North  to  reinforce  the  army  operating 
in  that  quarter  against  Richmond. 

General  "  Fighting "  Joe  Hooker  had  superseded 
Burnside  in  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
The  day  after  he  was  appointed  Lincoln  wrote  to  him 
as  follows: 

".  .  .  There  are  some  things  in  regard  to  which  I  am 
not  quite  satisfied  with  you.  ...  I  think  that  during 
General  Burnside's  command  of  the  army  you  have  taken 
counsel  of  your  ambition  and  thwarted  him  as  much  as 
you  could,  in  which  you  did  a  great  wrong  to  the  coun 
try  and  to  a  meritorious  and  honorable  brother  officer. 
I  have  heard,  in  such  a  way  as  to  believe  it,  of  your  re 
cently  saying  that  both  the  army  and  the  government 
needed  a  dictator.  .  .  .  Only  those  generals  who  gain 
successes  can  set  up  as  dictators.  What  I  ask  of  you 
now  is  military  success  and  I  will  risk  the  dictator 
ship.  .  .  ." 

103 


104  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Lincoln  thought  the  job  was  in  pretty  good  hands  as 
it  was. 

We  have  already  seen  that  Falmouth  was  a  false  po 
sition  from  which  to  operate  against  Richmond;  but  as 
McClellan  had  made  a  failure  of  the  water  route,  and 
Burnside  of  his  direct  attack,  Hooker's  only  alternative 
was  a  flank  movement.  A  move  on  Lee's  right  flank 
was  not  promising  of  success,  so  Hooker  determined  to 
cross  the  river  at  the  upper  fords  and  strike  Lee's  left 
and  rear. 

It  was  April  —  "  the  fields  were  green  and  the  skies 
were  blue."  Hooker  sent  Stoneman  with  10,000  cavalry 
to  operate  on  Lee's  line  of  communication,  and  to  mask 
the  march  of  his  main  column  up  the  river.  He  ordered 
Sedgwick  to  cross  it  below  and  hold  Lee  as  long  as  pos 
sible  at  Fredericksburg  in  order  that  he  might  have  time 
to  strike  and  crush  him.  Both  columns  commenced 
crossing  the  river  on  the  2pth  and  encountered  no  re 
sistance. 

On  the  3Oth  Stoneman  encountered  Stuart's  cavalry 
on  the  Spottsylvania  road,  but  was  unable  to  report 
whether  or  not  there  were  infantry  and  artillery  in  that 
direction.  This  was  Hooker's  first  trouble. 

He  halted  and  made  his  headquarters  at  Chancellors- 
ville. 

That  night, —  the  3Oth, —  he  issued  the  following  gen 
eral  order: 

^ 

"  It  is  with  heartfelt  satisfaction  that  the  commanding 
general  announces  to  the  army  that  the  operations  of  the 
ist  three  days  have  determined  that  our  enemy  must 
(either  ingloriously  flee,  or  come  out  from  behind  his 
breastworks   and  give  us   battle   on  our  own   ground, 
where  certain  destruction  awaits  him." 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  105 

Talking  boastfully,  he  said  to  some  of  his  officers: 

"  The  rebel  army  is  now  the  legitimate  property  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  They  may  as  well  pack  up 
their  haversacks  and  make  for  Richmond,  and  I  shall 
be  after  them." 

General  Schurz  says  of  this  order: 

".  .  .  They  (the  officers  and  men)  indeed  hoped  that 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  130,000  strong,  would  prove 
able  to  beat  Lee's  army,  only  60,000  strong.  But  it 
jarred  upon  their  feelings,  as  well  as  their  good  sense, 
to  hear  their  commanding  general  gasconade  so  boast 
fully  of  having  the  enemy  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand, — 
that  enemy  being  Robert  E.  Lee,  at  the  head  of  the  best 
infantry  in  the  world." 

Hooker  believed  that  he  surprised  Lee  in  his  move 
ment  across  the  river  and  thought  he  had  made  a  move 
on  the  chess-board  that  was  decisive, —  that  Lee  would 
have  to  attack  him  in  strong  position  or  retreat,  and 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  game  such  was  the  case. 
Joe  Johnston  or  Beauregard  in  Lee's  position  would  have 
retreated,  but  Lee  did  not  intend  to  retreat,  nor  had 
Hooker  stolen  a  march  on  him. 

While  the  army  was  in  winter  quarters  at  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  after  Burnside's  "  mud  march,"  Lee  went  to 
Richmond  on  a  visit.  Longstreet  was  left  in  command. 
He  says : 

".  .  .  Long  and  close  study  of  the  field  from  the  Po 
tomac  to  the  James  river,  and  the  experience  of  former 
campaigns,  made  it  clear  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 


io6  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

•  had  been  drawn  into  a  false  position,  and  it  became 
manifest  that  there  were  but  two  moves  left  open  for 
its  spring  campaign, —  first,  by  crossing  the  upper  fords 
of  the  Rappahannock ;  secondly,  by  detaching  forces  to 
the  south  of  the  James,  and  by  that  route  moving  against 
Richmond. 

"  To  guard  against  the  former,  I  laid  out  lines  for 
field  works  and  rifle  pits,  covering  all  approaches  by  the 
upper  fords  as  far  as  the  roads  leading  to  the  United 
States  Ford.  From  that  point  the  line  broke  to  the 
rear,  crossing  the  plank  road  and  extending  back  half 
a  mile  to  command  the  road  from  Chancellorsville  to 
Spottsylvania  Court  House.  When  the  lines  for  these 
works  were  well  marked,  I  was  ordered,  with  the  divi 
sions  of  Hood  and  Pickett  and  Bearing's  and  Henry's 
artillery  battalions,  to  the  south  side  near  Petersburg,  to 
be  in  position  to  meet  the  latter  move,  leaving  the  di 
visions  of  McLaws  and  R.  H.  Anderson  to  finish  the 
work  on  the  line  of  defense.  .  .  ." 

General  Colston,  who  commanded  one  of  Jackson's 
brigades,  published  the  following  in  the  Century  Maga 
zine: 

"  The  assertion  that  Hooker's  move  upon  Chancellors 
ville  was  a  surprise  to  General  Lee  is  a  great  mistake. 
Every  day  Lee  had  information  of  Hooker's  movements. 
The  following  letter,  sent  by  Lee  to  Jackson  and  by  the 
latter  to  me,  has  never  been  out  of  my  possession  since. 
It  shows  the  remarkable  intuition  which  enabled  Gen 
eral  Lee  on  so  many  occasions  to  foresee  and  penetrate 
the  intentions  of  his  antagonist.  In  this  case  a  demon 
stration  had  been  made  on  our  extreme  right  at  Port 
Royal,  and  without  waiting  for  orders  I  had  gone  with 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  107 

a  brigade  and  battery  to  meet  it.  I  reported  the  facts 
to  General  Jackson,  and  it  is  my  letter  to  him  to  which 
General  Lee  refers: 

"  '  HEADQUARTERS  A.  N.  VA.,  April  23,  1863. 
" '  LIEUT.  GEN.  T.  J.  JACKSON, 

"  '  Commanding  Corps. 

"  '  General :  I  have  received  General  Colston's  letter 
of  8.30  o'clock  to-day,  which  you  forwarded  to  me.  I 
think  from  the  account  given  me  by  Lieut.  Col.  Smith 
of  the  Engineers,  who  was  at  Port  Royal  yesterday,  of 
the  enemy's  operations  there  the  day  and  night  previous, 
that  his  present  purpose  is  to  draw  our  troops  in  that 
direction  while  he  attempts  a  passage  elsewhere.  I 
would  not  then  send  down  more  troops  than  are  actually 
necessary.  I  will  notify  Generals  McLaws  and  Ander 
son  to  be  on  the  alert,  for  I  think  that  if  a  real  attempt 
is  made  to  cross  the  river  it  will  be  above  Fredericks- 
burg.  Very  respectfully, 

"'R.  E.  LEE, 

" '  General/ 

"  The  back  of  the  letter  was  endorsed  by  Jackson, 
'  Respectfully  referred  to  General  Colston  for  his  guid 
ance/  It  was  also  marked  '  Confidential/  and  both  the 
front  and  the  back  of  the  envelope  were  marked  '  Pri 
vate/  so  that  not  even  my  adjutant  general  should  open 
it  in  case  of  my  absence." 

General  Long,  of  Lee's  staff,  says: 

".  .  .  Lee's  whole  cavalry  force,  consisting  of  two 
brigades, —  Fitz  Lee's  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's, —  under  the 
immediate  command  of  Stuart,  was  mainly  employed 


io8  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

in  guarding  the  fords  of  the  upper  Rappahannock. 
Hooker  had  no  sooner  commenced  his  movement  than 
it  was  reported  by  Stuart  to  General  Lee.  .  .  ." 

From  Lee's  report: 

"  At  5.30  a.  m.,  April  28,  the  enemy  crossed  the  Rap 
pahannock  in  boats  near  Fredericksburg,  and  driving  off 
the  pickets  on  the  river,  proceeded  to  lay  a  pontoon 
bridge  a  short  distance  below  Deep  Run.  Later  in  the 
afternoon  another  bridge  was  constructed  about  a  mile 
below  the  first  A  considerable  force  crossed  on  these 
bridges  during  the  day  and  was  massed  out  of  view  under 
the  high  bank  of  the  river. 

".  .  .  No  demonstration  was  made  opposite  any  other 
part  of  our  lines  at  Fredericksburg,  and  the  strength  of 
the  force  that  had  crossed,  and  its  apparent  indisposition 
to  attack,  indicated  that  the  principal  effort  of  the  enemy 
would  be  made  in  some  other  quarter.  This  impression 
was  confirmed  by  the  intelligence  received  from  General 
Stuart  that  a  large  body  of  the  infantry  and  artillery 
was  passing  up  the  river.  During  the  forenoon  of  the 
29th  that  officer  reported  that  the  enemy  had  crossed 
in  force  near  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  preceding  evening. 
Later  in  the  day  he  announced  that  a  heavy  column  was 
moving  from  Kelly's  toward  Germana  Ford  on  the  Rapi- 
dan  and  another  to  Ely's  Ford  on  the  same  river.  The 
routes  they  were  pursuing  after  crossing  the  Rapidan 
converge  near  Chancellorsville,  whence  several  roads  lead 
to  the  rear  of  our  position  at  Fredericksburg. 

".  .  .  The  enemy  in  our  front  near  Fredericksburg 
continued  inactive  and  it  was  now  apparent  that  the  main 
attack  would  be  made  upon  our  rear  and  flank." 

Hooker  is  severely  censured  for  halting  at  Chancel- 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  109 

lorsville  on  the  3Oth  instead  of  marching  to  the  open 
ground  around  Fredericksburg.  But  here  is  what  Lee's 
report  says  of  his  preparations  on  the  2Qth  to  oppose 
him: 

"  On  the  night  of  the  2Qth  General  Anderson  was  di 
rected  to  proceed  toward  Chancellorsville  and  dispose 
Wright's  brigade  and  the  troops  from  the  Bark  Mill 
Ford  to  cover  these  roads.  Arriving  at  Chancellorsville 
about  midnight,  he  found  the  commands  of  Generals 
Mahone  and  Posey  already  there,  having  been  withdrawn 
from  Bark  Mill  Ford,  with  the  exception  of  a  small 
guard. 

"  Learning  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Rapidan 
and  were  approaching  in  strong  force,  General  Ander 
son  retired  early  on  the  morning  of  the  3Oth  to  the  inter 
section  of  the  Mine  and  Plank  roads  near  Tabernacle 
church,  and  began  to  entrench  himself.  The  enemy's 
cavalry  skirmished  with  his  rear-guard  as  he  left  Chan 
cellorsville,  but  being  vigorously  repulsed  by  Mahone's 
brigade,  offered  no  farther  resistance  to  his  march.  Ma- 
hone  was  placed  on  the  old  turnpike,  Wright  and  Posey 
on  the  plank  road." 

Capt.  James  Power  Smith,  assistant  adjutant  general, 
aide-de-camp  to  General  Jackson,  says : 

".  .  .  The  divisions  of  Anderson  and  McLaws  had 
been  sent  from  Fredericksburg  to  meet  Hooker's  ad 
vance  from  Chancellorsville;  Anderson  on  Wednesday 
(29th),  McLaws  (except  Barksdale's  brigade)  on 
Thursday.  .  .  ." 

So  if  Hooker  had  advanced  he  would  have  run  up 


no  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

against  Anderson  and  McLaws,  with  Lee's  whole  army 
in  supporting  distance. 

On  the  next  day,  May  I,  Hooker  did  advance  with  the 
Second,  Fifth,  Twelfth,  and  Third  Corps.  Of  this  ad 
vance  Lee  says  in  his  report : 

".  .  .  Jackson's  troops  followed  Anderson's  on  the 
plank  road.  Colonel  Alexander's  battalion  of  artillery 
accompanied  the  advance.  The  enemy  was  soon  en 
countered  on  both  roads  and  heavy  skirmishing  with 
infantry  and  artillery  ensued,  our  troops  pressing  for 
ward  steadily.  A  strong  attack  on  General  McLaws 
was  repulsed  with  spirit  by  Semmes'  brigade,  and  Gen 
eral  Wright,  by  directions  of  General  Anderson,  con 
verging  to  the  left  of  the  Plank  road,  marched  by  way 
of  the  unfinished  railroad  from  Fredericksburg  to  Gor- 
donsville  and  turned  the  enemy's  right.  His  whole  line 
thereupon  retreated  rapidly,  vigorously  pursued  by  our 
troops  until  they  arrived  in  about  a  mile  of  Chancellors- 
ville.  Here  the  enemy  assumed  a  position  of  great  ma 
terial  strength,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a  dense  forest 
filled  with  tangled  undergrowth,  in  the  midst  of  which 
breastworks  of  logs  had  been  constructed,  with  trees 
felled  in  front  so  as  to  form  an  almost  impenetrable 
abatis.  His  artillery  swept  the  few  narrow  roads  by 
which  his  position  could  be  approached  from  the  front, 
and  commanded  the  adjacent  woods.  .  .  ." 

When  Hooker  wanted  to  get  out  of  the  Wilderness, 
Lee  held  the  "  few  narrow  roads " ;  and  when  Lee 
wanted  to  get  in,  Hooker  held  them. 

Hooker,  on  revisiting  Chancellorsville  after  the  war, 
said: 

".  .  .  Here,  on  this  open  ground,  I  intended  to  fight 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE  1 1 1 

my  battle.  But  the  trouble  was  to  get  my  army  on  it, 
as  the  banks  of  the  stream  are,  as  you  see,  rugged  and 
precipitous,  and  the  few  fords  were  strongly  fortified 
and  guarded  by  the  enemy. 

"  By  making  a  powerful  demonstration  in  front  of 
and  below  the  town  of  Fredericksburg  with  a  part  of 
my  army,  I  was  able,  unobserved,  to  withdraw  the  re 
mainder,  and,  marching  nearly  thirty  miles  up  the  stream, 
to  cross  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan  unopposed, 
and  in  four  days'  time  to  arrive  at  Chancellorsville, 
within  five  miles  of  this  coveted  ground.  And  all  this 
without  General  Lee's  having  discovered  that  I  had  left 
my  position  in  his  front.  So  far  I  regarded  my  move 
ment  as  a  great  success. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  fifth  day  my  army  was  astir, 
and  was  put  in  motion  on  three  lines  through  the  tangled 
forest  (the  Wilderness)  which  covers  the  whole  country 
around  Chancellorsville,  and  in  three  hours'  time  I  would 
have  been  in  position  on  these  crests,  and  in  possession 
of  Banks's  Ford,  in  short  and  easy  communication  with 
the  other  wing  of  my  army.  But  at  midnight  of  that 
morning  General  Lee  moved  out  writh  his  whole  army, 
and  by  sunrise  had  firm  possession  of  Banks's  Ford,  had 
thrown  up  this  line  of  breastworks  which  you  can  still 
follow  with  the  eye,  and  had  it  bristling  with  cannon 
from  one  end  to  the  other.  Before  I  had  proceeded 
two  miles  the  heads  of  my  columns,  while  still  upon  the 
narrow  roads  in  these  interminable  forests,  where  it  was 
impossible  to  maneuver  my  forces,  were  met  by  Jack 
son  with  a  full  two-thirds  of  the  entire  Confederate 
army.  I  had  no  alternative  but  to  turn  back,  as  I  had 
only  a  fragment  of  my  command  in  hand,  and  take  up 
the  position  about  Chancellorsville  which  I  had  occupied 
during  the  night,  as  I  was  being  rapidly  out-flanked  upon 


H2  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

my  right,  the  enemy  having  open  ground  on  which  to 
operate. 

"  And  here  again  my  reputation  has  been  attacked  be 
cause  I  did  not  undertake  to  accomplish  an  impossibility, 
but  turned  back  at  this  point;  and  every  history  of  the 
war  that  has  been  written  has  soundly  berated  me  be 
cause  I  did  not  fight  here  in  the  forest  with  my  hands 
tied  behind  me,  and  allow  my  army  to  be  sacrificed.  I 
have  always  believed  that  impartial  history  would  vindi 
cate  my  conduct  in  this  emergency.  .  .  ." 

Sir  Edward  Bruce  Hamley  in  his  work,  "  The  Oper 
ations  of  War  Explained  and  Illustrated,"  says: 

"  To  bring  an  army  from  the  order  of  march  to  the 
order  of  battle  is  a  work  of  time,  therefore  it  may,  in 
most  cases,  be  checked  by  a  force  deployed  in  order  of 
battle,  only  a  little  superior  to  the  heads  of  the  advancing 
columns.  And  the  uses  to  be  made  of  this  circumstance 
are  manifold ;  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that,  rightly  em 
ployed,  it  is  the  most  effective  weapon  in  the  military 
armory. " 

While  Lee  was  blocking  Hooker's  exit  from  the  Wil 
derness,  he  was  feeling  him  in  every  other  direction,  in 
order  to  locate  his  lines  definitely. 

General  Howard,  who  must  be  something  of  a  poet, 
says: 

".  .  .  In  my  youth  my  brother  and  I  had  a  favorite 
spot  in  an  upper  field  of  my  father's  farm  from  which 
we  were  accustomed,  after  the  first  symptoms  of  a  com 
ing  storm,  to  watch  the  operations  of  the  contending 
winds;  the  sudden  gusts  and  whirlwinds;  the  sidling 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE  113 

swallows  excitedly  seeking  shelter;  the  swift  and  swifter, 
black  and  blacker  clouds,  ever  rising  higher  and  pushing 
their  angry  fronts  toward  us.  As  we  listened  we  heard 
the  low  rumbling  from  afar;  as  the  storm  came  nearer, 
the  woods  bent  forward  and  shook  fiercely  their  thick 
branches,  the  lightning  zigzagged  in  flashes,  and  the 
deep-bassed  thunder  echoed  more  loudly,  till  there  was 
scarcely  an  interval  between  its  ominous  crashing  dis 
charges.  In  some  such  manner  came  on  that  battle  of 
May  2  to  the  watchers  at  Dowdall's  Tavern  and  Talley's 
farm-house. 

"  The  first  distant  symptom  occurred  the  evening  of 
May  i.  Then  was  heard  the  sudden  crack  of  rifle- 
shooting.  It  began  with  Steinwehr's  skirmishers,  and 
then  passed  on  to  Schurz.  Schimmelpfennig  pushed  out 
a  brigade  straight  forward  toward  the  southwest  and 
received  a  sudden  fire  of  artillery  from  the  intruders. 
They  left  him  and  pushed  on. 

"  It  was  '  a  rolling  reconnaissance  '  evidently  to  deter 
mine,  for  Lee's  and  Jackson's  information,  the  position 
of  our  flank.  .  .  ." 

On  the  night  of  May  i  Longstreet  was  on  the  south 
side  of  the  James  river,  eighty  or  one  hundred  miles 
away,  with  Hood's  and  Pickett's  divisions,  which  were 
among  the  best  in  the  army.  Early  was  at  Fredericks- 
burg  with  about  9,000  men  to  hold  Sedgwick,  who  had 
22,000.  Lee  with  Jackson  and  about  34,000  men  faced 
Hooker  and  his  90,000  on  the  main  Chancellorsville  line. 

Wellington,  who  told  Bliicher  at  Waterloo  that  he 
would  do  anything  to  help  him  except  divide  his  army, 
which  was  against  his  principles,  would  hardly  have  ap 
proved  of  this  example  in  long  division.  We  can 
imagine  his  surprise,  could  he  have  been  present  on  the 


ii4  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

evening  of  the  2d  when  Lee  stood  on  Hooker's  front 
with  12,000  men,  and  Jackson  on  his  right  rear  with 
22,000. 

Lee's  army,  present,  was  less  than  45,000  men,  in 
three  detachments  in  tlie  immediate  vicinity  of  Hooker's 
army  of  130,000.  Such  a  disposition  would  not  keep 
long,  and  so  Jackson  had  marched  from  Lee  with  orders 
to  attack  before  night  on  the  2d.  Lee  claimed  Hooker's 
attention  while  Jackson  was  marching  and  fighting. 

Of  Jackson's  attack  General  Howard  says : 

".  .  .  With  as  little  noise  as  possible,  a  little  after 
5  p.  m.,  the  steady  advance  of  the  enemy  began.  Its 
first  lively  effects,  like  a  cloud  of  dust  driven  before  a 
coming  shower,  appeared  in  the  startled  rabbits,  squirrels, 
quail,  and  other  game,  flying  wildly  hither  and  thither 
in  evident  terror,  and  escaping,  where  possible,  into  adja 
cent  clearings. 

"  The  foremost  men  of  Doles's  brigade  took  about 
half  an  hour  to  strike  our  advance  picket  on  the  pike. 
This  picket,  of  course,  created  no  delay.  Fifteen  min 
utes  later  he  reached  our  skirmishers,  who  seem  to  have 
resisted  effectively  for  a  few  minutes,  for  it  required  a 
main  line  to  dislodge  them.  Doles  says,  concerning  the 
next  check  he  received,  '  After  a  resistance  of  about  ten 
minutes  we  drove  him  (Devens)  from  his  positions  on 
the  left  and  carried  his  battery  of  two  guns,  caissons, 
and  horses.' 

"  This  was  the  fire  which  Steinwehr  and  I  heard 
shortly  after  our  return  from  Barlow.  Somebody's 
guns  thundered  away  for  a  few  short  minutes,  and  then 
came  the  fitful  rattle  of  musketry;  and  before  I  could 
again  get  into  the  saddle  there  arose  the  ceaseless  roar 
of  the  terrible  storm. 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE  1 1 5 

"  I  sent  out  my  chief  of  staff,  Colonel  Asmussen,  who 
was  the  first  officer  to  mount, — '  The  firing  is  in  front 
of  Devens;  go  and  see  if  all  is  in  order  on  the  extreme 
right/  He  instantly  turned  and  galloped  away.  I 
mounted  and  set  off  for  a  prominent  place  in  rear  of 
Schurz's  line,  so  as  to  change  front  to  the  northwest  of 
every  brigade  southeast  of  the  point  of  attack,  if  the 
attack  extended  beyond  Devens's  right  flank;  for  it  was 
divined  at  once  that  the  enemy  was  now  west  of  him. 
I  could  see  numbers  of  our  men  —  not  the  few  stragglers 
that  always  fly  like  the  chaff  at  the  first  breeze,  but 
scores  of  them  —  rushing  into  the  opening,  some  with 
arms  and  some  without,  running  or  falling  before  they 
got  behind  the  cover  of  Devens's  reserves,  and  before 
General  Schurz's  waiting  masses  could  deploy  or  charge. 
The  noise  and  the  smoke  filled  the  air  with  excitement, 
and  to  add  to  it  Dieckmann's  guns  and  caissons,  with 
battery  men  scattered,  rolled  and  tumbled  like  runaway 
wagons  and  carts  in  a  thronged  city.  The  guns  and  the 
masses  of  the  right  brigade  struck  the  second  line  of 
Devens  before  McLean's  front  had  given  way,  and, 
quicker  than  it  could  be  told,  with  all  the  fury  of  the 
wildest  hail-storm,  everything,  every  sort  of  organiza 
tion  that  lay  in  the  path  of  the  mad  current  of  panic- 
stricken  men,  had  to  give  way  and  be  broken  into 
fragments.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  Let  us  pause  here  a  moment  and  follow  Doles, 
who  led  the  enemy's  attack.  He  states  that,  after  his 
first  successful  charge,  '  the  command  moved  forward 
at  the  double-quick  to  assault  the  enemy,  who  had  taken 
up  a  strong  position  on  the  crest  of  a  hill  in  the  open 
field/  This  position  was  the  one  on  Hawkin's  farm 
where  Devens's  and  Schurz's  reserves  began  their  fight. 
But  wave  after  wave  of  Confederate  infantry  came  upon 


n6  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

them,  and  even  their  left  flank  was  unprotected  the  in 
stant  the  runaways  had  passed  it  by.  To  our  sorrow, 
we,  who  had  eagerly  observed  their  bravery,  saw  them 
also  give  way,  and  the  hill  and  crest  on  Hawkin's  farm 
were  quickly  in  the  hands  of  the  men  in  gray. 

"  Doles,  who  must  have  been  a  cool  man  to  see  so 
clearly  amid  the  screeching  shells  and  all  the  hot  excite 
ment  of  battle,  says  again:  *  He  '  (meaning  our  forces 
from  Schimmelpfennig's  and  Buschbeck's  brigades,  and 
perhaps  part  of  McLean's,  who  had  faced  about  and 
had  not  yet  given  away)  'made  a  stubborn  resistance 
from  behind  a  wattling  fence  on  a  hill  covered  thickly 
with  pine.' 

"  Among  the  stubborn  fighters  at  this  place  was  Major 
Jere  Williams.  The  enemy  was  drawing  near  him. 
His  men  fired  with  coolness  and  deliberation.  His  right 
rested  among  scrubby  bushes  and  saplings,  while  his  left 
was  in  comparatively  open  ground.  The  fire  of  the 
enemy  as  he  approached  was  murderous,  and  almost 
whole  platoons  of  our  men  were  falling;  yet  they  held 
their  ground.  He  waited,  rapidly  firing,  till  not  more 
than  thirty  paces  intervened,  and  then  ordered  the  re 
treat.  Out  of  three  hundred  and  thirty-three  men  and 
sixteen  commissioned  officers  in  the  regiment  (Twenty- 
fifth  Ohio),  one  hundred  and  thirty,  including  five  offi 
cers,  were  killed  or  wounded." 

General  Schurz  writes  of  the  attack: 

".  .  .  At  last  the  storm  broke  loose.  I  was  with  some 
of  my  staff  at  corps-headquarters,  waiting  for  General 
Howard  to  return,  our  horses  ready  at  hand.  It  was 
about  twenty  minutes  past  five  when  a  number  of  deer 
and  rabbits  came  bounding  out  of  the  woods  bordering 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  117 

the  opening  of  Hawkin's  farm  on  the  west.  The  ani 
mals  had  been  started  from  their  lairs  by  Jackson's  ad 
vance.  Ordinarily  such  an  appearance  of  game  would 
have  been  greeted  by  soldiers  in  the  field  with  outbreaks 
of  great  hilarity.  There  was  hardly  anything  of  the 
kind  this  time.  It  was  as  if  the  men  had  instinctively 
understood  the  meaning  of  the  occurrence.  A  little 
while  later  there  burst  forth,  where  Gilsa  stood,  a  heavy 
roar  of  artillery,  a  continuous  rattling  of  musketry,  and 
the  savage  screech  of  the  '  rebel  yell/  and  then  happened 
what  every  man  of  common  sense  might  have  foreseen. 
Our  two  cannon  standing  in  the  road  threw  several  rapid 
discharges  into  the  dense  masses  of  the  enemy  before 
them  and  then  limbered  up  and  tried  to  escape.  But  the 
rebel  infantry  were  already  upon  them,  shot  down  the 
horses,  and  captured  the  pieces.  Gilsa's  two  regiments, 
formed  at  right  angle  with  the  turnpike,  were  at  once 
covered  with  a  hail  of  bullets.  They  discharged  three 
rounds  —  it  is  a  wonder  they  discharged  as  many  —  and 
then,  being  fired  into  from  front  and  from  both  flanks 
at  close  quarters,  they  had  either  to  surrender  or  beat  a 
hasty  retreat.  They  retreated  through  the  woods,  leav 
ing  many  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field.  Some  of 
Gilsa's  men  rallied  behind  a  reserve  regiment  of  the 
First  division,  the  75th  Ohio,  whose  commander,  Colo 
nel  Riley,  had  been  sensible  and  quick  to  change  front, 
and  without  orders  advanced  to  help  Gilsa.  But  they 
were  promptly  assailed  in  front  and  flank  by  several 
rebel  regiments  and  completely  wrecked,  Colonel  Riley 
being  killed  and  the  adjutant  wounded.  Meanwhile  the 
enemy  had  also  pounced  upon  the  regiments  of  the  First 
division,  which  were  deployed  in  the  turnpike.  These 
regiments,  hemmed  in  on  the  narrow  road  between  dense 
thickets,  and  attacked  on  three  sides,  many  of  the  men 


n8  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

being  shot  through  their  backs,  were  not  able  to  fight  at 
all.  They  were  simply  telescoped  and  driven  down  the 
turnpike  in  utter  confusion." 

General  Schurz  censured  Hooker  and  Howard  severely 
for  the  surprise  of  the  Eleventh  corps.  He  was  appar 
ently  certain  that  his  position  would  be  attacked  in  flank 
and  rear,  and  as  it  turned  out  he  was  right.  But  he  was 
alarmed  by  the  strong  demonstrations  against  the  right 
wing  of  the  army,  and  did  not  stop  to  think  that  they 
would  have  been  as  necessary  to  cover  a  retreat  as  to 
mask  a  flank  movement.  Hooker  and  Howard  compre 
hended  this,  and  as  a  retreat  was  more  probable  than  a 
flank  attack,  they  declined  to  hazard  the  change  of  front 
suggested  by  Schurz. 

The  possibility  of  a  flank  attack  did  not  escape 
Hooker's  attention,  as  the  following  dispatch  shows : 

"  HEADQUARTERS, 
"  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  CHANCELLORSVILLE, 
"  May  2,  1863,  9.30  a.  m. 

"MAJOR-GENERALS  SLOCUM  AND  HOWARD:  I  am 
directed  by  the  major-general  commanding  to  say  that 
the  disposition  you  have  made  of  your  corps  has  been 
with  a  view  to  a  front  attack  by  the  enemy.  If  he 
should  throw  himself  upon  your  flank,  he  wishes  you  to 
examine  the  ground  and  determine  upon  the  position 
you  will  take  in  that  event,  in  order  that  you  may  be 
prepared  for  him  in  whatever  direction  he  advances. 
He  suggests  that  you  have  heavy  reserves  well  in  hand 
to  meet  this  contingency.  The  right  of  your  line  does 
not  appear  to  be  strong  enough.  No  artificial  defenses 
worth  naming  have  been  thrown  up,  and  there  appears 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  1 19 

to  be  a  scarcity  of  troops  at  that  point,  and  not,  in  the 
general's  opinion,  as  favorably  posted  as  might  be.  We 
have  good  reason  to  suppose  that  the  enemy  is  moving 
to  our  right.  Please  advance  your  pickets  as  far  as  may 
be  safe,  in  order  to  obtain  timely  information  of  their 
approach. 

"J.  H.  VAN  ALEN, 
"  Brigadier  General  and  Aide-de-Camp." 

But  as  the  day  wore  away  developments  favored  the 
theory  of  retreat. 

General  Howard  says : 

".  .  .  Jackson's  movement,  with  a  stronger  indication 
of  battle,  began  at  sunrise,  Rodes,  Colston,  and  A.  P. 
Hill  in  order  following  the  old  road  by  the  Catherine 
Furnace,  there  shoving  off  farther  south  to  get  beyond 
the  sight  of  our  men;  then  sweeping  around  by  a  private 
road,  well  known  to  them,  up  to  the  Orange  plank ;  and 
thence  on,  perhaps  a  mile  farther,  through  the  wild  for 
est  till  the  old  turnpike  was  found  and  crossed. 

'  The  Catherine  Furnace,  nearly  opposite  Sickles's 
right  and  two  and  a  half  miles  distant,  gave  an  open 
reach  and  fully  exposed  the  moving  columns  to  view. 
Except  at  that  point  the  entire  Confederate  force  was 
completely  covered  by  woods  and  by  Stuart's  busy  and 
noisy  cavalry. 

"  About  sunrise  at  DowdalFs  I  heard  cheering.  It 
was  a  hearty  sound,  with  too  much  bass  in  it  for  that 
of  the  enemy's  charge.  It  was  occasioned  by  General 
Hooker,  with  Colonel  Comstock  and  a  few  staff  officers, 
riding  along  slowly  and  inspecting  the  lines.  General 
Sickles  says  of  this :  '  It  is  impossible  to  pass  over  with 
out  mention  the  irrepressible  enthusiasm  of  the  troops 


120  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

for  Major  General  Hooker,  which  was  evinced  in  hearty 
and  prolonged  cheers  as  he  rode  along  the  lines  of  the 
Third,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  corps/ 

"  I  was  ready,  mounted,  and  with  my  officers  joined 
the  ever  increasing  cavalcade.  Hooker  observed  the 
troops  in  position ;  Barlow,  who  filled  the  cross  trenches 
an  hour  later,  had  not  yet  come  out  of  the  front  line, 
so  that  my  reserves  just  at  that  time  were  small.  He 
noticed  the  breastworks,  unusually  well  built  by  Schurz 
and  Devens.  He  passed  to  the  extreme  right,  and  then 
returned  by  the  shortest  route.  As  he  looked  over  the 
barricades,  while  receiving  the  salutes  and  cheers  of  the 
men,  he  said  to  me,  '  How  strong !  How  strong !  * 

"  I  still  had  much  extension,  so  that  there  were  gaps 
along  Schurz's  and  Devens's  fronts.  Colonel  Comstock 
spoke  to  me  in  his  quiet  way :  '  General,  do  close  in 
those  spaces ! ' 

"  I  said,  '  The  woods  are  thick  and  entangled ;  will 
anybody  come  through  there  ? ' 

"'Oh,  they  may!' 

"  His  suggestion  was  heeded. 

"  During  the  forenoon  General  Sickles  discovered 
Jackson's  moving  column.  It  was  passing  toward 
Orange  Court  House,  so  everybody  said.  Sickles  for 
warded  all  reports  to  General  Hooker,  who  had  now  re 
turned  to  Chancellorsville.  He  tried  to  divine  Jackson's 
purpose. 

"  About  midday  Sickles  received  General  Hooker's 
orders  to  advance  south  cautiously.  Soon  after,  per 
haps  by  2  p.  m.,  there  was  a  stronger  apprehension  of  a 
conflict,  for  there  was  a  sharp  skirmish  in  the  direction 
of  Catherine  Furnace.  The  rattle  of  musketry  followed; 
then  in  a  little  time  was  heard  the  booming  of  cannon. 
I  sent  the  news  to  every  division  and  said,  '  Be  ready/ 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE  1 2 1 

Slocum  went  forward  to  the  aid  of  Sickles,  and  Hancock 
was  behind  him  with  support.  Next,  the  enemy  was  re 
ported  to  be  in  full  retreat.  General  Hooker  so  tele 
graphed  to  Sedgwick;  Captain  Moore,  of  his  staff,  who 
had  gone  out  with  Birney  to  see  the  attack  upon  Jack 
son,  came  hurriedly  to  me  with  an  order  from  General 
Hooker  for  my  reserve  brigade, —  Barlow's.  .  .  .  My 
aide  had  now  returned  from  Sickles,  near  the  Furnace, 
and  reported  in  substance  that  he  (Sickles)  was  glad  to 
receive  the  help;  that  he  was  about  to  make  a  grand 
attack,  having  been  for  some  time  driving  the  enemy, 
and  expected  soon  a  brilliant  result;  that  he  desired  to 
place  my  reinforcements  upon  his  right  flank  in  the  for 
ward  movement.  Such  was  the  state  of  things  when, 
through  Captain  Moore,  General  Hooker  directed  to 
Sickles's  attack,  at  the  Furnace,  all  my  general  infantry 
reserves,  consisting  of  Barlow's  stanch  brigade.  .  .  ." 

Hooker  had  become  so  well  satisfied  that  Lee  was  re 
treating, —  and  no  doubt  his  opinion  was  that  of  his 
officers,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Schurz, —  that 
he  took  troops  from  Howard  to  strengthen  Sickles's 
fight  with  Jackson's  rear-guard  at  the  Furnace;  and  as 
late  as  4.10  p.  m.,  when  Johnson  was  forming  for  the 
attack,  he  telegraphed  to  Sedgwick : 

"  Capture  Fredericksburg  with  everything  in  it,  and 
vigorously  pursue  the  enemy.  We  know  that  the  enemy 
is  fleeing  to  save  his  trains.  Two  of  Sickles's  divisions 
are  amongst  them." 

The  conditions  under  which  the  Eleventh  corps  met 
disaster  are  frankly  and  correctly  stated  by  General 
Howard  in  the  Century  Magazine.  He  says : 


122  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

".  .  .  Twenty-three  years  ago  in  my  report  to  Gen 
eral  Hooker  I  wrote  the  following: 

'  Now,  as  to  the  causes  of  this  disaster  to  my  corps : 

'  1st  Though  constantly  threatened  and  apprised 
of  the  moving  of  the  enemy,  yet  the  woods  were  so  dense 
that  he  was  able  to  mass  a  large  force,  whose  exact 
whereabouts  neither  patrols,  reconnaissances,  nor  scouts 
ascertained.  He  succeeded  in  forming  a  column  oppo 
site  to  and  outflanking  my  right. 

'  2d.  By  the  panic  produced  by  the  enemy's  reserve 
fire,  regiments  and  artillery  were  thrown  suddenly  upon 
those  in  position. 

*  3d.  The  absence  of  General  Barlow's  brigade, 
which  I  had  previously  located  in  reserve  and  en  echelon 
with  Colonel  von  Gilsa's,  so  as  to  cover  his  right  flank. 
This  was  the  only  general  reserve  I  had/ 

"  Stonewall  Jackson  was  victorious.  Even  his  ene 
mies  praise  him ;  but,  providentially  for  us,  it  was  the 
last  battle  which  he  waged  against  the  American  Union. 
For,  in  bold  planning,  in  energy  of  execution  which  he 
had  the  power  to  diffuse,  in  indefatigable  activity  and 
moral  ascendency,  Jackson  stood  head  and  shoulders 
above  his  confreres,  and  after  his  death  General  Lee 
could  not  replace  him." 

Jackson  is  criticised  because  he  did  not  go  on  and  on, 
after  routing  Howard's  corps,  and  rout  all  the  other 
corps  in  Hooker's  army.  This  kind  of  criticism  is  very 
common,  the  critics  forgetting  that  even  a  thunderbolt 
will  stop  somewhere.  General  Colston  gives  a  few  rea 
sons  for  the  halt.  He  says: 

"  The  Federal  writers  have  wondered  why  Jackson's 
corps  did  not  complete  its  work  on  the  evening  of  May 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  123 

2d.  They  do  not  realize  the  condition  of  our  troops 
after  their  successful  charge  on  Howard.  We  had 
forced  our  way  through  brush  so  dense  that  the  troops 
were  nearly  stripped  of  their  uniforms.  Brigades,  regi 
ments,  and  companies  had  become  so  mixed  that  they 
could  not  be  handled;  besides  which  the  darkness  of 
evening  was  so  intensified  by  the  shade  of  the  dense 
woods  that  nothing  could  be  seen  a  few  yards  off.  The 
halt  at  that  time  was  not  a  mistake,  but  a  necessity.  So 
far  from  intending  to  stop,  Jackson  was  hurrying  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  to  the  front  to  take  the  place  of  Rodes's 
and  mine,  and  to  continue  the  attack,  when  he  was 
wounded;  A.  P.  Hill  was  also  wounded  soon  afterward, 
and  the  advance  of  his  troops  in  the  narrow  road  on 
which  alone  they  could  move  was  checked  by  the  shell 
and  canister  of  twelve  napoleon  guns,  from  an  elevation 
within  five  hundred  yards.  The  slaughter  and  confusion 
were  greatly  increased  by  this  terrible  fire  in  the  dark 
ness  of  the  night,  so  that  the  pause  in  the  attack  was  one 
of  those  fatalities  of  war  that  no  skill  or  foresight  can 
prevent." 

Jackson  moved  his  army  of  22,000  men  fifteen  miles 
over  the  narrow  roads  of  the  wilderness  in  the  immedi 
ate  presence  of  the  enemy.  It  was  a  good  day's  work. 

Sir  Edward  Bruce  Hamley  in  his  work,  "  The  Oper 
ations  of  War  Explained  and  Illustrated,"  says : 

".  .  .  To  bring  an  army  from  the  order  of  march 
to  the  order  of  battle  is  a  work  of  time.  .  .  ." 

Colonel  Hamley  would  probably  have  allowed  half  a 
day  for  this,  and  another  half  for  the  battle,  so  it  is  not 
much  of  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  when  Jackson 


124  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

halted  his  men,  or  rather  when  they  stopped  going,  he 
had  crowded  two  days'  work  into  one,  and  that  one  was 
to  be  followed  in  a  few  hours  by  the  great  battle  of 
the  3d. 

Of  it  General  Schurz  says : 

".  .  .  The  next  morning,  Sunday,  May  3,  found  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  about  90,000  men  of  it,  under 
General  Hooker's  immediate  command,  strongly  in 
trenched  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Chancellor  House,  and 
about  22,000  men,  under  General  Sedgwick,  near  Fred- 
ericksburg,  moving  up  to  attack  General  Lee  in  his  rear. 
Never  did  Lee's  genius  shine  more  brightly  than  in  the 
actions  that  followed. 

"  He  proved  himself,  with  his  60,000  men  against 
nearly  double  that  number,  a  perfect  master  of  that  su 
preme  art  of  the  military  leader, —  to  oppose  with  super 
ior  forces  at  every  point  of  decisive  importance.  First 
he  flung  Jackson's  old  corps,  now  under  command  of 
General  Jeb  Stuart,  against  some  of  Hooker's  breast 
works  in  the  center,  carrying  one  line  of  intrenchments 
after  another  by  furious  assaults.  Then  hearing  that 
Sedgwick  had  taken  Marye's  Heights  and  was  advancing 
from  Fredericksburg,  he  detached  from  his  front  against 
Hooker  a  part  of  his  force  large  enough  to  overmatch 
Sedgwick  and  drive  that  general  across  the  Rappahan- 
iiock.  Then  he  hurried  back  the  divisions  that  had 
worsted  Sedgwick,  to  make  his  own  force  superior  to 
Hooker's  at  the  point  where  he  wished  to  strike." 

Early  probably  thought  that  as  he  had  lost  his  posi 
tion  and  exposed  the  rear  of  the  army  to  Sedgwick's 
large  force,  Lee  would  also  fall  back  on  the  Richmond 
road.  This  was  a  natural  supposition,  as  he  probably 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE  125 

did  not  know  how  badly  Hooker  had  been  worsted. 
But  his  mistake  was  of  such  a  serious  character  that 
Lee  rode  with  the  troops  to  oppose  Sedgwick,  and 
Hooker  got  safely  over  the  river. 

Hooker  was  determined  to  make  the  best  of  the  cam 
paign,  and  so  issued  the  following  order : 

"  HEADQUARTERS, 
"  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"  May  6,  1863. 

"  The  major-general  commanding  tenders  to  this 
army  his  congratulations  in  its  achievements  of  the  last 
seven  days.  .  .  .  By  your  celerity  and  secrecy  of  move 
ment  our  advance  and  passage  of  the  river  was  undis 
puted,  and  on  our  withdrawal  not  a  rebel  ventured  to 
follow.  .  .  . 

"  By  command  of  Major-General  Hooker. 

"S.  WILLIAMS, 
"  Assistant  Adjutant  General." 

Lincoln,  however,  extended  no  congratulations,  for 
we  find  in  "  The  Diary  of  Gideon  Wells  "  the  following 
entry : 

"  June  20,  1863. 

".  .  .  The  President  said  if  Hooker  had  been  killed 
by  the  shot  that  knocked  over  the  pillar  that  stunned 
him,  we  should  have  been  successful. 

"  Sumner  said  he  knew  Hooker  to  be  a  blasphemous 
wretch.  At  Chancellorsville  he  exclaimed,  *  The  enemy 
are  in  my  power,  and  God  Almighty  cannot  deprive  me 
of  them.' ' 

That  was  all  cabinet  meeting  talk. 


126     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Sumner  condemned  Hooker  because  of  his  blasphemy, 
and  Lincoln,  because  he  failed  to  substantiate  it. 

Hooker  is  severely  criticised  for  not  making  better 
use  of  his  superior  numbers  in  the  Sunday  battle. 

Mr.  Samuel  P.  Bates,  who  accompanied  him  when 
he  visited  Chancellorsville,  says : 

"  I  ventured  to  ask  why  he  did  not  attack  when  he 
found  that  the  enemy  had  weakened  his  forces  in  the 
immediate  front  and  sent  them  away  to  meet  Sedgwick. 
'  That/  said  he,  '  would  seem  to  have  been  the  reasonable 
thing  to  do.  But  we  were  in  this  impenetrable  thicket. 
All  the  roads  and  openings  leading  through  it  the  enemy 
immediately  fortified  strongly,  and  planted  thickly  his 
artillery  commanding  all  the  avenues,  so  that  with  re 
duced  numbers  he  could  easily  hold  his  lines,  shutting 
me  in,  and  it  became  utterly  impossible  to  maneuver 
my  forces.  My  army  was  not  beaten.  Only  a  part  of 
it  had  been  engaged.  The  First  corps,  commanded  by 
Reynolds,  whom  I  regarded  as  the  ablest  officer  under 
me,  was  fresh,  and  ready  and  eager  to  be  brought  into 
action,  as  was  my  whole  army.  But  I  had  been  fully 
convinced  of  the  futility  of  attacking  fortified  positions, 
and  I  was  determined  not  to  sacrifice  my  men  need 
lessly,  though  it  should  be  at  the  expense  of  my  reputa 
tion  as  a  fighting  officer.  We  had  already  had  enough 
grievous  experience  in  that  line.  I  made  frequent 
demonstrations  to  induce  the  enemy  to  attack  me,  but 
he  would  not  accept  my  challenge.  Accordingly,  when 
the  eight  days'  rations  with  which  my  army  started  out 
were  exhausted,  I  retired  across  the  river.  Before  doing 
so  I  sent  orders  to  General  Sedgwick  to  hold  his  position 
near  Banks's  Ford,  on  the  south  side  of  the  stream,  and 
I  would  bring  my  whole  army  to  his  support;  but  the 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  127 

order  failed  to  reach  him  until  he  had  already  recrossed 
the  river.  Could  I  have  had  my  army  on  the  open 
grounds  at  that  point  where  I  could  have  maneuvered  it 
properly,  I  felt  assured  that  I  could  have  gained  a  de 
cisive  victory.  But  this,  my  last  chance,  was  frus 
trated.'  ' 

General  Pleasonton  did  not  think  much  of  the  battle. 
He  says  that  both  Lee  and  Hooker  failed  in  what  they 
attempted.  He  thinks  that  both  attempted  to  end  the 
war  at  Chancellorsville.  The  reason  they  did  not  end 
it,  he  says,  was  because  great  victories  are  only  won  by 
great  generals. 

But  Lee  was  not  trying  to  end  the  war ;  he  was  trying 
to  prolong  it,  and  he  did.  Then,  if  any  man  was  to 
blame  for  Hooker's  defeat,  Pleasonton  was  the  man. 
He  was  completely  outgeneraled  by  Stuart. 

It  may  be  that  the  defeats  of  McClellan,  Pope,  and 
Hooker  were  more  complimentary  than  otherwise  to 
those  officers,  for  if  a  general  should  always  anticipate 
improbable  and  apparently  impossible  movements  of  his 
opponents,  and  maneuver  accordingly,  he  would  be  ad 
judged  insane;  and  that  is  just  what  they  would  have 
had  to  do  in  order  to  avoid  defeat. 

Colonel  Mosby  says  of  the  battle: 

"  Considering  the  numerical  inferiority  of  the  South 
ern  army  and  the  fact  that  it  took  the  offensive  and 
drove  its  antagonist  out  of  big  intrenchments  and  over 
the  river  it  had  just  triumphantly  crossed,  I  consider  it 
the  boldest  deed  of  arms  and  the  most  wonderful  achieve 
ment  in  the  history  of  war." 

But  on  the  next  page  Colonel  Mosby  says : 


128  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

".  .  .  At  Austerlitz  the  Allies  attempted  to  do  the 
same  thing  that  Jackson  did  and  met  a  great  disaster. 
But  General  Lee  knew  that  he  did  not  have  Napoleon  to 
deal  with.  .  .  ." 

If  Napoleon  had  been  in  a  Wilderness  at  Austerlitz, 
and  the  Allies  had  been  Confederate  infantry  commanded 
by  a  Lee,  with  a  Jackson  and  a  Stuart  to  execute  his 
orders,  he  might  have  fared  just  about  as  Hooker  did. 
Lee,  seconded  by  his  ubiquitous  lieutenants,  Jackson  and 
Stuart,  won  an  incomparable  victory,  not  through 
Hooker's  incapacity,  but  because,  as  General  Schurz  so 
generously  says,  ".  .  .  He  p-roved  himself  a  perfect 
master  of  that  supreme  art  of  the  military  leader, —  to 
oppose  with  superior  forces  at  every  point  of  decisive 
importance.  .  .  ." 

And  as  General  Schurz  says,  ".  .  .  Never  did  Lee's 
genius  shine  more  brightly.  .  .  .  than  at  Chancellors- 
ville." 

Longstreet  says: 

"  My  impression  was,  and  is,  that  General  Lee  stand 
ing  under  his  trenches  would  have  been  stronger  against 
Hooker  than  he  was  against  Burnside,  and  that  he  would 
have  grown  stronger  every  hour  of  delay,  while  Hooker 
would  have  grown  weaker  in  morale  and  in  the  confi 
dence  of  his  plans  and  the  confidence  of  his  troops.  .  .  . 
By  the  time  that  the  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Hood  could 
have  joined  Lee,  General  Hooker  would  have  found 
that  he  must  march  to  the  attack  or  make  a  retreat  with 
out  a  battle.  The  Confederates  would  then  have  had 
bpportunity,  and  have  been  in  condition,  so  to  follow 
Hooker  as  to  have  compelled  his  retirement  to  Washing 
ton. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  129 

".  .  .  The  battle  as  a  pitched  and  independent  affair 
was  brilliant,  and,  if  the  war  was  for  glory,  could  be 
called  successful ;  but  besides  putting  the  cause  upon  the 
hazard  of  a  die,  it  was  crippling  of  resources  of  future 
progress,  while  the  wait  for  a  few  days  would  have 
given  time  for  concentration  and  opportunities  against 
Hooker  more  effective  than  were  experienced  with  Burn- 
side  at  Fredericksburg.  .  .  ." 

Burnside  crossed  the  river  in  Lee's  front,  while 
Hooker  crossed  on  his  flank,  and  was  in  position  to 
operate  against  his  line  of  communication.  Lee  says  in 
his  report  that  there  were  roads  leading  from  Chancel- 
lorsville  to  the  rear  of  his  army. 

Lee  said  he  could  not  afford  to  await  the  pleasure  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  His  strategy  was  designed 
always  to  keep  that  army  busily  employed  in  the  defense 
of  Washington.  Chancellorsville  enabled  him  to  do 
that  in  1863  just  as  Seven  Days  did  in  1862.  Seven 
Days  got  his  army  out  of  the  last  ditch,  and  Chancellors 
ville  kept  it  out.  It  "  compelled  Hooker's  retirement  to 
Washington  "  in  much  less  time  than  Longstreet's  plan 
would  have  done,  even  if  it  had  been  successful,  which 
in  all  probability  it  would  not  have  been. 

"  Putting  the  cause  on  the  hazard  of  a  die  "  was  noth 
ing  new.  Lee  did  that  all  through  the  war.  The  cause 
was  desperate  and  called  for  heroic  operations. 

Nor  was  Chancellorsville  more  "  crippling  in  resources 
than  other  battles,"  and  Lee  captured  5,000  prisoners, 
exclusive  of  wounded,  13  pieces  of  artillery,  19,500  stand 
iof  arms,  and  17  colors.  His  loss  was  10,000,  while 
Hooker's  was  16,845. 

Longstreet  says: 

"  Chancellorsville  is  usually  accepted  as  General  Lee's 


I3o     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

most  brilliant  achievement,  and  considered  as  an  inde 
pendent  affair,  it  was  certainly  grand." 

Yes,  and  considered  as  a  part  of  the  campaign  of 
1863  it  was  grander,  as  it  enabled  Lee  to  throw  Hooker 
from  Virginia  into  Pennsylvania.  None  of  Lee's  oper 
ations  were  "  independent  affairs."  They  were  all  de 
signed  with  one  end  in  view,  and  that  was  the  prolonga 
tion  of  the  war. 

There  is  a  romantic  story  of  Lee  and  Jackson  sitting 
on  cracker  boxes  on  the  night  of  the  ist,  and  it  is  said 
by  some  that  Jackson  proposed  the  flank  movement. 
The  "  cracker  box  "  story  does  very  well  to  "  point  a 
moral  or  adorn  a  tale,"  but  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the 
Chancellorsville  net  had  been  spread  for  Hooker  long 
before  the  cracker  box  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  that 
every  thread  of  it  had  been  carefully  gone  over.  Von 
Moltke  began,  in  1867,  to  make  plans  for  the  war  with 
France  and  completed  them  in  the  early  part  of  1869; 
and  Lee  in  the  following  letter  says  that  "  every  move 
ment  of  an  army  must  be  well  considered  and  properly 
ordered."  And  it  is  a  fair  historical  inference  that  he 
did  not  wait  for  the  cracker  boxes. 

"LEXINGTON,  VA.,  Oct.  28,  1867. 
"  DR.  A.  T.  BLEDSOE, 

"  Office  Southern  Review, 
"Baltimore,  Md. 

"  My  dear  Sir :  In  reply  to  your  inquiry,  I  must  ac 
knowledge  that  I  had  not  read  the  article  on  Chancel 
lorsville  in  the  last  number  of  the  Southern  Review,  nor 
have  I  read  any  of  the  books  published  on  either  side 
since  the  termination  of  hostilities.  I  have  as  yet  felt 
no  desire  to  review  any  recollections  of  those  events, 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE  131 

and  have  been  satisfied  with  the  knowledge  I  possessed 
of  what  transpired.  I  have,  however,  learned  from 
others  that  the  various  authors  of  the  life  of  Jackson 
award  to  him  the  credit  of  the  success  gained  by  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  when  he  was  present,  and 
describe  the  movements  of  his  corps  or  command  as 
independent  of  the  general  plan  of  operations  and  under 
taken  at  his  own  suggestion  and  upon  his  own  responsi 
bility. 

"  I  have  the  greatest  reluctance  to  do  anything  that 
might  be  considered  detracting  from  his  well  deserved 
fame,  for  I  believe  no  one  was  more  convinced  of  his 
worth  or  appreciated  him  more  highly  than  myself;  yet 
your  knowledge  of  military  affairs,  if  you  have  none  of 
the  events  themselves,  will  teach  you  that  this  could  not 
have  been  so. 

"  Every  movement  of  an  army  must  be  well  considered 
and  properly  ordered,  and  every  one  who  knew  General 
Jackson  must  know  that  he  was  too  good  a  soldier  to 
violate  this  fundamental  principle.  In  the  operations 
around  Chancellorsville  I  overtook  General  Jackson,  who 
had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  advance,  as  the 
skirmishers  of  the  two  armies  met,  advanced  with  the 
troops  to  the  Federal  line  of  defenses,  and  was  on  the 
field  until  their  whole  army  recrossed  the  Rappahannock. 
There  is  no  question  as  to  who  was  responsible  for  the 
operations  of  the  Confederates,  or  to  whom  any  failure 
would  have  been  charged.  What  I  have  said  is  for  your 
own  information.  .  .  . 

"  I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  friend  and  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE." 

Lee  no  doubt  planned  the  flank  movement  as  he  did 
the  whole  battle,  and  Jackson  executed  it.  The  plan  was 


i32  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

bold  and  desperate,  the  execution  rapid  and  glorious, 
and  to  Lee  and  Jackson  the  honors  have  been  awarded. 
Stuart  has  received  little  credit ;  but  to  shield  that  column, 
actually  in  contact  with  the  enemy,  with  his  "  busy  and 
noisy  cavalry,"  and  finally  lead  it  to  a  position  from 
which  it  could  fall  like  a  thunderbolt  on  the  enemy  was 
the  work  of  no  ordinary  cavalryman,  but  rather  of  one 
of  a  triumvirate  of  military  geniuses  that  made  of  Chan- 
cellorsville  an  unparalleled  victory. 

General  Schurz  pays  Stuart  the  following  very  pretty 
compliment : 

".  .  .  On  the  nth  we  had  a  day's  truce  between  the 
two  armies  for  the  purpose  of  caring  for  the  wounded 
and  burying  the  dead.  Confederate  and  Union  officers 
met  on  the  battle-field  of  Cedar  Mountain  and  exchanged 
polite  compliments.  The  famous  cavalry  general,  *  Jeb 
Stuart/  a  figure  of  martial  elegance,  was  one  of  the  Con 
federate  generals.  I  am  sorry  I  did  not  have  any  con 
versation  with  him,  for  I  could  not  help  feeling  myself 
attracted  by  that  handsome  young  enemy  looking  so  gay 
and  so  brave.  .  .  ." 

If  business  had  been  as  dead  in  the  North  as  it  was 
in  the  South,  Chancellorsville  might  have  ended  the  war. 
But  business  was  booming.  Fortunes  were  being  rapidly 
made,  and  as  money  is  the  panacea  for  all  the  ills  that 
flesh  is  heir  to,  Chancellorsville  grieved  the  North  less 
than  any  previous  defeat,  and  so  it  was  "  On  with  the 
dance." 


\ 


Facing  page   133 


CHAPTER  II 

GETTYSBURG 

THE  books  written  by  Lee's  generals,  staff,  and  biog 
raphers  make  it  appear  that  he  planned  the  Gettys 
burg  campaign  to  conquer  Confederate  independence  at 
Gettysburg,    and    that    Confederate    independence    was 
possible  at  Gettysburg. 

As  he  did  not  accomplish  the  alleged  object,  these 
authors  and  historians,  who  naturally  inferred  that  their 
books  were  the  best  authority,  have  made  of  the  cam 
paign  the  fatal  failure,  and  of  the  battle  the  grand  de 
cisive  battle,  of  the  war. 

We  shall  see  that  beyond  the  employment  of  his  usual 
strategy,  designed  as  ever  to  limit  the  activity  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  defense  of  Washington, 
Lee  had  no  plan. 

We  shall  see  that  he  had  no  idea  of  conquering  Con 
federate  independence  at  Gettysburg,  and  that  Confeder 
ate  independence  at  Gettysburg  was  impossible. 

We  shall  see  that  the  campaign  was  not  a  failure,  and 
that  the  battle  was  not  a  decisive  battle,  but  a  mere 
accidental  incident  of  a  successful  campaign. 

Lee  with  70,000  men  in  the  North  did  not  conquer 
Confederate  independence  in  July,  1863.  Neither  did 
Lincoln  subdue  the  Confederacy  with  70,000  men  in  the 
South  in  July,  1863.  It  took  him  nearly  two  years 
longer  to  do  it  with  nearly  a  million  men  in  the  South, 
and  more  war  craft  than  ever  engaged  in  any  war. 

J33 


I34  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Among  other  errors  that  contribute  to  the  exaggerated 
importance  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  is  the  idea  that  it 
marked  the  "  turning  point,"  the  "  high  tide  of  the  re 
bellion."  This  mistaken  view  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
Lee's  victories  were  brilliant,  and  gained  on  the  most 
conspicuous  field, —  that  between  Washington  and  Rich 
mond, —  and  therefore  obscured  the  Federal  successes 
elsewhere. 

Two  years  after  the  war  commenced,  March  5,  1861, 
with  the  firing  on  Sumter,  the  Federals  had  taken  Nor 
folk  and  New  Orleans,  and  held  the  Mississippi  from 
source  to  mouth,  except  at  Vicksburg.  Kentucky  and 
Missouri  were  held  by  Federal  forces,  and  Tennessee 
had  been  made  almost  untenable  by  Grant's  operations 
and  the  navy  on  the  Tennessee  river.  Fort  Pulaski  had 
fallen,  and  with  it  went,  practically,  Savannah.  The 
North  had  the  largest  navy  afloat;  the  South,  none 
worthy  of  the  name.  The  Northern  navy  held  the 
southern  ports  almost  in  complete  blockade.  It  held  the 
coast  to  the  Rio  Grande,  and  dominated  all  the  rivers. 

The  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy  waned  everywhere 
from  the  first,  except  in  Virginia,  and  the  "  turning 
point "  there  came  in  the  Wilderness  when  Lee  found 
himself  so  weak,  comparatively,  that  he  was  compelled 
to  renounce  his  hitherto  aggressive  policy,  and  act  en 
tirely  on  the  defensive. 

This  condition  was  decisive,  and  would  have  existed 
just  the  same  if  Lee  had  defeated  Meade  at  Gettysburg, 
or  had  there  been  no  Gettysburg.  Gettysburg  was  not 
a  decisive  battle  in  immediate  effect,  or  in  its  influence 
on  subsequent  conditions;  nor  does  it  rank  as  a  Con 
federate  disaster  with  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg  and 
Pemberton's  army,  which  was  made  while  Lee  and 
Meade  confronted  each  other  at  Gettysburg.  Vicksburg 


GETTYSBURG  135 

was  the  loss  of  an  army  with  artillery  and  infantry  arms, 
so  precious  to  the  Confederacy,  and  of  a  valuable  stra 
tegic  point,  while  Gettysburg  was  simply  a  repulse. 

General  Joe  Johnston  was  in  command  of  the  geo 
graphical  department  embracing  Vicksburg,  and  was  em 
powered  to  use  the  entire  resources  at  his  command  to 
save  it. 

On  the  1 5th  of  June  he  telegraphed  to  the  War  De 
partment  from  Jackson,  Mississippi : 

"  I  consider  saving  Vicksburg  hopeless." 
The  Secretary  replied: 

"  Your  telegram  grieves  and  alarms  us.  Vicksburg 
must  not  be  lost,  at  least  without  a  struggle.  The  inter 
est  and  honor  of  the  Confederacy  forbid  it.  I  rely  on 
you  still  to  avert  the  loss.  If  better  resource  does  not 
offer,  you  must  hazard  attack.  It  may  be  made  in  con 
cert  with  the  garrison,  if  practicable,  but  otherwise  with 
out.  By  day  or  night  as  you  think  best." 

On  the  2 ist  the  Secretary  wires  as  follows : 

"  Only  my  convictions  of  almost  imperative  necessity 
for  action  induces  the  official  dispatch  I  have  just  sent 
you.  On  every  ground  I  have  great  deference  for  your 
judgment  and  military  genius,  but  I  feel  it  right  to  share, 
if  need  be  to  take,  the  responsibility  and  leave  you  free 
to  follow  the  most  desperate  course  the  occasion  may 
demand.  Rely  upon  it,  the  eyes  and  hopes  of  the  whole 
Confederacy  are  upon  you,  with  the  full  confidence  that 
you  will  act,  and  with  the  sentiment  that  it  were  better 
to  fall  nobly  daring  than,  through  prudence  even,  to  be 


136  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

inactive.  I  look  to  attack  in  the  last  resort,  but  rely 
on  your  resources  of  generalship  to  suggest  less  desper 
ate  modes  of  relief." 

There  was  no  such  anxiety  as  this  over  Gettysburg. 

The  object  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  we  have  in 
Lee's  own  words.  It  is  explicitly  stated  in  the  following 
letter  to  Mr.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War: 

"  CULPEPER  COURT  HOUSE,  June  8,  1863. 
"  As  far  as  I  can  judge  there  is  nothing  to  be  gained 
by  this  army's  remaining  quietly  on  the  defensive,  which 
it  must,  unless  it  can  be  reinforced.  I  am  aware  there 
is  difficulty  and  hazard  in  taking  the  aggressive  with  so 
large  an  army  in  its  front  intrenched  behind  a  river 
where  it  cannot  be  advantageously  attacked.  Unless  it 
can  be  drawn  out  in  a  position  to  be  assailed,  it  will  take 
its  own  time  to  prepare  and  strengthen  itself  to  renew 
its  advance  upon  Richmond  and  force  this  army  back 
within  the  intrenchments  of  that  city.  This  may  be  the 
result  in  any  event;  still  I  think  it  worth  the  trial  to 
prevent  such  a  catastrophe.  Still,  if  the  Department 
thinks  it  better  to  remain  on  the  defensive  and  guard, 
as  far  as  possible,  all  avenues  of  approach  and  wait  the 
time  of  the  enemy,  I  am  ready  to  adopt  this  course. 
You  have,  therefore,  only  to  inform  me." 

So  far  from  expecting  to  conquer  Confederate  inde 
pendence  at  Gettysburg,  Lee  was  not  sure  that  he  would 
not  be  forced  within  the  intrenchments  at  Richmond, 
even  if  he  received  reinforcements.  It  was  to  avert 
"  such  a  catastrophe  "  that  he  ordered  the  forward  move 
ment. 

Of  this  General  Hunt  says: 


GETTYSBURG  137 

"These  operations  indicate  on  the  part  of  General 
Lee  either  a  contempt  for  his  opponent,  or  a  belief  that 
the  chronic  terror  of  the  War  Department  for  the  safety 
of  Washington  could  be  safely  relied  upon  to  paralyze 
his  movements,  or  both.  On  no  other  hypothesis  can 
we  account  for  his  stretching  his  army  from  Fredericks- 
burg  to  Williamsport,  with  his  enemy  concentrated  on 
one  flank  and  on  the  shortest  road  to  Richmond." 

Again  General  Hunt  says: 

"On  June  10,  he  (General  Hooker),  learning  that 
Lee  was  in  motion  and  that  there  were  but  few  troops 
at  Richmond,  proposed  an  immediate  march  on  that 
place,  from  which,  after  capturing  it,  he  could  send  the 
disposable  part  of  his  force  to  any  threatened  point  north 
of  the  Potomac;  and  he  was  informed  that  Lee's  army 
and  not  Richmond  was  his  '  true  objective.' ' 

The  following  dispatch  from  Lincoln  to  Hooker  is 
the  one  to  which  Hunt  refers  sarcastically : 

"...  I  think  Lee's  army  is  your  true  objective  point. 
If  he  comes  toward  the  upper  Potomac,  follow  on  his 
flank.  .  .  ." 

Hunt  said: 

"Had  he  (Hooker)  taken  Richmond,  Peck's  large 
force  at  Suffolk  and  Keyes's  10,000  men  on  the  Penin 
sula  might  have  been  utilized,  and  Hooker's  whole  army 
set  free  for  operations  against  Lee. 

"  It  was  not  now  a  question  of  '  swapping  queens.' 
Washington  was  safe,  being  well  fortified  and  sufficiently 


138  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

garrisoned,  or  with  available  troops  within  reach,  with 
out  drawing  on  Hooker;  and  to  take  Richmond  and 
scatter  the  Confederate  government  was  the  surest  way 
to  ruin  Lee's  army,  '  his  true  objective/ 

'  The  same  day,  June  10,  Hooker  proposed  to  march 
on  Richmond,  Air.  Seddon  replied  to  Lee's  letter,  con 
curring  in  his  views.  He  considered  aggressive  action 
necessary,  '  that  all  attendant  risks  and  sacrifices  must 
be  incurred/  and  adds :  *  I  have  not  hesitated,  in  co 
operating  with  your  plans,  to  leave  this  city  almost 
defenseless/  ' 

Lee  did  not  hold  Hooker  in  contempt.  He  com 
manded  too  large  an  army  to  be  contemptible.  But  he 
realized,  as  he  had  from  the  first,  that  if  he  should  be 
thrown  on  the  defensive  it  would  be  the  beginning  of 
the  end.  The  movement  was  desperate;  the  alternative, 
suicide. 

Hooker  obeyed  Lincoln's  instructions  and  marched 
along  on  Lee's  flank.  Ewell  cleared  the  Valley  of  Mil- 
roy's  forces  and  crossed  the  Potomac  June  15.  Old 
Virginia  was  devastated,  the  rail  fences  had  been  burned 
and  the  grass  was  short,  while  in  Maryland  and  Penn 
sylvania  there  were  "  fresh  fields  and  pastures  new." 
Ewell  met  no  opposition,  and  no  doubt  he  and  his  men 
had  the  time  of  their  lives  while  gathering  up  "  uncon- 
sidered  trifles  "  in  the  way  of  supplies,  cattle,  etc.,  etc.,  so 
badly  needed  by  their  friends  in  Virginia. 

The  advance  into  Pennsylvania  created  consternation 
in  Harrisburg,  Pittsburg,  and  Philadelphia ;  and  Lee  was 
in  hopes  that  Lincoln  would  call  troops  from  the  South, 
especially  from  Vicksburg, —  which  is  another  proof 
that  he  did  not  expect  to  conquer  Confederate  independ 
ence  at  Gettysburg.  But  Lincoln  met  the  emergency  by 


; 


GEORGE  G.  MEADE 


GETTYSBURG  139 

assembling  thirty  regiments  of  Pennsylvania  militia  and 
nineteen  regiments  from  New  York,  with  cavalry  and 
artillery  at  Harrisburg. 

On  the  igth  of  June,  Lee,  who  was  at  Berryville,  Va., 
wrote  to  Ewell,  who  was  at  Hagerstown,  Md. : 

"  I  very  much  regret  that  you  have  not  the  benefit 
of  your  whole  corps,  for,  with  that  north  of  the  Poto 
mac,  should  we  be  able  to  detain  General  Hooker's  army 
from  following  you,  you  would  be  able  to  accomplish 
as  much  unmolested  as  the  whole  army  could  perform 
with  General  Hooker  in  its  front.  If  your  advance 
causes  Hooker  to  cross  the  Potomac,  or  separate  his  army 
in  any  way,  Longstreet  can  follow  you." 

When  Lee  wrote  this  letter  it  is  evident  he  did  not 
know  whether  or  not  he  would  cross  the  river  at  all, 
and  he  certainly  did  not  expect  Ewell,  even  if  he  had 
his  whole  corps  with  him,  to  conquer  Confederate  in 
dependence.  His  whole  object,  as  he  says,  was  to 
"  detain  "  Hooker ;  and  he  was  not  particular  as  to  how 
or  where  he  did  it.  No  doubt  he  would  have  been  con 
tent  to  winter  up  there.  But  his  army  was  divided,  and 
to  divide  an  army  in  the  presence  of  a  larger  army,  es 
pecially  when  a  part  of  it  is  to  operate  in  the  territory 
of  a  powerful  enemy,  is  a  hazardous  operation ;  but  to 
keep  it  divided  for  any  considerable  time  is  to  invite 
disaster.  Conditions  were  of  an  uncertain  character, 
and  rather  than  have  them  continue  so,  Lee  determined 
to  put  an  end  to  them,  by  uniting  his  army  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  knowing  that  such  a  move  would  compel  Hooker 
to  make  a  corresponding  one.  Hence,  in  a  letter  to 
Davis  written  at  Williamsport,  June  25,  he  said : 

"  I  have  not  sufficient  troops  to  maintain  my  com- 


i4o  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

munications  and  have  to  abandon  them.  I  think  I  can 
throw  General  Hooker's  army  across  the  Potomac  and 
draw  troops  from  the  South,  embarrassing  their  plans  of 
campaign  in  a  measure,  if  I  do  nothing  else,  and  have  to 
return.  I  still  hope  all  things  will  end  well  for  us  at 
Vicksburg." 

The  same  day  he  writes  again: 

".  .  .  So  strong  is  my  conviction  of  the  necessity  of 
activity  on  our  part  in  military  affairs  that  you  will  ex 
cuse  my  adverting  to  the  subject  again,  notwithstanding 
what  I  have  said  in  my  previous  letter  to-day.  It  seems 
to  me  that  we  cannot  afford  to  keep  our  troops  waiting 
movements  of  the  enemy,  but  should  so  employ  our  forces 
as  to  give  occupation  to  his  at  points  of  our  selec 
tion.  .  .  ." 

There  is  nothing  in  these  letters  to  indicate  that  he 
expects  to  bag  Confederate  independence  at  Gettys 
burg.  He  abandons  his  line  of  communication  and  car 
ries  with  him  what  ammunition  he  expects  to  use, 
certainly  not  enough  for  battles  and  a  siege  of  Washing 
ton.  He  was  not  in  pursuit  of  the  ignis  fatuus  of  Con 
federate  independence  at  Gettysburg  —  he  did  not  expect 
to  end  the  war  there  or  anywhere.  His  purpose  was 
exactly  the  reverse, —  it  was  to  protract  the  war.  For 
in  its  prolongation  lay  the  only  hope  of  Confederate 
independence. 

The  campaign  was  a  failure  in  the  estimation  of  Lee's 
staff  and  biographers,  not  through  any  fault  of  Lee's 
but  because  Stuart  took  the  cavalry  on  an  unauthorized 
raid  around  Meade's  army,  leaving  "  Lee  in  Pennsyl 
vania,"  as  Colonel  Taylor  expresses  it,  "  a  giant  with 
his  eyes  put  out." 


GETTYSBURG  141 

Speaking  of  Stuart  at  Gettysburg,  Colonel  Taylor  says : 

".  .  .  No  report  had  reached  General  Lee  from  Gen 
eral  Stuart,  who  was  ordered  to  give  notice  of  the  move 
ments  of  the  Federal  army,  should  it  cross  the  Potomac; 
and  as  nothing  had  been  heard  from  him,  General  Lee 
naturally  concluded  that  the  enemy  had  not  yet  left 
Virginia.  .  .  .  Great  was  his  surprise  and  annoyance 
therefore  when  on  the  28th  he  received  information  from 
one  of  his  scouts  to  the  effect  that  the  Federal  army  had 
crossed  the  Potomac  and  was  approaching  South  Moun 
tain.  How  materially  different  his  plans  would  have 
been  had  he  been  kept  informed  of  the  movements  of  his 
adversaries  will  never  be  known.  .  .  ." 

Lee's  reports  agree  with  the  books  of  his  staff  as  to 
his  ignorance  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  but  they 
probably  have  the  same  authors. 

Colonel  Taylor  says : 

".  .  .  General  Lee  could  not  bear  to  be  annoyed  with 
the  consideration  of  these  matters  of  routine.  .  .  When 
the  staff  was  first  organized  a  large  batch  of  these  papers 
was  submitted  to  him  every  morning.  .  .  This  went  on 
for  a  short  time,  and  then  he  called  me  to  him  and  said 
that  he  would  have  to  put  me  back  in  the  office.  I  knew 
what  he  meant  and  I  acted  accordingly.  He  wished  re 
lief  from  such  annoyance;  he  had  real  work  to  do  and 
wished  to  be  rid  of  these  matters  of  detail." 

Longstreet  tells  of  the  scout  in  his  report.     He  says: 

".  .  .  On  the  night  of  the  28th  one  of  my  scouts  came 
in  with  the  information  that  the  enemy  had  passed  the 


142  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Potomac  and  was  probably  in  pursuit  of  us.  The  scout 
was  sent  to  general  headquarters  with  the  suggestion 
that  the  army  concentrate  east  of  the  mountain  and  bear 
down  to  meet  the  enemy." 

Yet  Longstreet  says  in  his  book  that  he  opposed  ag 
gressive  action  in  Pennsylvania. 

The  startling  report  of  the  scout,  according  to  Long- 
street  and  Lee's  staff,  caused  a  radical  change  of  plans. 
But  Colonel  Mosby  proves  that  the  scout  reported  at 
Greenwood  on  the  3Oth,  and  not  at  Chambersburg  on  the 
28th,  and  that  the  alleged  change  of  plans  was  ordered 
on  the  27th. 

Nor  was  it  a  change  of  plan  at  all  —  it  was  simply 
an  order  for  concentration. 

Lee  refused  to  see  the  scout,  which  is  good  evidence 
that  he  knew  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  river.  He  left 
cavalry  in  observation  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
his  signal  corps  had  a  favorable  country  in  which  to 
operate. 

But  if  he  had  had  neither  he  would  have  known 
where  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was,  because  its  place 
was  between  him  and  Washington. 

General  Hunt  says : 

".  .  .  General  Hooker's  instructions  were  to  keep  al 
ways  in  view  the  safety  of  Washington  and  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  this  necessarily  subordinated  his  operations 
to  those  of  the  enemy.  ..." 

Lee  knew  this  —  it  was  what  he  based  his  strategy 
on. 

Lee  was  disappointed  in  not  finding  Stuart  at  or  near 
Chambersburg,  and  his  staff  exaggerated  the  incident  in 
order  to  relieve  him  of  responsibility  for  their  fancied 


JAMES  LONGSTREET 


Facing   page    143 


GETTYSBURG  143 

failure  of  the  campaign.  They  were  so  zealous  that  they 
failed  to  see  that  they  were  exposing  their  idol  to  a 
charge  of  incompetency,  for,  as  Colonel  Mosby  says,  and 
as  any  one  of  common  sense  would  say :  ".  .  .  If  Gen 
eral  Lee  did  not  know  when  he  first  arrived  at  Cham- 
bersburg,  and  if  Longstreet  did  not  know  that  Hooker 
had  crossed  the  Potomac,  then  neither  was  fit  to  com 
mand  an  army,  nor  an  army  corps.  .  .  ' 

While  at  Chambersburg  Lee  knew  where  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was,  and  that  is  why,  on  the  27th,  he 
recalled  Ewell  from  York.  He  intended  to  concentrate 
his  army  at  Cashtown,  as  his  order  and  the  following 
letter  show: 

"  GREENWOOD,  July  i,  1863. 
"  BRIG.  GEN.  I.  D.  IMBODEN. 

"  GENERAL  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  7  a.  in. 
yesterday  from  Mercersburg.  ...  Upon  arriving  at 
Chambersburg  to-day  I  desire  you  to  relieve  General 
Pickett,  who  will  then  move  forward  to  this  place.  .  .  . 
My  headquarters  for  the  present  will  be  at  Cashtown, 
east  of  the  mountain." 

Lee  wanted  to  be  where  he  could  invite  attack  on  his 
front,  or  fall  upon  any  force  that  might  move  against 
his  line  of  communication, —  such  a  move  as  that  con 
templated  by  Hooker  when  he  asked  Halleck  for  the 
Harper's  Ferry  garrison. 

Cashtown  was  clearly  indicated. 

Meade  did  not  hear  of  Swell's  countermarch  until  the 
1st,  because  Stuart  had  cut  the  wires;  but  as  soon  as  he 
got  the  news  he  issued  a  general  order  for  his  army  to 
withdraw  to  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek. 

Neither  Lee  nor  Meade  had  any  use  for  Gettysburg. 
Lee  held  it  on  the  24th  of  June  with  Gordon's  division, 


144  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

and  gave  it  up.  Meade  held  it  on  the  3Oth  with  Buford's 
cavalry,  and  was  going  to  give  it  up  the  next  day.  The 
only  interest  the  Confederates  manifested  in  the  place 
was  because  they  thought  it  a  good  town  for  shoes. 
Pettigrew's  brigade  marched  there  from  Cashtown  on 
the  3Oth  in  search  of  shoes,  but  instead  found  Buford's 
cavalry.  Gordon's  men  were  there  a  week  before,  and 
no  doubt  got  all  the  shoes  that  would  fit. 

But  A.  P.  Hill,  who  was  at  Cashtown,  bright  and  early 
on  the  morning  of  the  1st  sent  Heth's  and  Fender's 
divisions  and  two  battalions  of  artillery  out  toward  Get 
tysburg.  He  said  he  wanted  to  "  find  out  what  was  in 
his  front."  About  the  same  time  Reynolds,  who  had 
three  corps  at  Emmitsburg,  was  marching  toward  Gettys 
burg.  He  was  not  expecting  a  fight,  because  he  thought 
at  that  time  that  Lee  was  marching  north. 

Heth  struck  Buford  about  three  miles  from  Gettys 
burg.  Buford  fought  his  cavalry  dismounted  and  noti 
fied  Reynolds.  In  this  way  the  battle  of  the  first  day 
was  precipitated. 

Colonel  Mosby  says  that  Hill  marched  from  Cash- 
town  without  orders,  not  to  "  find  out  what  was  in  his 
front,"  but  to  hunt  a  fight;  and  he  is  probably  correct, 
for  Hill  was  lonesome  without  a  fight.  Then  he  was 
absolutely  devoid  of  discretion.  More  than  once  he  led 
his  men  to  certain  slaughter,  and  fell  himself  at  Peters 
burg  as  the  curtain  was  falling  on  the  last  act  of  the  war 
drama.  And  so  Colonel  Mosby  makes  Hill  "  responsible 
for  bringing  upon  us  the  dies  irae,  dies  ilia/' 

But  it  was  well  known  throughout  the  army  that  Lee 
was  annoyed  at  not  finding  Stuart  at  or  near  Chambers- 
burg.  Colonel  Mosby  proves  that  it  was  impossible  for 
him  to  be  there,  but  Lee  had  little  respect  for  impos 
sibilities. 


GETTYSBURG  145 

What  Lee  wanted  with  Stuart  at  Chambersburg  was 
not  to  tell  him  that  Hooker  had  crossed  the  river,  for  he 
knew  that,  but  to  put  him  between  the  two  armies;  and 
if  Stuart  had  been  there,  Pleasonton  would  have  been  in 
his  front,  and  the  cavalry  operations  would  have  pre 
vented  Hill  from  going  to  Gettysburg.  So  while  the 
collision  was  due  to  Hill's  indiscretion,  that  indiscretion 
would  have  been  impossible  if  Stuart  had  been  present. 

If  Stuart  had  not  cut  Meade's  wires,  there  would  have 
been  no  Gettysburg,  because  the  order  of  withdrawal 
would  have  been  issued  sooner,  and  would  have  caught 
Reynolds  before  he  left  camp  on  the  morning  of  the 
ist.  If  Hill  had  not  felt  that  he  needed  a  fight, —  or 
if  Stuart  had  been  between  the  two  armies, —  there 
would  have  been  no  Gettysburg.  So  Gettysburg  was  an 
accidental  incident  of  the  campaign. 

The  real  gravamen  of  the  charge  that  Lee's  friends 
make  against  Stuart,  and  that  Colonel  Mosby  urges 
against  Hill,  is  that  the  battle  of  the  ist,  in  Colonel 
Mosby's  words,  ".  .  .  compelled  Lee  to  stay  at  Gettys 
burg  and  fight  a  battle  under  duress,  or  retreat,  or  at 
least  appear  to  retreat.  .  .  ." 

We  shall  see  later  on  that  that  was  not  the  reason 
Lee  continued  fighting  at  Gettysburg. 

He  had  a  much  better  reason. 

The  battle  of  the  first  day  ended  with  Lee's  tired  troops 
in  possession  of  the  field,  and  the  enemy  strongly  posted 
with  reinforcements  on  Gulp's  Hill. 

General  Gordon  thought  the  battle  ought  to  have  been 
made  decisive.  He  says : 

".  .  .  From  the  situation  plainly  to  be  seen  on  the 
first  afternoon,  and  from  the  facts  that  afterward  came 
to  light  as  to  the  positions  of  different  corps  of  General 


146     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Meade's  army,  it  seems  certain  that  if  the  Confederates 
had  simply  moved  forward,  following  up  the  advantage 
gained,  and  striking  the  separated  Union  commands  in 
succession,  the  victory  would  have  been  Lee's  instead  of 
Meade's.  .  .  ." 

That  is,  if  the  Confederates  had  taken  Culp's  Hill, 
and  Meade  had  obligingly  marched  his  separated  com 
mands  up  so  that  Lee  could  beat  them  in  detail,  the 
victory  might  have  been  Lee's  instead  of  Meade's.  But 
it  is  not  by  any  means  certain  that  the  Confederates 
could  have  carried  Culp's  Hill;  it  appeared  doubtful. 

General  Hunt  says : 

"  Ewell's  absent  division  did  not  arrive  until  near  sun 
set,  when  the  Twelfth  Federal  corps  and  Stannard's  Ver 
mont  brigade  were  up  also,  and  the  Third  corps  arriving. 
In  fact  an  assault  by  the  Confederates  was  not  practic 
able  before  5  130  p.  m. ;  and  after  that  the  position  was 
perfectly  secure.  For  the  first  time  that  day  the  Federals 
had  the  advantage  of  position,  and  sufficient  troops  and 
artillery  to  occupy  it,  and  General  Ewell  would  not  have 
been  justified  in  attacking  without  positive  orders  of  Gen 
eral  Lee,  who  was  present  and  wisely  abstained  from 
giving  them.  .  .  ." 

But  if  Lee  had  carried  Culp's  Hill,  Meade,  instead  of 
marching  his  separated  commands  up  to  have  them 
beaten  in  detail,  would  have  ordered  them  to  concen 
tration  in  strong  position  on  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek,  as 
was  his  original  intention. 

General  Hunt  says : 

"  When   Meade   learned   that   Ewell   had   withdrawn 


Facing  page   146 


R.  S.  EWELL 


GETTYSBURG  147 

from  the  Susquehanna  he  issued  a  circular  order  to  Corps 
commanders : 

"  '  If  the  enemy  assume  the  offensive,  and  attack,  it 
is  my  intention,  after  holding  them  in  check  sufficiently 
long  to  withdraw  trains  and  other  impedimenta,  to  with 
draw  the  army  from  its  present  position  and  form  a 
line  of  battle  with  the  left  resting  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Middleburg  and  the  right  at  Manchester,  the  general 
direction  being  that  of  Pipe  Creek/ ' 

Of  this  position  General  Hunt  says : 

"  From  Westminster,  which  is  on  the  Paris  ridge,  the 
eastern  boundary  of  the  valley  of  the  Monocacy,  good 
roads  led  in  every  direction  and  gave  the  place  the  same 
strategic  value  for  Meade  that  Gettysburg  did  for  Lee. 
The  new  line  could  not  be  turned  by  Lee  without  im 
minent  danger  to  his  own  army,  nor  could  he  afford  to 
advance  upon  Washington  or  Baltimore,  leaving  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  intact  behind  and  so  near  him. 
That  would  be  to  invite  the  fate  of  Burgoyne.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  Without  magazines,  or  assured  communications, 
Lee  would  have  to  scatter  his  army  more  or  less,  in  order 
to  subsist  it,  and  so  expose  it  to  Meade's;  or  else  keep 
it  united,  and  so  starve  it,  and  Meade  could  compel  the 
latter  alternative  by  simple  demonstrations. 

'  There  would  be  but  two  courses  for  Lee,  either  to 
attack  Meade  in  his  chosen  position  or  retreat  without 
a  battle.  .  .  . 

"  In  case  of  defeat  Meade's  line  of  retreat  would  be 
comparatively  short,  and  easily  covered,  whilst  Lee's 
would  be  for  two  marches  through  an  open  country  be 
fore  he  could  gain  the  mountain  passes.  .  .  ." 

Lee  had  defeated  McClellan  at  Richmond,   Pope  at 


148    THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Manassas,  Burnside  at  Fredericksburg,  and  Hooker  at 
Chancellorsville ;  but  in  every  case  they  had  fallen  back 
to  strong  positions, —  McClellan  at  Harrison's  Landing, 
Pope  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  Hooker 
and  Burnside  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock. 
And  they  were  all  in  position  to  resist  attack.  If  Meade 
had  been  defeated,  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  him 
from  doing  what  his  predecessors  had  so  often  done  with 
the  same  army. 

Lee  said  he  carried  into  Pennsylvania  what  ammuni 
tion  he  thought  he  would  need.  As  he  did  not  get  any 
more  he  would  hardly  have  had  enough  to  take  Gulp's 
Hill  and  demolish  all  Meade's  separated  columns  as  they 
marched  up.  In  fact,  he  was  short  of  ammunition 
after  the  3d  day,  and  did  not  get  any  more  until  July 
10,  when  he  was  standing  at  bay  on  the  river,  waiting 
for  it  to  fall  so  that  he  could  get  back  into  Virginia. 
What  little  he  got  then  came  over  in  rowboats. 

Then  his  70,000  men,  after  demolishing  Meade's  90,- 
ooo  or  100,000,  would  have  been  reduced  to,  say,  50,- 
ooo,  for  a  siege  of  Washington,  with  the  49  regiments 
that  were  at  Harrisburg  behind  the  intrenchments  with 
the  garrison  already  there.  Then,  as  Vicksburg  fell  on 
the  4th,  Grant  could  have  spared,  say,  50,000  to  save 
Washington.  They  could  have  reached  Lee's  rear  in 
three  or  four  days. 

General  Gordon  says: 

"  Calmly  reviewing  the  indisputable  facts  which  made 
the  situation  at  Gettysburg  and  in  the  Wilderness  strik 
ingly  similar,  and  considering  them  from  a  purely  mili 
tary  and  worldly  standpoint,  I  should  utter  my 
profoundest  conviction  were  I  to  say :  '  Had  Jackson 
been  there,  the  Confederacy  had  not  died.'  " 


GETTYSBURG  149 

But  Lee  was  "there."  Hearing  the  guns  when  he 
arrived  at  Cashtown,  he  rode  rapidly  on  to  Gettysburg 
and  arrived  just  as  the  battle  ended.  He  did  not  think 
it  advisable  to  order  an  attack  on  Gulp's  Hill,  and  no 
doubt  Jackson  would  have  agreed  with  him,  as  he  was 
far  more  discreet  than  Lee. 

The  battle  of  the  first  day  at  Gettysburg  was  some 
thing  like  Jackson's  battle  at  Cedar  Mountain.  There 
he  routed  the  enemy  from  the  field,  occupied  it  two 
days,  then  fell  back  toward  Gordonsville.  He  did  not 
feel  it  incumbent  upon  him  to  fight  another  battle,  for 
the  enemy  was  reinforced,  just  as  he  was  at  Gettysburg. 

Had  Jackson,  Hannibal,  Napoleon,  and  Joshua  "  been 
there,"  the  Confederacy  "  had  died  "  just  the  same. 

Longstreet  says  that  on  the  afternoon  of  the  first  day 
he  rode  to  Lee's  headquarters,  and  after  surveying  the 
enemy  rallying  his  forces  on  Cemetery  Ridge,  and  satis 
fying  himself  of  the  strength  of  the  position,  he  said  to 
Lee :  "  We  could  not  call  the  enemy  to  position  better 
suited  to  our  plans.  All  we  have  to  do  is  to  file  round 
his  left  and  secure  good  ground  between  him  and  his 
capital." 

lt  This,"  Longstreet  continues,  "  when  said,  was 
thought  to  be  the  opinion  of  my  commander  as  much 
as  my  own.  I  was  not  a  little  surprised  therefore  at 
his  impatience  as,  striking  the  air  with  his  closed  hand, 
he  said:  'If  he  is  there  to-morrow,  I  will  attack 
him.'  .  .  .  That  he  was  excited  and  off  his  balance  was 
evident  on  the  afternoon  of  the  first,  and  he  labored 
under  that  oppression  until  enough  blood  was  shed  to 
appease  him." 

Lee  was  no  doubt  as  much  surprised  at  Longstreet's 
plan  as  Longstreet  was  at  Lee's  reception  of  it. 


150  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Lee  knew  before  he  reached  Gettysburg  that  what 
ever  he  did  had  to  be  done  at  once  —  that  time  was  the 
essence  of  the  occasion  —  as  the  following  from  Long- 
street's  book  will  show: 

"  At  Cashtown  General  Lee  found  General  Hill  had 
halted  his  division,  under  R.  H.  Anderson,  and  his  re 
serve  artillery.  He  had  General  Anderson  called,  who 
subsequently  wrote  me  of  the  interview  as  follows : 
*  About  twelve  o'clock  I  received  a  message  notifying 
me  that  General  Lee  desired  to  see  me.  I  found  him 
intently  listening  to  the  fire  of  the  guns  and  very  much 
disturbed  and  distressed.  At  length  he  said,  more  to 
himself  than  to  me:  "  I  cannot  think  what  has  become 
of  Stuart.  I  ought  to  have  heard  from  him  long  before 
now.  He  may  have  met  with  disaster,  but  I  hope  not. 
In  the  absence  of  reports  from  him  I  am  in  ignorance  as 
to  what  we  have  in  front  of  us.  It  may  be  the  whole 
Federal  army,  or  it  may  be  only  a  detachment.  If  it 
is  the  whole  Federal  force  we  must  fight  a  battle  here. 
If  we  do  not  gain  a  victory  those  defiles  and  gorges  we 
passed  this  morning  will  shelter  us  from  disaster." 

He  realized  that  if  he  was  to  fight,  the  sooner  the 
better,  also  that  he  must  keep  his  back  up  against  those 
defiles  and  gorges;  and  therefore  he  was  prompt  in  re 
jecting  Longstreet's  proposal. 

Longstreet  contends  that  his  flank  movement  would 
have  called  Meade  to  aggressive  battle  with  the  Con 
federates  on  good  ground  of  their  own  selection.  But 
it  is  hardly  probable  that  Meade  would  have  remained 
passive  while  Lee  filed  around  his  left  in  search  of  Long- 
street's  "  good  ground."  He  might  have  preferred  to 
fall  back  to  good  ground  himself,  just  as  Lee  fell  back 


GETTYSBURG  151 

after  the  Wilderness  in  response  to  Grant's  flank  move 
ment;  or  he  might  have  decided  to  attack  while  Lee 
was  executing  a  difficult  movement  and  unmasking  those 
"  defiles  and  gorges,"  for  even  if  he  had  been  repulsed 
he  could  have  fallen  back  as  his  army  had  done  on 
several  similar  occasions,  and  just  as  Lee  did  after  his 
repulse. 

Or  suppose  Meade  had  permitted  Lee  to  file  around 
his  left  and  occupy  in  peace  and  quiet  Longstreet's  "  good 
ground  between  him  and  his  capital."  How  comfortable 
Lee  would  have  been,  seventy  miles  north  of  Washington, 
with  a  limited  supply  of  ammunition,  and  "  those  defiles 
and  gorges  "  exposed  to  the  enemy. 

General  Hunt  says  of  Longstreet's  plan : 

"  It  had  not  been  General  Lee's  intention  to  deliver 
a  battle  so  far  from  his  base  unless  attacked,  but  he  now 
found  himself,  by  the  mere  force  of  circumstances,  com 
mitted  to  one.  If  it  must  take  place,  the  sooner  the 
better.  .  .  .  Longstreet  indeed  urged  General  Lee  in 
stead  of  attacking  to  turn  General  Meade's  left,  and  by  in 
terposing  between  him  and  Washington,  and  threatening 
his  communications,  to  force  him  to  attack  the  Confeder 
ate  army  in  position ;  but  General  Lee  probably  saw  that 
Meade  would  be  under  no  such  necessity ;  would  have  no 
great  difficulty  in  obtaining  supplies,  and  disregarding  the 
clamor  from  Washington,  could  play  a  waiting  game 
which  it  would  be  impossible  for  Lee  to  maintain  in  the 
open  country.  He  could  not  advance  on  Baltimore  or 
Washington  with  Meade  in  his  rear,  nor  could  his  army 
subsist  in  a  hostile  region  which  would  soon  swarm  with 
additional  enemies.  His  communication  could  be  cut, 
for  his  recommendation  to  assemble  even  a  small  army 
at  Culpeper  to  cover  them  had  not  been  complied  with. 


152    THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

A  battle  was  a  necessity  to  Lee,  and  a  defeat  would  be 
more  disastrous  to  Meade,  and  less  so  to  himself,  at 
Gettysburg  than  at  any  point  east  of  it.  With  the  defiles 
of  the  South  Mountain  range  close  in  his  rear,  which 
could  be  easily  held  by  a  small  force,  a  safe  retreat 
through  the  Cumberland  Valley  was  assured,  so  that  his 
army,  once  through  these  passes,  would  be  practically  on 
the  bank  of  the  Potomac,  at  a  point  already  prepared 
for  crossing.  Any  position  east  of  Gettysburg  would 
deprive  him  of  these  advantages.  It  is  more  probable 
that  General  Lee  was  influenced  by  cool  calculation  of 
this  nature  than  by  hot  blood,  or  that  the  opening  suc 
cess  of  a  chance  battle  had  thrown  him  off  his  balance." 

» 
Meade  was  on  the  lookout.     He  dispatched  Halleck: 

"  July  2,  1863,  3  p.  m.  If  not  attacked,  and  can  get 
any  positive  information  of  the  position  of  the  enemy 
which  will  justify  me  in  so  doing,'  I  shall  attack.  If 
I  find  it  hazardous  to  do  so,  or  am  satisfied  the  enemy 
is  endeavoring  to  move  to  my  rear  and  interpose  be 
tween  me  and  Washington,  I  shall  fall  back  on  my  sup 
plies  at  Westminster." 

Longstreet  elaborately  defends  his  proposed  flank 
movement.  He  cites  General  Grant  at  Petersburg  and 
Von  Moltke  at  Metz,  but  fails  to  note  that  General  Grant 
had  three  times  as  many  men  as  Lee,  and  Von  Moltke 
about  twice  as  many  as  the  French,  whereas  Lee  at  Get 
tysburg  was  materially  inferior  in  numbers,  equipment, 
etc.,  to  Meade.  Then,  neither  Grant's  nor  Moltke's  lines 
of  communication  were  threatened,  in  fact  they  were  ab 
solutely  secure,  while  Lee's,  such  as  they  were,  were  in 
imminent  danger. 


GETTYSBURG  153 

Longstreet  quotes  a  contributor  to  Blackwood's  Maga 
zine,  who  had  evidently  been  deluded  by  reading  his 
book  : 

"  '  If/  said  he  (Lee)  on  many  occasions,  '  I  had  taken 
General  Longstreet's  advice  on  the  eve  of  the  second  day 
of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  filed  off  the  left  corps 
of  my  army  behind  the  right  corps,  in  the  direction  of 
Washington  and  Baltimore,  along  the  Emmitsburg  road, 
the  Confederates  would  to-day  be  a  free  people.' ' 

If  Lee  ever  said  this  or  anything  like  it,  it  must  have 
been  during  a  fit  of  aberration. 

I  wrote  to  Gen.  Fitz  Lee  while  he  was  in  Cuba,  re 
garding  this  alleged  admission,  and  he  replied: 

"  November  5,  1900.  Longstreet  did  not  get  on  the 
field  with  his  troops  until  the  second  day's  fight.  The 
two  armies  were  in  such  close  proximity  then  that  it 
could  not  be  possible  to  turn  Meade's  left  flank,  because 
our  transportation  would  have  been  in  danger  of  capture 
and  our  lines  of  communication  with  Virginia  cut  off. 
It  was  not,  however,  a  practicable  move  at  any  time." 

The  Count  of  Paris  is  prolific  in  alternatives  at  Lee's 
disposal,  but  it  is  only  necessary  to  name  his  preference. 
It  is :  "  He,  Lee,  has  the  choice  to  retire  into  the  gaps 
of  South  Mountain  in  order  to  compel  Meade  to  come 
after  him."  He  says  that  this  would  have  been  the  best 
plan,  "  because  by  preserving  the  strategic  offensive,  Lee 
would  then  secure  all  the  advantages  of  the  tactical  de 
fensive." 

But  Meade  might  have  objected  to  being  compelled 
to  follow  Lee  into  any  traps.  He  might  have  preferred 


154  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

to  leave  Lee  in  the  gaps,  for  it  would  only  have  been 
a  question  of  time  when  he  would  have  been  bottled  up 
by  Meade's  reinforcements,  which  were  being  rushed 
from  every  direction. 

Then  General  Lee  says  in  his  report  of  the  time: 

"  At  the  same  time  we  were  unable  to  await  an  at 
tack,  as  the  country  was  unfavorable  for  collecting  sup 
plies  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  who  could  restrain 
our  foraging  parties  by  holding  the  mountain  passes  with 
local  and  other  troops." 

On  the  1 2th  of  July  he  wrote  to  Davis  from  Williams- 
port: 

"  But  for  the  power  the  enemy  possesses  of  accumulat 
ing  troops  I  should  be  willing  to  await  his  attack." 

The  battle  of  the  first  has  been  underrated  by  his 
torians.  It  lasted  from  8  a.  m.  to  4  p.  m.,  and  was  one 
of  the  most  stubbornly  contested  battles  of  the  war. 
The  loss  on  both  sides  was  heavy,  and  Meade's  greater 
than  on  the  third  day.  Heth's  and  Fender's  divisions 
were  badly  used  up,  and  would  have  been  driven  back  to 
Cashtown  had  not  Rodes,  who  was  marching  for  concen 
tration,  hearing  the  guns,  changed  his  direction  and  come 
to  their  aid.  Even  then  the  battle  was  doubtful  until 
Early,  following  Rodes,  came  in  on  the  Federal  right 
and  rear. 

From  Lee's  report: 

"  More  than  5000  prisoners,  exclusive  of  wounded,  3 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  some  colors  were  captured. 
Among  the  prisoners  were  two  brigadier  generals,  one 
of  whom  was  badly  wounded.  Our  own  loss  was  heavy, 


GETTYSBURG  155 

including  a  number  of  officers,  among  whom  were  Major 
General  Heth  slightly,  and  Brigadier  General  Scales  of 
Fender's  division  severely,  wounded.  .  .  ." 

Meade  sustained  a  heavy  loss  in  the  death  of  General 
Reynolds,  and  Lee  lost  General  Archer,  who  was  cap 
tured. 

The  battle  of  the  first  did  commit  Meade  to  Gettys 
burg.  The  intelligence  that  he  had  been  defeated  and 
had  retreated,  leaving  his  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field, 
would  have  thrown  the  North  into  convulsions.  Then 
there  was  a  strong  sentiment  both  in  the  army  and  the 
country  which  favored  the  restoration  of  McClellan. 
Powerful  influences  urged  it  on  Lincoln,  and  while  he 
stemmed  the  tide,  he  might  not  have  been  able  to  do  it 
if  Meade  had  fallen  back  on  Westminster. 

But  Lee,  after  burying  his  dead  and  removing  his 
wounded,  could  have  drawn  his  lines  in  to  Cashtown 
without  producing  the  slightest  effect  in  the  South;  and 
there  was,  of  course,  no  man  in  the  Confederate  army 
that  could  take  his  place.  And  so  he  had  no  such  rea 
sons  as  Meade  had  for  staying  at  Gettysburg. 

When  Lee  passed  through  Cashtown  he  did  not  know 
whether  he  had  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  his  front 
or  only  a  detachment;  but  when  he  reached  Gettysburg 
and  saw  the  enemy  retreating  he  knew  it  was  a  detach 
ment,  because  he  knew  that  the  Confederates  present  could 
not  have  routed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  field. 
Any  ordinary  commander  under  the  circumstances, — 
an  unexpected  victory  calculated  to  encourage  him  and 
depress  his  opponent,  who  had  only  a  detachment  present, 
—  would  have  determined  to  fight  it  out.  And  so  Lee 
did  not  have  to  be  "  compelled  "  to  fight  at  Gettysburg. 
Both  sound  military  sense  and  his  inclination,  which 


156  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

was  always  to  fight  if  he  had  half  a  chance,  impelled 
him. 

Of  the  time  General  Hunt  says : 

".  .  .  .  Early  on  the  morning  of  July  2  when  nearly 
all  the  Confederate  army  had  reached  Gettysburg  or  its 
immediate  vicinity,  a  large  portion  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  still  on  the  road.  The  Second  corps  and 
Sykes,  with  two  divisions  of  the  Fifth,  arrived  about 
7  a.  m.,  Crawford's  division  not  joining  until  noon; 
Lock  wood's  brigade,  two  regiments  from  Baltimore,  at 
eight;  De  Trobrians's  and  Burling's  brigades  of  the 
Third  corps,  from  Emmitsburg,  at  nine,  and  the  artil 
lery  Reserve  and  its  large  ammunition  train  from  Tarry- 
town  at  10.30  a.  m.  Sedgwick's  Sixth  corps,  the  largest 
in  the  army,  after  a  long  night  march  from  Manchester, 
reached  Rock  Creek  at  4  p.  m.  .  .  ." 

Now  at  this  time,  the  morning  of  the  2d,  it  is  clear 
that  Stuart's  absence  had  accidentally  given  Lee  the  ad 
vantage  over  Meade. 

He  had  won  a  considerable  victory  and  had  his  army 
concentrated  while  Meade's  was  scattered. 

It  is  true  that  Gettysburg  was  the  result  of  Stuart's 
absence,  but  he  was  not  responsible  for  the  conduct  of 
the  battle;  and  its  conduct  is  all  that  there  is  to  regret 
in  the  entire  campaign. 

Lee  knew  that  Meade  would  decide  immediately 
whether  or  not  he  would  hold  the  ridge,  and  if  he  decided 
to  hold  it  he  would  order  his  marching  columns  to  Get 
tysburg.  Every  hour  would  add  fortifications  and  rein 
forcements  to  a  naturally  strong  position,  therefore  the 
sooner  he  attacked  in  the  morning  the  better. 

Lee's  plan  of  battle  was  for  Longstreet  to  attack 
Meade's  left,  and  for  Ewell  to  act  in  concert  by  a  dem- 


GETTYSBURG  157 

onstration  on  his  right  to  be  developed  into  an  attack  if 
opportunity  offered. 

But  Longstreet  was  not  ready  to  attack  until  5  p.  m., 
when  Lee  must  have  known  that  the  whole  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  on  the  ridge,  and  that  the  advantage  for 
tune  had  thrown  in  his  way  had  vanished.  If  he  could 
•have  resisted  his  temptation  to  fight  anyhow,  he  might 
have  withdrawn  to  Cashtown,  with  a  tactical  disposition 
to  take  advantage  of  any  mistake  Meade  might  make  if 
he  pursued.  And  even  if  he  had  continued  the  retreat, 
the  objects  of  the  campaign  would  have  been  secured 
just  as  they  were.  But  the  enemy  was  in  sight,  the 
hunt  was  up,  and  Hood  advanced  to  the  attack.  He  was 
severely  wounded  by  the  artillery  fire  and  General  Law 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  division.  He  says : 

".  .  .  Advancing  rapidly  across  the  valley  ...  all 
the  time  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  batteries,  our  front 
line  struck  the  enemy's  skirmishers  posted  along  the 
further  edge  of  the  valley.  Brushing  these  quickly 
away,  we  soon  came  upon  their  first  line  of  battle  run 
ning  along  the  lower  slopes  of  the  hills  known  as  Devil's 
Den,  to  our  left  of  Round  Top,  and  separated  from  the 
latter  by  Plum  Run  valley.  The  fighting  soon  became 
close  and  severe.  Exposed  to  the  artillery  fire  from  the 
heights  in  front  and  on  our  left,  as  well  as  to  the  mus 
ketry  of  the  infantry,  it  required  all  the  steadfastness 
and  courage  of  the  veterans  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  whose  spirits  were  never  higher  than  then,  to 
face  the  storm.  With  rapidly  thinning  ranks  the  gray 
line  swept  on  until  the  blue  line  in  front  wavered,  broke, 
and  seemed  to  dissolve  in  the  woods  and  rocks  on  the 
mountain  side. 

"  The  advance  continued  steadily,  the  center  of  the 


158  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

division  moving  directly  upon  the  guns  on  the  hill  ad 
joining  Devil's  Den  on  the  north,  from  which  we  had 
been  suffering  so  severely.  In  order  to  secure  my  right 
flank  I  extended  it  well  upon  the  side  of  Round  Top. 
.  .  .  Thus  disposed,  the  division  continued  to  move  for 
ward,  encountering  as  it  ascended  to  the  battery  on  the 
spur  and  the  heights  to  the  right  and  left  of  it  a  most 
determined  resistance  from  the  Federal  troops,  who 
seemed  to  be  continually  reinforced.  The  ground  was 
rough  and  difficult,  which  rendered  an  orderly  advance 
impossible.  Sometimes  the  Federals  would  hold  one 
side  of  the  huge  boulders  on  the  slope  until  the  Confed 
erates  occupied  the  other  side. 

"  In  some  cases  my  men,  with  reckless  daring, 
mounted  to  the  top  of  the  large  rocks  in  order  to  get  a 
better  view  and  to  deliver  their  fire  with  better  effect. 
One  of  them,  Sergeant  Barbee  of  the  Texas  brigade, 
having  reached  a  rock  a  little  in  advance  of  the  line, 
stood  erect  on  the  top  of  it,  loading  and  firing  as  coolly 
as  if  unconscious  of  danger,  while  the  air  around  him 
was  fairly  swarming  with  bullets.  He  soon  fell  help 
less  from  several  wounds,  but  he  held  the  rock  till  the 
litter  bearers  carried  him  off. 

"  In  less  than  an  hour  from  the  time  we  advanced  to 
the  attack  the  hill  by  Devil's  Den,  opposite  our  center, 
was  taken  with  three  pieces  of  artillery  that  had  occupied 
it.  The  remaining  piece  was  run  down  the  opposite 
slope  by  the  gunners  and  escaped.  .  .  . 

"  Up  to  this  time  I  had  seen  nothing  of  McLaws's  di 
vision,  which  was  to  have  extended  our  left,  and  to  have 
moved  to  the  attack  at  the  same  time.  I  therefore  halted 
my  line.  .  .  ." 

Longstreet  says : 


GETTYSBURG  159 

"...  I  rode  to  McLaws,  found  him  ready  for  his 
opportunity,  and  Barksdale  chafing  in  his  wait  for  the 
order  to  seize  the  battery  in  his  front.  Kershaw's  bri 
gade  advanced  and  struck  near  the  angle  of  the  enemy's 
line  where  his  forces  were  gathering  strength  .  .  .  Mc 
Laws  ordered  Barksdale  in.  With  glorious  bearing  he 
sprang  to  his  work,  overriding  obstacles  and  danger. 
Without  a  pause  to  deliver  a  shot,  he  had  the  battery. 
Kershaw,  joined  by  Semmes's  brigade,  responded,  and 
Hood's  men,  feeling  the  impulsion  of  relief,  resumed 
their  bold  fight,  and  presently  the  enemy's  line  was 
broken  through  its  length.  But  his  well  seasoned  troops 
knew  how  to  utilize  the  advantages  of  their  ground  and 
put  back  their  dreadful  fire  from  rocks,  depressions,  and 
stone  fences,  as  they  went  to  shelter  about  Little  Round 
Top.  That  point  had  not  been  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
nor  marked  as  an  important  feature  of  the  field.  The 
broken  ranks  sought  shelter  under  its  rocks  and  defiles 
as  birds  fly  to  cover.  .  .  . 

".  .  .  The  fighting  had  by  this  time  become  tremen 
dous,  and  brave  men  and  officers  were  stricken  by 
hundreds.  Posey  and  Wilcox  dislodged  the  forces 
about  the  Brick  House.  General  Sickles  was  desper 
ately  wounded!  General  Willard  was  dead!  General 
Semmes  of  McLaws's  division  was  mortally  wounded ! 
Our  left  relieved,  the  brigades  of  Anderson's  division 
moved  on  with  Barksdale,  passed  the  swale,  and  moved 
up  the  slope.  Caldwell's  division,  and  presently  those 
of  Ayers  and  Barnes  of  the  Fifth  corps,  met  and  held 
our  strongest  battle.  While  thus  engaged  General 
Sykes  succeeded  in  putting  Weed's  and  Vincent's  bri 
gades  and  Hazlett's  batteries  on  the  summit  of  Little 
Round  Top,  but  presently  we  reached  Caldwell's  division, 
broke  it  off,  and  pushed  it  from  the  field.  Of  his  bri- 


i6o  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

gade  commanders  Zook  was  killed,  Brook  and  Cross 
were  wounded,  the  latter  mortally.  On  our  side,  Barks- 
dale  was  down,  dying,  and  G.  T.  Anderson  wounded. 
General  Hancock  reported  sixty  per  cent,  of  his  men 
lost.  We  had  carried  Devil's  Den,  were  at  the  Round 
Top  and  the  Wheat  Field,  but  Ayers's  division  of  regu 
lars  and  Barnes's  division  were  holding  us  in  equal 
battle. 

".  .  .  By  a  fortunate  strike  upon  Ayers's  flank  we 
broke  his  line,  and  pushed  him  and  Barnes  so  closely  that 
they  were  obliged  to  use  most  strenuous  efforts  to  get 
away  without  losing  in  prisoners,  as  well  as  their  killed 
and  wounded. 

'<(  We  gained  the  Wheat  Field,  and  were  so  close  upon 
the  gorge  that  our  artillery  could  no  longer  sustain  their 
fire  into  it.  We  were  on  Little  Round  Top,  grappling 
for  the  crowning  point.  The  brigade  commanders  there, 
Vincent  and  Weed,  were  killed,  also  the  battery  com 
manders,  Hazlett  and  others ;  but  their  troops  were  hold 
ing  to  their  work  as  firmly  as  the  mighty  boulders  that 
helped  them." 

General  Hunt  says: 

"  The  breaking  of  the  Peach  Orchard  angle  exposed 
the  flanks  of  the  batteries,  on  its  crests,  which  retired 
firing,  in  order  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  infantry. 
Many  guns  of  different  batteries  had  to  be  abandoned 
because  of  the  destruction  of  horses  and  men;  many 
were  hauled  off  by  hand ;  all  the  batteries  lost  heavily. 
Bigelow's  Ninth  Massachusetts  made  a  stand  close  by 
the  Trostle  House  in  the  corner  of  the  field  through 
which  he  had  retired  fighting  with  prolonges  fixed.  Al 
though  much  cut  up,  he  was  directed  by  McGilvery  to 


GETTYSBURG  161 

hold  that  point  at  all  hazards  until  a  line  of  artillery 
could  be  formed  in  front  of  the  wood  beyond  Plum  Run. 
This  line  was  formed  by  collecting  the  serviceable  bat 
teries  and  fragments  of  batteries  that  were  brought  off, 
with  which  and  Dow's  Maine  battery  fresh  from  the  re 
serve  the  pursuit  was  checked.  Finally  some  twenty-five 
guns  formed  a  solid  mass,  which  unsupported  by  infantry 
held  this  part  of  the  line,  aided  Humphreys'  movements, 
and  covered  by  its  fire  the  abandoned  guns  on  the  field 
until  they  could  be  brought  off,  as  all  were,  except  perhaps 
one.  When,  after  fully  accomplishing  its  purpose,  all 
that  was  left  of  Bigelow's  battery  was  withdrawn.  It 
was  closely  pursued  by  Humphreys'  2ist  Mississippi,  the 
only  Confederate  regiment  which  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Run.  His  men  had  entered  the  battery  and  fought 
hand  to  hand  with  the  cannoneers ;  one  was  killed  whilst 
trying  to  spike  a  gun,  and  another  knocked  down  with  a 
handspike  whilst  endeavoring  to  drag  off  a  prisoner.  Of 
the  four  battery  officers  one  was  killed,  another  mortally, 
and  a  third,  Captain  Bigelow,  severely  wounded.  Of 
seven  sergeants,  two  were  killed  and  four  wounded;  or 
a  total  of  twenty-eight  men,  including  two  missing;  and 
eighty  out  of  eighty-eight  horses  were  killed  or  wounded." 

Longstreet  says: 

".  .  .  General  Meade  thought  that  the  Confederate 
army  was  working  on  my  part  of  the  field.  He  led 
some  regiments  of  the  Twelfth  corps  and  posted  them 
against  us,  called  a  division  of  Newton's  corps  first  from 
beyond  Hancock's,  and  sent  Crawford's  division,  the 
last  of  the  Fifth  corps,  splitting  through  the  gorge,  form 
ing  solid  lines,  in  places  behind  stone  fences,  and  mak 
ing  steady  battle,  as  veterans  fresh  in  action  know  so 


162  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

well  how  to  make.  While  Meade's  lines  were  growing, 
my  men  were  dropping ;  we  had  no  others  to  call  to  their 
aid,  and  the  weight  against  us  was  too  heavy  to  carry. 
.  .  .  No  other  part  of  our  army  had  engaged!  My 
17,000  against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac!  The  sun  was 
down  and  with  it  went  down  the  severe  battle.  .  .  ." 

He  fought  troops  that  were  much  farther  from  the 
battle-field  on  the  night  of  the  first  than  he  was,  other 
wise  his  17,000  might  have  been  enough.  Had  he  dis 
played  the  same  zeal  and  energy  that  they  did,  he  would 
have  occupied  Little  Round  Top  without  the  loss  of  a 
man.  He  says  it  was  the  "  citadel  of  the  field,"  and,  if 
so,  should  have  given  him  victory. 

General  Hunt  says: 

".  .  .  General  Longstreet  was  ordered  to  form  the 
divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  on  Anderson's  right, 
so  as  to  envelop  our  left  and  drive  it  in.  These  divisions 
were  only  three  miles  off  at  daylight,  and  moved  early, 
but  there  was  great  delay  in  forming  them  for  battle, 
owing  principally  to  the  absence  of  Law's  brigade,  for 
which  it  would  have  been  well  to  substitute  Anderson's 
fresh  division,  which  could  have  been  replaced  by  Petti- 
grew's,  then  in  reserve.  There  seems  to  have  been  no 
good  reason  why  the  attack  should  not  have  been  made 
by  8  or  9  a.  m.,  at  latest,  when  the  Federal  Third  corps 
was  not  all  up,  nor  Crawford's  division,  nor  the  artillery 
reserves,  nor  the  Sixth  corps,  and  our  lines  still  very 
incomplete.  .  .  ." 

Ewell  on  the  left  had  orders  only  to  make  a  diversion 
in  Longstreet's  favor,  to  be  converted  into  attack,  if  op- 


GETTYSBURG  163 

portunity  offered.  He  looked  for  the  opportunity  till 
about  sundown,  then  made  an  attack,  which,  like  Long- 
street's,  met  with  some  success,  and  might  have  met 
with  more,  had  not  the  Federal  troops  had  all  day  in 
which  to  strengthen  their  position. 

The  following  excerpt  is  from  a  review  of  Long- 
street's  book,  in  the  "  Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Serv 
ice  Institution,"  October,  1897: 

".  .  .  But  there  is  a  mass  of  evidence  which  goes  to 
show  that  General  Lee  considered  Longstreet  responsible, 
and  this  evidence  the  latter  has  certainly  not  refuted. 
.  .  .  Longstreet  is  content  with  the  assertion  that  until 
eleven  o'clock  he  had  received  no  definite  orders  to  at 
tack.  But  it  was  never  Lee's  practice  to  issue  definite 
orders  to  his  corps  commanders.  He  was  accustomed 
to  explain  his  general  intentions,  and  to  leave  the  execu 
tion  in  their  hands,  and  if  on  this  occasion  he  departed 
from  his  usual  custom,  it  was  because  Longstreet  de 
clined  to  move  without  explicit  orders  to  that  effect.  .  .  . 
He  was  aware  that  Lee  was  anxious  to  attack  as  early 
as  possible ;  he  was  aware  that  an  early  attack  was  essen 
tial  to  success;  he  was  aware  how  the  commander-in- 
chief  desired  his  divisions  should  be  placed;  and  yet, 
until  he  received  a  definite  order  to  advance,  did  abso 
lutely  nothing.  He  made  no  attempt  to  reconnoiter  his 
line  of  march,  to  bring  his  troops  into  position,  or  to 
initiate  the  attack  in  accordance  with  the  expressed  wishes 
of  his  superior.  .  .  ." 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  ist  Lee  said  to  Longstreet, 
"If  he  is  there  to-morrow,  I  will  attack  him."  That 
was  enough.  Any  loyal,  zealous,  energetic  commander 


164  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

would  have  had  his  troops  on  the  front  that  night.     H< 
would  not  have  waited  for  morning  nor  orders.     Long 
street  was  not  in  the  battle  of  the  ist,  his  troops  were 
fresh,  and  Lee  naturally  depended  on  him  for  the  next 
day's  battle. 


CHAPTER  III 

GETTYSBURG 

T  ONGSTREET  published  an  account  of  the  battle  in 
•"  1878,  and  quotes  as  follows  from  a  letter  he  re 
ceived  from  General  Hood  in  1875 : 

"  General  Lee  was  seemingly  anxious  you  should  at 
tack  that  morning.  You  thought  it  better  to  await  the 
arrival  of  Pickett's  division  —  at  that  time  still  in  rear 
—  in  order  to  make  the  attack,  and  you  said  to  me  sub 
sequently  :  '  The  general  is  a  little  nervous  this  morn 
ing;  he  wishes  me  to  make  the  attack.  I  do  not  wish 
to  do  so  without  Pickett.  I  never  like  to  go  into  battle 
with  one  boot  off/  ' 

Longstreet  was  balky,  just  as  he  was  at  Second  Ma- 
nassas  when  Lee  desired  him  to  attack  when  he  arrived 
on  the  field.  In  his  account  of  the  battle  of  the  2d  he 
attempts  to  show  that  his  proposed  flank  movement, 
which  had  been  so  unceremoniously  turned  down  by  Lee 
the  day  before,  was  "  in  the  air/' 

He  says :  "  General  Hood  appealed  again  and  again 
for  the  move  to  the  right,  but,  to  give  more  confidence 
to  his  attack,  he  was  reminded  that  the  move  to  the  right 
had  been  carefully  considered  by  our  chief  and  rejected 
in  favor  of  his  present  orders." 

General  Hood's  letter,  from  which  Longstreet  quotes, 
is  published  in  full  in  General  Hood's  "  Advance  and 

165 


i66  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Retreat."  In  it  he  explains  as  follows  his  proposed 
move,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  it  was  entirely  different 
from  the  move  that  had  been  "  carefully  considered  by 
our  chief  " : 

'  The  instructions  I  received  were  to  place  my  division 
across  the  Emmitsburg  road,  form  line  of  battle,  and  at 
tack.  Before  reaching  this  road,  however,  I  had  sent 
forward  some  of  my  picked  Texas  scouts  to  ascertain 
the  position  of  the  enemy's  extreme  left  flank.  They 
soon  reported  to  me  that  it  rested  upon  Round  Top 
mountain;  that  the  country  was  open,  and  that  I  could 
march  through  an  open  woodland  pasture  around  Round 
Top,  and  assault  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear;  that  their 
wagon  trains  were  parked  in  rear  of  their  line  and  were 
badly  exposed  to  our  attack  in  that  direction.  As  soon 
as  I  arrived  upon  the  Emmitsburg  road  I  placed  one  or 
two  batteries  in  position  and  opened  fire.  A  reply  from 
the  enemy's  guns  soon  developed  his  position.  His  left 
rested  on  or  near  Round  Top,  with  line  bending  back 
and  again  forward,  forming  as  it  were  a  concave  line, 
as  approached  by  the  Emmitsburg  road. 

"  A  considerable  body  of  troops  was  posted  in  front 
of  their  main  line  between  the  Emmitsburg  road  and 
Round  Top.  This  force  was  in  line  of  battle  upon  an 
eminence  near  a  peach  orchard.  I  found  that  in  making 
the  attack  according  to  orders,  viz.,  up  the  Emmitsburg 
road,  I  should  have  first  to  encounter  and  drive  off  this 
advanced  line  of  battle;  secondly,  at  the  base  and  along 
the  slope  of  the  mountain,  to  confront  immense  boulders 
of  stone,  so  massed  together  as  to  form  narrow  open 
ings  which  would  break  our  ranks  and  cause  the  men 
to  scatter  while  climbing  up  the  rocky  precipices.  I 
found,  moreover,  that  my  division  would  be  exposed  to 


GETTYSBURG  167 

a  heavy  fire  from  the  main  line  of  the  enemy  in  position 
on  the  crest  of  the  high  range,  of  which  Round  Top 
was  the  extreme  left,  and,  by  reason  of  the  concavity  of 
the  enemy's  main  line,  that  we  would  be  subject  to  a 
destructive  fire  in  flank  and  rear  as  well  as  in  front,  and 
deemed  it  at  most  an  impossibility  to  clamber  along  the 
boulders  of  this  steep  and  rugged  mountain,  and  under 
this  number  of  cross  fires  put  the  enemy  to  flight.  I 
knew  if  the  feat  was  accomplished  it  must  be  at  a  most 
fearful  sacrifice  of  as  brave  and  gallant  soldiers  as  ever 
engaged  in  battle.  The  reconnaissance  of  my  Texas 
scouts  and  the  development  of  the  Federal  lines  were 
effected  in  a  very  short  space  of  time;  in  truth,  shorter 
than  I  have  taken  to  recall  and  jot  down  these  facts, 
although  the  scenes  and  events  of  that  day  are  as  clear 
to  my  mind  as  if  the  great  battle  had  been  fought  yes 
terday.  I  was  in  possession  of  these  important  facts 
so  shortly  after  reaching  the  Emmitsburg  road  that  I 
considered  it  my  duty  to  report  to  you  at  once  my  opin 
ion  that  it  was  unwise  to  attack  up  the  Emmitsburg 
road  as  ordered,  and  to  urge  you  to  allow  me  to  turn 
Round  Top  and  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear. 

"  Accordingly,  I  despatched  a  staff  officer  bearing  to 
you  my  request  to  be  allowed  to  make  the  proposed 
movement  on  account  of  the  above  stated  reasons.  Your 
reply  was  quickly  received :  '  General  Lee's  orders  are 
to  attack  up  the  Emmitsburg  road.'  I  sent  another  offi 
cer  to  say  that  I  feared  nothing  could  be  accomplished 
by  such  an  attack,  and  renewed  my  request  to  turn  Round 
Top.  Again  your  answer  was :  '  General  Lee's  orders 
are  to  attack  up  the  Emmitsburg  road.'  During  this 
interim  I  had  continued  the  use  of  the  batteries  upon 
the  enemy  and  had  become  more  and  more  convinced 
that  the  Federal  line  extended  to  Round  Top,  and  that  I 


i68  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

could  not  reasonably  hope  to  accomplish  much  by  the 
attack  as  ordered.  In  fact,  it  seemed  to  me  the  enemy 
occupied  a  position  by  nature  so  strong  —  I  may  say 
impregnable  —  that,  independently  of  their  flank  fire, 
they  could  easily  repel  our  attack  by  merely  throwing 
and  rolling  stones  down  the  mountain  side  as  we  ap 
proached.  A  third  time  I  despatched  one  of  my  staff 
to  explain  fully  in  regard  to  the  situation,  and  suggested 
that  you  had  better  come  and  look  for  yourself.  I  se 
lected  in  this  instance  my  adjutant  general,  Col.  Harry 
Sellers,  whom  you  know  to  be  not  only  an  officer  of 
great  courage,  but  also  of  marked  ability.  Colonel 
Sellers  returned  with  the  same  message :  *  General  Lee's 
orders  are  to  attack  up  the  Emmitsburg  road/  Almost 
simultaneously  Colonel  Fairfax  of  your  staff  rode  up 
and  repeated  the  above  order.  After  this  urgent  pro 
test  against  entering  the  battle  at  Gettysburg,  according 
to  instruction,  which  protest  is  the  first  and  only  one  I 
ever  made  during  my  entire  military  career,  I  ordered  my 
line  to  advance  and  make  the  assault." 

The  move  to  the  right  that  had  been  "  carefully 
considered  by  our  chief "  was  an  impossible  strategic 
movement,  involving  a  march  of  the  whole  army  on  a 
prospecting  expedition  for  good  ground  between  the 
enemy  and  his  capital ;  while  that  proposed  by  Hood 
was  a  simple  tactical  movement.  Then  from  Long- 
street's  account  of  the  reception  his  plan  received  from 
"  our  chief,"  it  does  not  appear  that  it  was  carefully  con 
sidered  or  that  it  was  considered  at  all. 

Neither  is  it  by  any  means  certain  that  Hood's  pro 
posed  move  would  have  been  a  success.  He  did  not 
have  the  Wilderness  to  shield  his  march.  Meade  would 
have  discovered  it  at  once  and  would  have  met  him  with 


GETTYSBURG  169 

superior  numbers.  Then  the  whole  of  the  artillery  re 
serve  was  back  there  with  those  wagons,  and  as  the 
country  was  open  Hood  would  have  met  with  a  very 
warm  reception.  Either  Longstreet  did  not  approve  of 
Hood's  tactics,  or  else  he  was  sulky  because  of  Lee's 
rejection  of  his  plan.  No  other  interpretation  is  possi 
ble,  because  he  knew  he  had  discretion  as  to  tactics.  In 
fact  at  Second  Manassas  he  substituted  his  own  tactics 
for  those  ordered  by  Lee  for  the  relief  of  Jackson,  and 
brags  of  it  in  his  book. 

The  battles  of  the  ist  and  2d,  while  not  decisive  of 
anything,  were,  on  the  whole,  Confederate  successes. 
On  both  days  Meade  had  been  driven  from  the  open 
field  and  his  army  had  suffered  severely. 

Mr.  Rhodes  says  of  its  condition: 

"  The  feeling  among  the  officers  in  Meade's  camp  that 
night  (2d)  was  one  of  gloom.  On  the  first  day  of  the 
battle  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  had  been  almost 
annihilated.  On  the  second  day  the  Fifth  and  part  of 
the  Second  had  been  badly  shattered,  the  Third  in  the 
words  of  its  commander,  who  had  succeeded  Sickles, 
was  *  used  up  and  not  in  good  condition  to  fight.'  The 
loss  of  the  army  had  been  20,000  men.  Only  the  Sixth 
and  Twelfth  corps  were  fresh." 

So  Lee's  decision  to  continue  the  battle  was  not  alto 
gether  due  to  his  "  uncontrollable  combativeness." 

The  general  plan  for  the  3d  was  a  simultaneous  as 
sault  front  and  flank.  Longstreet' s  corps  was  to  attack 
the  center,  and  the  Second  corps  the  right.  One  division 
of  the  3d  corps  was  at  Longstreet's  disposal. 

Colonel  Long,  chief  of  artillery  of  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  says : 


170  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

".  .  .  General  Lee  determined  to  attack  on  the  third 
day  Meade's  front  where  there  was  a  depression  through 
which  the  Emmitsburg  road  passes.  The  decision  here 
indicated  was  reached  at  a  conference  held  during  the 
morning  on  the  field  in  front  of  and  within  cannon  shot 
of  Round  Top,  there  being  present  Generals  Lee,  Long- 
street,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  H.  Heth,  Col.  A.  L.  Long  and 
Major  Venable.  The  plan  of  attack  was  discussed,  and 
it  was  decided  that  General  Pickett  should  lead  the  as 
saulting  column,  to  be  supported  by  the  divisions  of 
McLaws  and  Hood,  and  such  other  force  as  A.  P.  Hill 
could  spare  from  his  command.  The  only  objection 
offered  was  by  General  Longstreet,  who  remarked  that 
the  guns  on  Little  Round  Top  might  be  brought  to  bear 
on  his  right.  This  objection  was  answered  by  Colonel 
Long,  who  said  that  the  guns  on  Round  Top  could  be 
suppressed  by  our  batteries.  This  point  being  settled, 
the  attack  was  ordered  and  General  Longstreet  was  di 
rected  to  carry  it  out." 

It  was  most  extraordinary  that  Colonel  Long  should 
have  made  such  a  statement,  and  still  more  so  that  Lee 
and  Longstreet  should  have  credited  it,  for  both  of  them 
and  every  artilleryman  in  the  army  were  painfully  aware 
of  the  superiority  of  the  Federal  artillery.  Both  gen 
erals  frequently  referred  to  the  heavier  metal  and  super 
ior  ammunition  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  of  which  there 
was  no  end. 

Longstreet  says: 

"  In  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  fifty-one  brigades 
of  infantry,  eight  brigades  of  cavalry,  and  three  hundred 
and  seventy  guns.  The  artillery  appointments  were  so 
superior  that  our  officers  sometimes  felt  humiliated  when 


GETTYSBURG  171 

posted  to  unequal  combat  with  their  better  metal  and 
munitions.  .  .  ." 

The  Second  corps  did  not  wait  for  Longstreet,  but 
attacked  early  in  the  morning  and  was  repulsed.  Lee's 
plans  had  gone  awry  through  Longstreet's  delay,  just 
as  on  the  2d.  The  advantages  of  a  simultaneous  attack 
were  lost,  and  Meade  had  several  hours  in  which  to 
strengthen  his  center. 

Longstreet,  however,  did  get  his  artillery  in  position 
about  one  o'clock. 

General  Hunt,  Meade's  chief  of  artillery,  says : 

".  .  .  Here  a  magnificent  display  greeted  my  eyes. 
Our  whole  front  for  two  miles  was  covered  by  batteries 
already  in  line,  or  going  into  position.  They  stretched 
apparently  in  one  unbroken  mass  from  opposite  the  town 
to  the  Peach  Orchard,  which  bounded  the  view  to  the 
left,  the  ridges  of  which  were  planted  thick  with  cannon. 
Never  before  had  such  a  sight  been  witnessed  on  this 
continent,  and  rarely,  if  ever,  abroad.  What  did  it 
mean?  It  might  possibly  be  to  hold  their  line  while  the 
infantry  was  sent  to  aid  Ewell,  or  to  guard  against  a 
counterstroke  from  us ;  but  it  most  probably  meant  an 
assault  on  our  center,  to  be  preceded  by  a  cannonade  in 
order  to  crush  our  batteries  and  shake  our  infantry,  at 
least  to  cause  us  to  exhaust  our  ammunition  in  reply,  so 
that  the  assaulting  column  might  pass  in  good  condition 
over  the  half  mile  of  open  ground  beyond  our  effective 
musketry  fire." 

Colonel  Alexander,  chief  of  artillery  of  the  First  corps, 
received  the  following  note  from  General  Longstreet : 

"COLONEL:     If  the  artillery  fire  does  not  have  the 


I72  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

effect  to  drive  off  the  enemy,  or  greatly  demoralize  him, 
so  as  to  make  our  effort  pretty  certain,  I  would  prefer 
that  you  would  not  advise  General  Pickett  to  make  the 
charge." 

Colonel  Alexander  says : 

"  This  note  rather  startled  me.  If  that  assault  was 
to  be  made  on  General  Lee's  judgment  it  was  all  right, 
but  I  did  not  want  it  made  on  mine.  I  wrote  to  Gen 
eral  Longstreet  to  the  following  effect :  '  General :  I 
will  only  be  able  to  judge  the  effect  of  our  fire  on  the 
enemy  by  his  return  fire,  for  his  infantry  is  but  little 
exposed  to  view,  and  the  smoke  will  obscure  the  field. 
If,  as  I  infer  from  your  note,  there  is  any  alternative 
to  the  attack,  it  should  be  carefully  considered  before 
opening  our  fire,  for  it  will  take  all  the  ammunition  we 
have  left  to  test  this  one  thoroughly;  and  if  the  result 
is  unfavorable  we  will  have  none  left  for  another  effort; 
and  even  if  this  is  entirely  successful,  it  can  only  be  so 
at  a  very  bloody  cost.'  To  this  presently  came  the  fol 
lowing  reply :  '  Colonel :  The  intention  is  to  advance 
the  infantry  if  the  artillery  has  the  desired  effect  of  driv 
ing  the  enemy  off,  or  having  other  effect  such  as  to  war 
rant  us  in  making  the  attack/ ' 

Both  Longstreet's  notes  assumed  discretion,  yet  in  his 
book  he  says: 

"  The  order  was  imperative.  The  Confederate  com 
mander  had  fixed  his  heart  upon  it." 

Alexander  says : 

"...  I  hardly  knew  whether  this  left  me  discretion 


GETTYSBURG  173 

or  not,  but  at  any  rate  it  seemed  decided  that  the  artillery 
must  open.  I  felt  that  if  we  went  that  far  we  could  not 
draw  back,  but  that  the  infantry  must  go  too.  Gen.  A. 
R.  Wright,  of  Hill's  corps,  was  with  me,  looking  at  the 
position,  when  these  notes  were  received,  and  we  dis 
cussed  them  together.  Wright  said :  '  It  is  not  so  hard 
to  go  there  as  it  looks ;  I  was  nearly  there  with  my  bri 
gade  yesterday.  The  trouble  is  to  stay  there.  The 
whole  Yankee  army  is  there  in  a  bunch/  ' 

Alexander  then  rode  over  to  Pickett  and  found  him 
sanguine.  He  then  wrote  to  Longstreet: 

"  When  our  artillery  fire  is  at  its  best,  I  will  order 
Pickett  to  charge." 

So  that,  instead  of  General  Lee's  "  intentions  "  being 
carried  out,  the  attack  was  to  be  ordered  when  the  ar 
tillery  fire  was  at  its  best. 

Alexander  says : 

".  .  .  Before  the  cannonade  opened  I  had  made  up 
my  mind  to  give  Pickett  the  order  to  advance  within 
fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  after  it  began.  But  when  I 
looked  at  the  full  development  of  the  enemy's  batteries, 
and  knew  that  his  infantry  was  generally  well  protected 
from  our  fire  by  stone  walls  and  swells  of  the  ground,  I 
could  not  bring  myself  to  give  the  word.  It  seemed 
madness  to  launch  infantry  into  that  fire,  with  nearly 
three  quarters  of  a  mile  to  go  at  midday  under  a  July 
sun.  I  let  the  fifteen  minutes  pass,  twenty  and  twenty- 
five,  hoping  vainly  for  something  to  turn  up.  Then  I 
wrote  to  Pickett:  'If  you  are  coming  at  all  you  must 
come  at  once,  or  I  cannot  give  you  proper  support;  but 
the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened  at  all,  at  least  eighteen 
guns  are  still  firing  from  the  cemetery  alone/  .  .  ." 


174  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Here  Alexander  is  urging  Pickett  to  attack  simply  be 
cause  his  ammunition  is  running  low.  Colonel  Long's 
promise  to  suppress  the  batteries  on  Round  Top  and 
General  Lee's  intention  to  attack  only  in  case  they  were 
suppressed  are  entirely  lost  sight  of. 

General  Hunt  says: 

".  .  .  Thence  I  rode  to  the  artillery  reserve  to  order 
fresh  batteries  and  ammunition  to  be  sent  to  the  ridge. 
...  I  now  rode  on  the  ridge  to  inspect  the  batteries. 
The  infantry  were  lying  down  on  its  reverse  slope  near 
the  crest  in  open  ranks  waiting  events.  .  .  .  Our  fire 
was  deliberate,  but  on  inspecting  the  chests  I  found  that 
the  ammunition  was  running  low,  and  hastened  to  Gen 
eral  Meade  to  advise  its  immediate  cessation,  and  prepa 
ration  for  the  assault  which  would  certainly  follow.  .  .  ." 

Alexander  says: 

".  .  .  Suddenly  the  enemy's  fire  began  to  slacken,  and 
the  guns  in  the  cemetery  limbered  up  and  vacated  the 
position.  Then  I  wrote  to  Pickett  urgently :  '  For 
God's  sake  come  quick.  The  eighteen  guns  are  gone. 
Come  quick,  or  my  ammunition  won't  let  me  support 
you.'  Then  he  said:  'If  he  does  not  run  fresh  bat 
teries  in  there  in  five  minutes,  this  is  our  fight.'  .  .  ." 

Any  artillery  driver  in  the  army  would  have  known 
that  the  guns  were  going  out  to  make  room  for  fresh 
ones.  Hunt  would  have  had  a  hundred  guns  in  the 
cemetery  if  he  had  had  position  for  them. 

Edmund  Rice,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  U.  S.  A.,  says: 

"  From  the  opposite  ridge,  three-fourths  of  a  mile 


GETTYSBURG  175 

away,  a  line  of  skirmishers  sprang  lightly  forward  out 
of  the  woods,  and  with  intervals  well  kept  moved  rapidly 
down  into  the  open  fields,  closely  followed  by  a  line  of 
battle,  then  by  another,  and  by  yet  a  third.  Both  sides 
watched  this  never-to-be-forgotten  scene, —  the  grandeur 
of  attack  of  so  many  thousand  men.  Gibbon's  division, 
which  was  to  stand  the  brunt  of  the  assault,  looked  with 
admiration  on  the  different  lines  of  Confederates,  march 
ing  forward  with  easy,  swinging  step,  and  the  men  were 
heard  to  exclaim :  *  Here  they  come ! '  '  Here  they 
come ! '  '  Here  comes  the  infantry ! '  Soon  little  puffs 
of  smoke  issued  from  the  skirmish  line,  as  it  came  dash 
ing  forward,  firing  in  reply  to  our  own  skirmishers  in 
the  plain  below,  and  with  this  faint  rattle  of  musketry 
the  stillness  was  broken ;  never  hesitating  for  an  instant, 
but  driving  our  men  before  it,  or  knocking  them  over 
by  a  biting  fire  as  they  rose  up  to  run  in,  their  skirmish 
line  reached  the  fences  of  the  Emmitsburg  road.  This 
was  Pickett's  advance,  which  carried  a  front  of  five  hun 
dred  yards  or  more.  .  .  ." 

Alexander  says : 

"  Meanwhile  the  infantry  had  no  sooner  debouched 
on  the  plain  than  all  the  enemy's  line  which  had  been 
nearly  silent  broke  out  again  with  all  its  batteries.  The 
eighteen  guns  were  back  in  the  cemetery,  and  a  storm  of 
shells  began  bursting  over  and  among  our  infantry.  .  .  ." 

Hunt  says : 

"  Meanwhile  the  enemy  advanced  and  McGilvery 
opened  a  destructive  oblique  fire,  reinforced  by  that  of 
Rittenhouse's  six  rifle  guns  from  Round  Top,  which 


i  ;6  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

were  served  with  remarkable  accuracy,  enfilading  Pick- 
ett's  lines.  The  steady  fire  from  McGilvery  and  Rit- 
tenhouse  on  their  right  caused  Pickett's  men  to  drift  in 
the  opposite  direction,  so  that  the  weight  of  the  assault 
fell  upon  the  position  occupied  by  Hazard's  batteries. 
.  .  .  The  enemy  advanced  magnificently,  unshaken  by 
the  shot  and  shell  which  tore  through  their  ranks  from 
the  front  and  from  our  left.  .  .  .  When  our  canister 
fire  and  musketry  was  opened  upon  them  it  occasioned 
disorder,  but  they  still  advanced  gallantly  until  they 
reached  the  stone  wall,  behind  which  our  troops  lay. 
Here  ensued  a  desperate  conflict,  the  enemy  succeeding 
in  passing  the  wall  and  entering  our  lines,  causing  great 
destruction  of  life,  especially  among  the  batteries." 

General  Hunt  says: 

".  .  .  The  losses  in  the  batteries  of  the  Second  corps 
were  very  heavy.  Roty  and  Gushing  were  killed  and 
Woodruff  mortally  wounded  at  their  guns.  ...  So  great 
was  the  destruction  of  men  and  horses  that  Cushing's 
and  Woodruff's  United  States,  and  Brown's  and  Arnold's 
Rhode  Island  batteries,  were  consolidated  to  make  two 
serviceable  ones." 

The  attacking  column, —  consisting  of  Pickett's  divi 
sion,  Heth's,  commanded  by  Pettigrew,  and  Wilcox's 
brigade  of  Anderson's  division, —  numbered  15,000. 
Heth's  division  soon  fell  back  in  disorder.  Pender's  di 
vision,  which  had  advanced,  fell  back ;  and  Wilcox,  seeing 
that  the  attack  was  hopeless,  failed  to  advance.  General 
Lee  intended  that  Hood  and  McLaws  should  participate 
in  the  attack;  and  Anderson,  commanding  one  of  Hill's 
divisions,  was  at  Longstreet's  call,  but  he  used  none  of 
these  troops  in  the  attack. 


GETTYSBURG  177 

General  Webb,  who  commanded  the  brigade  in  front 
of  Pickett,  says: 

".  .  .  The  enemy  advanced  steadily  to  the  fence,  driv 
ing  out  a  portion  of  the  7ist  Pennsylvania  Volunteers. 
General  Armistead  passed  over  the  fence,  with  probably 
over  a  hundred  of  his  command  and  with  several  battle 
flags.  .  .  ." 

From  the  report  of  Colonel  Aylett,  commanding  Armi- 
stead's  brigade  of  Pickett's  divisions : 

".  .  .  The  brigade  moved  across  the  open  field  for 
more  than  half  a  mile,  receiving,  as  it  came  in  range, 
fire  of  shell,  grape,  canister,  and  musketry,  which  rapidly 
thinned  its  ranks;  still  it  pushed  on  until  the  first  line 
of  the  enemy,  strongly  posted  behind  a  stone  wall,  was 
broken  and  driven  from  its  position,  leaving  in  our  hands 
a  number  of  pieces  of  artillery.  By  this  time  the  troops 
on  our  right  and  left  were  broken  and  driven  back,  and 
the  brigade  was  exposed  to  a  severe  musketry  fire  from 
the  front  and  both  flanks  and  an  enfilading  artillery  fire 
from  a  rocky  hill  some  distance  to  the  right.  No  sup 
ports  coming  up,  the  position  was  untenable,  and  we  were 
compelled  to  retire,  leaving  more  than  two-thirds  of  our 
bravest  and  best  killed  or  wounded  on  the  field.  .  .  . 
This  report  would  fail  in  completeness  and  in  the  ren 
dition  of  justice  to  signal  valor  and  heroic  behavior  were 
it  omitted  to  notice  particularly  the  gallant  conduct  of 
our  brigade  commander,  L.  A.  Armistead.  Conspicuous 
to  all,  fifty  yards  in  advance  of  his  brigade,  waving  his 
hat  upon  his  sword,  he  led  his  men  upon  the  enemy, 
with  a  steady  bearing  which  inspired  all  breasts  with  en 
thusiasm  and  courage,  and  won  the  admiration  of  every 


178  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

beholder.  Far  in  advance  of  all,  he  led  the  attack  till 
he  scaled  the  works  of  the  enemy  and  fell  wounded  in 
their  hands,  but  not  until  he  had  driven  them  from  their 
position  and  seen  his  colors  planted  over  their  fortifica 
tions.  .  .  ." 

Our  artillery  fire  was  a  blunder.  Hunt  says  it  was 
more  dangerous  behind  the  ridge  than  on  its  crest.  In 
other  words,  it  did  some  damage  at  Meade's  headquar 
ters  and  among  the  trains;  but  it  did  not  help  Pickett. 
It  divulged  the  point  of  attack,  and  was  a  waste  of  am 
munition  that  might  have  proved  fatal.  Our  experience 
from  Bull  Run  to  Petersburg  taught  that  artillery  fire, 
unless  at  men  on  their  feet  or  at  batteries  in  the  open,  is 
practically  harmless. 

Rhodes  says : 

" '  It  was  a  most  terrific  and  appalling  cannonade/ 
said  Hancock.  But  it  did  little  damage.  The  Union 
soldiers  lay  under  the  protection  of  stone  walls,  swells  of 
the  ground,  and  earthworks,  and  the  projectiles  of  the 
enemy  passed  over  their  heads,  sweeping  the  open  ground 
in  their  rear." 

General  Schurz  thought  that  Meade  should  have  or 
dered  a  counter  attack  —  he  calls  it  the  "  lost  oppor 
tunity."  A  question  of  this  nature  must  always  remain 
an  open  one,  because  in  actual  battle  almost  anything 
may  happen ;  but  if  General  Schurz  had  been  on  our  side, 
he  would  not  have  been  so  sanguine.  There  was  noth 
ing  in  the  behavior  of  our  men  that  indicated  expectation 
or  fear  of  a  counter  attack.  Even  Pickett's  men  that 
were  left  came  in  leisurely,  and  would  have  been  well 
pleased  to  reciprocate  the  reception  they  had  received. 


CARL  SCHURZ 


Facing  page   17 


GETTYSBURG  179 

Of  the  whole  of  our  corps  (Longstreet's)  only  Pickett's 
division  of  less  than  5,000  had  suffered  to  any  consider 
able  extent  in  the  attack.  We  would  have  had  more  guns 
against  Meade  than  he  had  against  Pickett,  for  like 
McClellan  at  Malvern  Hill  we  had  positions  and  good 
open  ground  in  front,  and  with  canister  at  short  range 
our  guns  were  as  good  as  Meade's. 
General  Hunt  says : 

"  The  advance  of  the  Confederate  brigades  to  cover 
Pickett's  retreat  showed  that  the  enemy's  line  opposite 
Cemetery  Ridge  was  occupied  by  infantry.  Our  own 
line  on  the  ridge  was  in  more  or  less  disorder  as  the 
result  of  the  conflict,  and  in  no  condition  to  advance  a 
sufficient  force  for  a  counter  assault.  The  largest  bodies 
of  organized  troops  available  were  on  the  left,  and  Gen 
eral  Meade  now  proceeded  to  Round  Top  and  pushed 
out  skirmishers  to  feel  the  enemy  in  its  front.  An  ad 
vance  to  the  Plum  Run  line  of  the  troops  behind  it  would 
have  brought  them  directly  in  front  of  the  numerous 
batteries  which  crowned  the  Emmitsburg  Ridge,  com 
manding  that  line  and  all  the  intervening  ground;  a 
further  advance,  to  the  attack,  would  have  brought  them 
under  additional  heavy  flank  fires.  McCandless's  bri 
gade,  supported  by  Nevin's,  was,  however,  pushed  for 
ward,  under  cover  of  the  woods,  which  protected  them 
from  the  fire  of  all  these  batteries ;  it  crossed  the  Wheat 
Field,  cleared  the  woods,  and  had  an  encounter  with 
a  portion  of  Benning's  brigade,  which  was  retiring. 
Hood's  and  McLaws'  divisions  were  falling  back  under 
Longstreet's  orders  to  their  strong  position,  resting  on 
Peach  Orchard  and  covering  Hill's  line.  It  needs  but 
a  moment's  examination  of  the  official  map  to  see  that 
our  troops  on  the  left  were  locked  up.  As  to  the  center, 


i8o  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Pickett's  and  Pettigrew's  assaulting  divisions  had  fromed 
no  part  of  A.  P.  Hill's  line,  which  was  practically  intact. 
The  idea  that  there  must  have  been  '  a  gap  of  at  least 
a  mile '  in  that  line,  made  by  throwing  forward  these 
divisions,  and  that  a  prompt  advance  from  Cemetery 
Ridge  would  have  given  us  the  line  itself,  or  at  least  the 
artillery  in  front  of  it,  was  a  delusion.  A  prompt  coun 
ter-charge  after  a  combat  between  two  small  bodies  of 
men  is  one  thing;  the  change  from  the  defensive  to  the 
offensive  of  an  army,  after  an  engagement  at  a  single 
point,  is  quite  another.  This  was  not  a  '  Waterloo  de 
feat/  with  a  fresh  army  to  follow  it  up,  and  to  have 
made  such  a  change  to  the  offensive,  on  the  assumption 
that  Lee  had  made  no  provision  against  a  reverse,  would 
have  been  rash  in  the  extreme.  An  advance  of  twenty 
thousand  men  from  Cemetery  Ridge  in  the  face  of  the 
hundred  and  forty  guns  then  in  position  would  have  been 
stark  madness;  an  immediate  advance  from  any  point, 
in  force,  was  simply  impracticable,  and  before  due  prepa 
ration  could  have  been  made  for  a  change  to  the  offensive, 
the  favorable  moment  —  had  any  resulted  from  the  re 
pulse  —  would  have  passed  away." 

Hunt  says: 

"  General  Lee  now  abandoned  the  attempt  to  dislodge 
Meade;  intrenched  a  line  from  Oak  Hill  to  Peach  Or 
chard;  started  all  his  impedimenta  to  the  Potomac  in 
advance,  and  followed  with  his  army  on  the  night  of 
July  4,  via  Fairfield.  This  compelled  Meade  to  take  the 
circuitous  routes  through  the  lower  passes;  and  the  stra 
tegic  advantage  to  Lee  and  disadvantages  to  Meade  of 
Gettysburg  were  made  manifest.  General  Meade  has 
been  accused  of  slowness  in  the  pursuit.  This  charge 


GETTYSBURG  181 

is  not  well  founded ;  he  lost  no  time  in  commencing  nor 
vigor  in  pushing  it. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  4th  he  ordered  French,  at 
Frederick,  to  seize  and  hold  the  lower  passes,  and  put 
all  the  cavalry,  except  Gregg's  and  Mclntosh's  brigades, 
in  motion  to  harass  the  enemy's  anticipated  retreat  and 
to  destroy  his  trains  and  bridges  at  Williamsport.  It 
stormed  heavily  that  day,  and  the  care  of  the  wounded 
and  burial  of  the  dead  proceeded,  whilst  the  enemy's  line 
was  being  reconnoitered.  So  soon  on  the  5th  as  it  was 
certain  that  Lee  was  retreating,  Gregg  was  started  in 
pursuit  on  the  Chambersburg  pike,  and  the  infantry, — 
now  reduced  to  a  little  over  47,000  effectives,  short  of 
ammunition  and  supplies, —  by  the  lower  passes.  The 
Sixth  corps  taking  the  Hagerstown  road,  Sedgwick  re 
ported  the  Fairfield  pass  fortified,  a  large  force  present, 
and  that  a  fight  could  be  had;  upon  which,  on  the  6th, 
Meade  halted  the  rest  of  the  infantry  and  ordered  two 
corps  to  his  support,  but  soon  learning  that  although 
the  pass  could  be  carried  it  would  cause  too  much  delay, 
he  resumed  the  march,  leaving  Mclntosh  and  a  brigade 
of  the  Sixth  corps  to  follow  the  enemy  through  the  Fair- 
field  pass. 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  4th  Kilpatrick  had  a  sharp 
encounter  with  the  enemy  in  Monterey  pass,  and  this  was 
followed  by  daily  cavalry  combats  on  the  different  routes, 
in  which  much  damage  was  done  to  trains  and  many 
captures  of  wagons,  caissons,  and  prisoners  effected. 
On  the  5th  French  destroyed  the  pontoon  bridge  at  Fall 
ing  Waters.  On  the  6th  Buford  attacked  at  Williams- 
port  and  Kilpatrick  toward  Hagerstown,  on  his  right, 
but  as  Imboden's  train  guard  was  strong,  Stuart  was 
up,  and  Longstreet  close  by,  they  had  to  withdraw.  The 
enemy  proceeded  to  construct  a  new  bridge,  and  intrench 


182     THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

a  strong  line  covering  Williamsport  and  Falling  Waters. 
There  were  heavy  rains  on  the  7th  and  8th,  but  the  in 
fantry  corps  reached  Middletown  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th,  received  supplies,  crossed  the  mountains  that  day, 
and  at  its  close  the  right  was  at  Boonsboro,  and  the  left 
at  Rohrersville,  on  the  road  to  Hagerstown  and  Will 
iamsport.  The  river  was  now  greatly  swollen  and  un- 
fordable,  and  Halleck  on  the  loth  advised  Meade  to 
postpone  a  general  battle  until  his  army  was  concentrated 
and  his  reinforcements  up;  but  Meade,  fully  alive  to  the 
importance  of  striking  Lee  before  he  could  cross  the 
Potomac,  advanced  on  that  day  and  the  nth;  and  on 
the  1 2th  pushed  forward  reconnaissances  to  feel  the 
enemy. 

"  After  a  partial  examination,  made  by  himself  and 
his  chiefs  of  staff,  and  of  engineers,  which  showed  that 
its  flanks  could  not  be  turned,  and  that  the  line,  so  far 
as  seen  by  them,  presented  no  vulnerable  points,  he  de 
termined  to  make  a  demonstration  in  force  on  the  next 
morning,  the  I3th,  supported  by  the  whole  army,  and 
to  attack  if  a  prospect  of  success  offered.  On  assembling 
his  corps  commanders,  however,  he  found  their  opinion 
so  adverse  that  he  postponed  it  for  further  examination, 
after  which  he  issued  the  order  for  the  next  day,  the 
1 4th.  On  advancing  that  morning,  it  was  found  that 
the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  line  and  crossed  the  river, 
partly  by  fording,  and  partly  by  a  new  bridge.  A  care 
ful  survey  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  line  after  it  was 
abandoned  justified  the  opinion  of  the  corps  commanders 
against  an  attack,  as  it  showed  that  an  assault  would 
have  been  disastrous  to  us.  It  proved  also  that  Meade 
in  overriding  that  opinion  did  not  shrink  from  a  great 
responsibility,  notwithstanding  his  own  recent  experience 
at  Gettysburg,  when  all  the  enemy's  attacks  on  even  par- 


GETTYSBURG  183 

tially  intrenched  lines  had  failed.     If  he  erred  on  this 
occasion,  it  was  on  the  side  of  temerity.  .  .  . 

"  But  the  hopes  and  expectations  excited  by  the  vic 
tory  of  Gettysburg  were  as  unreasonable  as  the  fears 
that  had  preceded  it;  and  great  was  the  disappointment 
that  followed  the  *  escape '  of  Lee's  army.  It  was 
promptly  manifested,  too,  and  in  a  manner  which  indi 
cates  how  harshly  and  unjustly  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  and  its  commanders  were  usually  judged  and 
treated ;  and  what  trials  the  latter  had  to  undergo  whilst 
subjected  to  the  meddling  and  hectoring  of  a  distant  su 
perior,  himself  but  too  often  the  mere  mouthpiece  of  an 
irresponsible  clique,  from  which  they  were  not  freed 
until  the  general-in-chief  accompanied  it  to  the  field. 

"  That  same  day,  before  it  was  possible  that  all  the 
circumstances  could  be  known,  three  telegraphic  dis 
patches  passed  between  the  respective  headquarters. 
First,  Halleck  to  Meade :  *  I  need  hardly  say  to  you 
that  the  escape  of  Lee's  army  without  another  battle  has 
created  great  dissatisfaction  in  the  mind  of  the  Presi 
dent,  and  it  will  require  an  active  and  energetic  pursuit 
on  your  part  to  remove  the  impression  that  it  has  not 
been  sufficiently  active  heretofore.'  Second,  Meade  to 
Halleck :  '  Having  performed  my  duty  conscientiously 
and  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  the  censure  of  the  Presi 
dent  (conveyed  in  your  dispatch  of  i  p.  m.  to-day)  is  in 
my  judgment  so  undeserved  that  I  feel  compelled  most 
respectfully  to  ask  to  be  relieved  immediately  from  the 
command  of  the  army.'  Third,  Halleck  to  Meade: 
'  July  14.  My  telegram  stating  the  disappointment  of 
the  President  at  the  escape  of  Lee's  army  was  not  in 
tended  as  a  censure,  but  a  stimulus  to  an  active  pursuit. 
It  is  not  deemed  a  sufficient  cause  for  your  application 
to  be  relieved.'  " 


184  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

The  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  first 
three  years  of  the  war  was  a  "  job,"  as  Lincoln  called  it, 
that  was  not  sought  by  the  officers  of  that  army.  The 
army  carried  Washington, —  the  old  man  of  the  sea, — 
on  its  back;  and  the  commanders  had  to  shoulder  not 
only  their  own  blunders,  but  those  of  Lincoln  and  Hal- 
leek. 

An  officer  who  held  a  "  responsible  and  confidential 
position  at  the  headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  in  the  War  Department "  writes  in  the  Century  for 
November,  1886:  "Lincoln  apparently  yielded  to  the 
views  of  those  in  charge  of  the  military  department  of 
affairs,  and  therefore  Halleck  confidentially  inquired  of 
Reynolds  if  he  was  prepared  to  accept  the  command. 
Reynolds  replied  that  he  expected  to  obey  all  lawful 
orders  coming  to  his  hands,  but  as  the  communication 
seemed  to  imply  the  possession  of  an  option  in  himself, 
he  deemed  it  his  duty  to  say  frankly  that  he  could  not 
accept  the  command  in  a  voluntary  sense,  unless  a  liberty 
of  action  should  be  guaranteed  to  him  considerably  be 
yond  any  which  he  had  reason  to  expect." 

The  command  of  the  army  had  been  refused  by 
Reynolds,  Hooker  had  thrown  it  up  in  disgust,  and  at 
the  eleventh  hour  it  was  thrust  upon  Meade.  Hunt  says : 
"  He  spent  the  day  (28)  in  ascertaining  the  position  of 
his  army." 

July  i,  when  he  was  ordering  the  scattered  columns 
to  concentration  on  Pipe  Creek,  the  battle  of  the  first 
day  was  raging.  When  he  heard  of  it  he  rode  to  Gettys 
burg,  arriving,  as  Rhodes  says,  "  at  one  in  the  morning, 
pale,  tired-looking,  hollow-eyed,  and  worn  out  from  want 
of  sleep,  anxiety,  and  responsibility."  He  found  Rey 
nolds  killed,  the  battle  lost,  and  himself  committed  to 
new  ground.  He  did  not  know  but  that  Lee  would  at- 


GETTYSBURG  185 

tack  in  full  force  at  daylight,  and  did  know  that  his  own 
marching  columns  would  be  late.  At  this  moment 
Meade  was  the  grandest  figure  on  the  Union  side  of 
the  war;  but  we  hear  less  of  him  than  we  do  of  Lincoln's 
Gettysburg  address. 

Pickett's  charge  is  generally  considered  "  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,"  whereas  it  was  only  an  incident  of  the  bat 
tle,  just  as  Malvern  Hill  was  an  incident  of  the  Seven 
Days'  battles.  The  critical  moment  at  Gettysburg  was 
not  when  Pickett  made  his  charge,  nor  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  ist,  but  it  was  on  the  morning  of  the  2d. 

The  attack  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  was  impetuous 
and  desperate,  and  if  it  had  been  timed  in  the  early 
morning  when  a  good  part  of  Meade's  army  was  on 
the  road,  when  his  lines  were  incomplete  and  Little 
Round  Top  unoccupied,  there  is  little  doubt  that  Lee 
would  have  won  the  battle. 

Lee  was  of  course  conscious  of  Longstreet's  misman 
agement  and  probably  had  it  in  mind  when  writing  as 
follows  in  his  letter  of  resignation  shortly  after  Gettys 
burg  :  "  In  addition,  I  sensibly  feel  the  growing  failure 
of  my  bodily  strength.  I  have  not  yet  recovered  from 
the  attack  I  experienced  last  spring.  I  am  becoming 
more  and  more  incapable  of  exertion,  and  am  thus  pre 
vented  from  making  personal  supervision  o*f  the  oper 
ations  in  the  field  which  I  feel  to  be  necessary.  I  am 
so  dull  that  in  making  use  of  the  eyes  of  others  I  am 
frequently  misled." 

The  "  Official  Records  "  give  the  returns  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  on  the  3ist  of  May,  1863  :  Infan 
try  59,457,  cavalry  10,292,  artillery  4,702,  total  74,451. 
Ewell's  losses  in  the  Valley  and  Stuart's  in  Pennsylvania 
must  have  reduced  Lee's  strength  at  Gettysburg  to  less 
than  70,000  men.  The  same  authority  gives  the  strength 


i86  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  June  30,  1863,  Jus^  before 
the  battle  as  104,256,  and  the  losses  as:  Army  of  the 
Potomac;  Killed,  3,155;  Wounded,  14,529;  Missing, 
5,365 ;  Total,  23,049.  Army  of  Northern  Virginia : 
Killed,  2,592;  Wounded,  12,709;  Missing,  5,150;  Total, 
20,451. 

Lee  says  in  his  report :  "  It  is  not  yet  in  my  power 
to  give  a  correct  statement  of  our  casualties,  which  \vere 
severe,  including  many  brave  men,  and  an  unusual  pro 
portion  of  distinguished  and  valuable  officers.  Among 
them  I  regret  to  mention  the  following  general  officers : 
Major  Generals  Hood,  Pender,  and  Trimble  severely, 
and  Heth  slightly,  wounded.  General  Pender  has  since 
died.  .  .  .  Brigadier  Generals  Barksdale  and  Garnett 
were  killed,  and  Brigadier  General  Semmes  was  mortally 
wounded.  .  .  .  Brigadier  Generals  Kemper,  Armistead, 
Scales,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Hampton,  J.  M.  Jones,  and  Jen 
kins  were  also  wounded.  Brigadier  General  Archer  was 
taken  prisoner.  General  Pettigrew,  though  wounded  at 
Gettysburg,  continued  in  command  until  he  was  mortally 
\vounded  near  Falling  Waters.  .  .  ." 

Lee  took  desperate  chances  in  the  battle  of  Chancel- 
lorsville  rather  than  fall  back  on  Richmond.  In  his 
letter  of  June  8  to  Mr.  Seddon  already  quoted,  he  states 
clearly  the  object  of  the  campaign:  "Unless  it  (the 
Army  of  the  Potomac)  can  be  drawn  out  in  a  position 
to  be  assailed  it  will  take  its  own  time  to  strengthen 
itself  to  renew  its  advances  upon  Richmond  and  force 
this  army  back  within  the  intrenchment  of  that  city." 
It  was  "  to  prevent  such  a  catastrophe  "  that  he  took  the 
still  further  desperate  chances  of  stretching  his  army 
from  Fredericksburg  to  Williamsport,  with  Hooker  prac 
tically  between  him  and  defenseless  Richmond. 

In  this  letter  to  Mr.  Seddon  we  have  the  object  of  the 


WADE  HAMPTON 


cing  page   187 


GETTYSBURG  187 

campaign  clearly  stated  in  Lee's  own  words,  and  the  fol 
lowing  letter  of  July  12  to  President  Davis,  written  when 
he  was  standing  on  the  Potomac  waiting  for  it  to  fall 
so  that  he  could  recross  into  Virginia,  shows  that  he  con 
sidered  the  object  of  the  campaign  fully  accomplished : 

"Mr.  President:  I  have  nothing  of  moment  to  add 
to  what  I  have  said  in  my  letter  of  the  loth.  So  far 
everything  goes  well.  The  army  is  in  good  condition, 
and  occupies  a  strong  position,  covering  the  Potomac 
from  Williamsport  to  Falling  Waters.  .  .  .  The  river 
has  now  fallen  to  four  feet,  and  a  bridge,  which  is  being 
constructed,  I  hope  will  be  passable  to-morrow.  Should 
the  river  continue  to  subside,  our  communication  with 
the  south  bank  will  be  opened  by  to-morrow.  Had  the 
late  unexpected  rise  not  occurred,  there  would  have  been 
no  cause  for  anxiety,  as  it  would  have  been  in  my  power 
to  recross  the  Potomac  on  my  first  reaching  it,  without 
molestation.  Everything  would  have  been  accomplished 
that  could  have  been  reasonably  expected,  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  would  have  been  thrown  north  of  that  river, 
the  forces  invading  the  coasts  of  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia  diminished,  their  plan  of  the  present  campaign 
broken  up,  and  before  new  arrangements  could  have 
been  made  for  its  resumption,  the  summer  would  have 
ended.  I  still  trust  that  a  kind  Providence  will  cause 
all  things  to  work  together  for  our  good. 

"  Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General. 

"  His  Excellency  Jefferson  Davis, 
"  President  Confederate  States." 

In  his  letter  to  Davis  he  says  that  "  had  the  late  unex- 


188  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

pected  rise  not  occurred,  there  would  have  been  no  cause 
for  anxiety,  as  it  would  have  been  in  my  power  to 
recross  the  Potomac  on  my  first  reaching  it,  without 
molestation.  Everything  would  have  been  accomplished 
that  could  have  been  reasonably  expected."  As  he 
crossed  the  river  the  next  day  unmolested  everything 
was  accomplished  that  could  have  been  reasonably  ex 
pected. 

After  Lee's  return  to  Virginia  he  wrote  to  a  relative 
as  follows :  "  I  knew  that  crossing  the  Potomac  would 
draw  them  off,  and  if  we  could  only  have  been  strong 
enough  we  should  have  detained  them.  But  God  willed 
otherwise,  and  I  fear  we  shall  soon  have  them  all  back. 
The  army  did  all  it  could.  I  fear  I  require  of  it  impos 
sibilities,  but  it  responded  to  the  call  nobly  and  cheer 
fully,  and  though  it  did  not  win  a  victory,  it  conquered 
a  success." 

The  campaign  of  1862  enabled  Lee  to  get  his  army 
out  of  the  last  ditch  at  Richmond.  The  campaign  of 
1863  enabled  him  to  keep  it  out.  Therefore  the  army  as 
Lee  says  "  conquered  a  success,"  and  the  campaign  ac 
complished  everything  that  could  have  been  reasonably 
expected,  or  for  that  matter  unreasonably  expected. 
Nor  were  other  results  of  the  campaign  inconsiderable. 
Ewell  defeated  and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  valley, 
capturing  4000  prisoners,  25  cannon,  II  standards,  250 
wagons,  400  horses,  and  a  large  quantity  of  stores  and 
small  arms.  He  and  Stuart  also  secured  great  quanti 
ties  of  supplies  in  Pennsylvania,  which  were  all  badly 
needed  by  the  Confederate  army.  Virginia  was  relieved 
for  a  time  of  the  presence  of  the  devastating  armies,  so 
that  altogether  the  campaign  was  not  a  failure,  but  one 
of  Lee's  grandest  successes. 


PART  IV 
THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 


Facing  page   191 


CHAPTER  I 

FROM    THE   RAPIDAN   TO   THE   JAMES 

IN  the  last  months  of  1863  there  was  a  campaign  of 
strategy  which  ended  in  Meade's  retreat  from  Mine 
Run,  to  which  point  he  had  advanced  in  light  march 
ing  order  in  the  hope  of  surprising  Lee.     Instead,  he 
found  Lee  strongly  intrenched  and  prepared.     He  hesi 
tated,  and  Lee  decided  to  attack  on  the  2d  of  December; 
but  Meade  retreated.     Lee  pursued,  but  Meade  escaped. 

Now  General  Grant  appeared  upon  the  scene.  He 
was  commander-in-chief,  not  only  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  but  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 
He  came  up  from  the  Southwest  where  his  successes  had 
been  of  great  material  value,  but  had  been  easily  attained. 
He  always  had  superior  numbers,  always  encountered 
inferior  commanders,  and  always  had  the  cooperation 
of  the  navy.  The  whole  Vicksburg  campaign,  Donelson, 
and  Chattanooga  cost  him  only  15,351  men,  whereas  he 
lost  in  the  single  battle  of  the  Wilderness  17,666  men, 
and  in  the  campaign  69,326,  or  four  times  his  loss  in 
obtaining  all  his  successes  in  the  Southwest.  The  fact 
is  that  with  the  exception  of  Shiloh,  where  he  was  sur 
prised  and  worsted  by  Johnston,  and  discredited  by  the 
testimony  of  Buell  and  other  officers,  he  had  never  seen 
any  righting  of  any  consequence.  He  says  of  Chatta 
nooga:  ".  .  .  The  victory  at  Chattanooga  was  won 
against  great  odds,  considering  the  advantage  the  enemy 
had  of  position,  and  was  accomplished  more  easily  than 
was  expected  by  reason  of  Bragg' s  making  several  grave 

191 


I92  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

mistakes:  first,  in  sending  away  his  ablest  corps  com 
mander  with  over  20,000  troops ;  second,  in  sending  away 
a  division  of  troops  on  the  eve  of  battle ;  third,  in  placing 
so  much  of  a  force  on  the  plain  in  front  of  his  impreg 
nable  position.  .  .  ." 

So  the  victory  was  not  won  by  superior  generalship  or 
by  hard  fighting,  but  was  due  to  Bragg's  stupid  blun 
ders. 

The  impregnable  position  Grant  speaks  of, —  the  crest 
of  the  ridge, —  was  won  by  a  wonderful  charge.  Grant 
asked  Thomas  by  whose  order  the  troops  moved.  "  By 
their  own,  I  fancy,"  he  replied. 

Now  the  fact  is  that  ridge  was  easy.  Bragg  was  like 
a  coon  in  the  top  of  a  tree  with  branches  down  to  the 
ground  and  easy  to  climb.  The  troops  went  without  or 
ders  because  it  was  easy  —  the  proof  is  that  in  the  whole 
battle,  including  the  wonderful  charge,  Grant's  total  loss 
was  only  5815  men.  The  charge  must  have  been  well- 
nigh  bloodless. 

At  Chattanooga  Grant  had  60,000  men  against  Bragg's 
40,000;  yet  he  says  the  victory  was  won  against  great 
odds. 

His  greatest  success, —  that  of  Vicksburg, —  was  easy. 
His  entire  loss,  including  the  five  battles  or  skirmishes 
in  May,  was  only  7536,  which  is  conclusive  proof  that 
he  met  with  little  resistance. 

In  his  book,  among  a  hundred  other  misrepresenta 
tions,  he  says:  ".  .  .  In  the  east  the  opposing  forces 
stood  in  substantially  the  same  relations  toward  each 
other  as  three  years  before,  or  when  the  war  began.  .  .  . 
No  substantial  advantage  had  been  gained  by  either 
side.  .  .  ." 

We  shall  see  how  utterly  devoid  of  truth  this  state 
ment  is. 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         193 

When  Lee  confronted  McClellan  at  Richmond  he  had 
80,000  men  against  McClellan's  100,000,  and  his  army 
was  fairly  well  clad  and  provisioned. 

Colonel  Taylor  says: 

"  The  official  records  show  that  General  Grant  had 
something  over  140,000  men  on  the  1st  of  May,  1864, 
with  which  to  commence  his  campaign  against  General 
Lee,  of  which  number  120,000  were  actually  put  into 
battle ;  while  General  Lee  had,  with  which  to  oppose  this 
vast  host,  less  than  65,000,  including  the  command  of 
General  Longstreet  that  had  now  returned  to  him  after 
the  campaign  in  Tennessee.  These  figures  are  not  exag 
gerated  in  the  least.  Let  him  who  doubts  search  the 
official  records.  (See  '  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
to  the  First  Session  of  the  39th  Congress/  vol.  i,  1865- 
1866,  pp.  3-5,  55.)  General  Badeau  gives  the  strength 
of  the  army  opposing  General  Lee  as  119,981." 

None  of  Grant's  predecessors  had  authority  over  a 
man  outside  of  their  lines,  but  Grant  had  unlimited  au 
thority. 

He  says: 

".  .  .  As  a  reinforcement  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
or  to  act  in  support  of  it,  the  Ninth  army  corps,  over 
20,000  strong,  under  General  Burnside,  had  been  rendez 
voused  at  Annapolis,  Md.  This  was  an  admirable  posi 
tion  for  such  a  reinforcement.  The  corps  could  be 
brought  at  the  last  moment  as  a  reinforcement  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  or  it  could  be  thrown  on  the  sea- 
coast  south  of  Norfolk  in  Virginia  or  North  Carolina, 
to  operate  against  Richmond  from  that  direction.  .  .  ," 


194  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  IN  FIELD,  CULPEPER  C.  H., 
"April  9,  1864. 

"  MAJ.  GEN.  GEO.  G.  MEADE,  commanding  Army  of 
the  Potomac:  .  .  .  Gilmore  will  join  Butler  with  about 
10,000  men  from  North  Carolina.  Butler  can  reduce 
his  garrison  so  as  to  take  23,000  men  into  the  field  di 
rectly  to  his  front.  The  force  will  be  commanded  by 
Maj.  Gen.  W.  F.  Smith.  With  Smith  and  Gilmore,  But 
ler  will  seize  City  Point  and  operate  against  Richmond 
from  the  south  side  of  the  river.  .  .  . 

"  U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant  General." 

".  .  .  My  general  plan  was  to  concentrate  all  the  force 
possible  against  the  Confederate  armies  in  the  field. 
There  were  but  two  such,  as  we  have  seen,  east  of  the 
Mississippi  and  facing  north.  The  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee  commanding,  was  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Rapidan  river,  confronting  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac;  the  second,  under  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johns 
ton  was  at  Dalton,  Georgia,  opposed  to  Sherman,  who 
was  still  at  Chattanooga.  .  .  .  Accordingly,  I  arranged 
for  a  simultaneous  movement  all  along  the  line.  Sher 
man  was  to  move  from  Chattanooga,  Johnston's  army 
and  Atlanta  being  his  objective  points.  Crook,  com 
manding  in  West  Virginia,  was  to  move  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Gauley  river  with  a  cavalry  force  and  some  artil 
lery,  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  railroad  to  be  his  ob 
jective.  Either  the  enemy  would  have  to  keep  a  large 
force  to  protect  their  communications  or  see  them  de 
stroyed,  and  a  large  amount  of  forage  and  provisions, 
which  they  so  much  needed,  fall  into  our  hands.  Sigel 
was  in  command  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  He  was  to 
advance  up  the  Valley,  covering  the  north  from  an  in- 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         195 

vasion  through  that  channel  as  well  while  advancing  as 
by  remaining  near  Harper's  Ferry.  Every  mile  he  ad 
vanced  also  gave  us  stores  on  which  Lee  relied.  Butler 
was  to  advance  by  the  James  river,  having  Richmond 
and  Petersburg  as  his  objectives." 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  a  grand  army.  Grant 
had  nothing  to  do  with  its  creation.  It  was  handed  over 
to  him  organized,  disciplined,  and  more  lavishly  supplied 
than  any  army  the  world  had  ever  seen.  He  had  never 
seen  such  an  army. 

He  says  of  it : 

"  There  never  was  a  corps  better  organized  than  was 
the  quartermaster's  corps  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
in  1864.  .  .  .  To  overcome  all  difficulties  the  chief  quar 
termaster,  Gen.  Rufus  Ingalls,  had  marked  on  each 
wagon  the  corps  badge,  with  the  division  color,  and  the 
number  of  the  brigade.  At  a  glance  the  particular  bri 
gade  to  which  any  wagon  belonged  could  be  told.  The 
wagons  were  also  marked  to  denote  the  contents ;  if  am 
munition,  whether  for  artillery  or  infantry;  if  forage, 
whether  grain  or  hay;  if  rations,  whether  bread,  pork, 
beans,  rice,  sugar,  coffee,  or  whatever  it  might  be. 
Empty  wagons  were  never  allowed  to  follow  the  army  or 
stay  in  camp.  As  soon  as  a  wagon  was  empty  it  would 
return  to  the  base  of  supply  for  a  load  of  precisely  the 
same  article  that  had  been  taken  from  it.  .  .  ." 

Speaking  of  the  field  telegraph  service,  he  says : 

"  Nothing  could  be  more  complete  than  the  organiza 
tion  and  discipline  of  this  body  of  brave  and  intelligent 
men.  Insulated  wires,  insulated  so  that  they  would 


196  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

transmit  messages  in  a  storm,  on  the  ground,  or  under 
water,  were  wound  upon  reels  making  about  two  hun 
dred  pounds  weight  of  wire  to  each  reel.  .  .  .  The  mules 
thus  loaded  were  assigned  to  brigades,  and  always  kept 
with  the  commands  they  were  assigned  to.  ...  The 
moment  the  troops  were  put  into  position  to  go  into 
camp,  all  the  men  connected  with  this  branch  of  service 
would  proceed  to  put  up  their  wires.  A  mule  loaded 
with  a  coil  of  wire  would  be  led  to  the  rear  of  the  near 
est  flank  of  the  brigade  he  belonged  to,  and  would  be 
led  in  a  line  parallel  thereto,  while  one  man  would  hold 
an  end  of  the  wire  and  uncoil  it  as  the  mule  was  led 
off.  .  .  .  This  would  be  done  in  the  rear  of  every  bri 
gade  at  the  same  time.  The  end  of  all  the  wires  would 
then  be  joined,  making  a  continuous  wire  in  the  rear  of 
the  whole  army.  .  .  .  Before  leaving  Spottsylvania  I 
sent  back  to  the  defenses  of  Washington  over  one  hun 
dred  pieces  of  artillery,  with  horses  and  caissons.  This 
relieved  the  roads  over  which  we  were  to  march  of  more 
than  two  hundred  six-horse  teams,  and  still  left  us  more 
artillery  than  could  be  advantageously  used.  In  fact, 
before  reaching  the  James  river,  I  again  reduced  the  ar 
tillery  with  the  army  largely.  .  .  ." 

Then,  too,  Grant  practically  commanded  the  navy  that 
held  the  coast  and  every  river  in  the  Confederacy.  What 
a  tremendous  array  against  two  little  worn-out  Confed 
erate  armies,  the  condition  of  which  is  shown  by  the  fol 
lowing  letters : 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  January  2,  1864. 
"  His  EXCELLENCY,  JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 
"  President  Confederate  States, 

"  Richmond. 
"MR.  PRESIDENT:  .  .  .  We  are  now  issuing  to  the 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES          197 

troops  a  fourth  of  a  pound  of  salt  meat  and  have  only 
three  days'  supply  at  that  rate.  .  .  . 
"  I  am,  with  great  respect, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

"  HEADQUARTERS, 
"  ARMY  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"  January  18,  1864. 
"  BRIG.  GEN.  A.  R.  LAWTON, 

"  Quartermaster  General,  Richmond. 
"GENERAL:     The  want  of  shoes  and  blankets  in  this 
army  continues  to  cause  much  suffering,  and  to  impair 
its  efficiency.     In  one  regiment,  I  am  informed,  there  are 
only  fifty  men  with  serviceable  shoes,  and  a  brigade  that 
recently  went  on  picket  was  compelled  to  leave  several 
hundred  men  in  camp  who  were  unable  to  bear  the  ex 
posure,  being  destitute  of  shoes  and  blankets.  .  .  . 
"  I  am,  with  great  respect, 

"  Your  obt.  svt, 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  April  12,  1864. 
"  MR.  PRESIDENT  :     My  anxiety  for  provisions  for  the 
army  is  so  great  that  I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing 
it  to  your  Excellency.     I  cannot  see  how  we  can  operate 
with  our  present  supplies.  .  .  .  We  have  rations  for  the 
troops  to-day  and  to-morrow.  .  .  . 
"  I  am,  with  great  respect, 

"  Your  obt.  svt, 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 


198  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  April  16,  1864. 
"  GEN.  BRAXTON  BRAGG  : 

"GENERAL:  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  I3th, 
enclosing  copy  of  a  communication  from  Colonel  Gorgas, 
in  reference  to  the  large  proportion  of  artillery  with  this 
army.  I  have  never  found  it  too  large  in  battle,  and  it 
has  generally  been  opposed  by  about  three  hundred  pieces 
of  the  enemy,  of  larger  caliber,  longer  range,  and  with 
more  effective  ammunition.  If,  however,  its  equipment 
overtaxes  the  means  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  or, 
as  you  suggest,  its  supply  of  horses  cannot  be  kept  up, 
that  decides  the  question,  and  no  argument  on  the  sub 
ject  is  necessary.  .  .  . 

"  R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

Grant  had  a  "  substantial  advantage  "  in  not  having 
to  write  such  letters  as  these.  In  the  history  of  the  5th 
Massachusetts  there  is  a  letter  from  which  the  following 
is  taken : 

".  .  .  To-day  I  was  up  to  Brandy  Station.  You  can 
form  no  idea  of  the  bustle  and  confusion  at  this  depot 
when  the  army  is  getting  ready  to  move.  It  looked  to 
me  as  if  a  thousand  or  more  wagons  were  waiting  to 
load,  and  there  were  immense  piles  of  ammunition  and 
all  kinds  of  ordnance  stores,  etc.,  etc.,  and  piles  of  boxes 
of  hard  bread  as  high  as  two  and  three-story  houses. 
It  reminded  me  some  of  a  wharf  in  New  York,  with 
twelve  or  fifteen  ships  loading  and  unloading.  .  .  ." 

Gen.  Morris  Schaff,  assistant  to  the  chief  of  ordnance 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  says : 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES          199 

".  .  .  While  I  do  not  wish  to  encumber  the  narrative 
with  a  burden  of  figures,  yet  it  may  interest  the  reader 
to  know  that  we  had  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
morning  we  set  off  on  the  great  campaign,  4300  wagons 
and  835  ambulances.  There  were  34,981  artillery,  cav 
alry,  and  ambulance  horses,  and  22,528  mules,  making 
an  aggregate  of  57,419  animals.  The  strength  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  between  ninety-nine  and  one 
hundred  thousand  men.  Burnside,  who  caught  up  with 
us  the  second  day  of  the  Wilderness,  brought  with  him 
about  twenty  thousand  more.  .  .  ." 

The  fact  is  that  a  substantial  advantage, —  more  than 
that,  a  decisive  advantage, —  had  been  gained  by  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  before  Grant  came  to  Virginia,  as  the 
following  letter  shows : 

"  HEADQUARTERS, 
"  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"October  19,   1863. 
"  HON.  JAS.  A.  SEDDON, 

"  Secretary  of  War,  Richmond,  Va. 
"SiR:  If  General  Meade  is  disposed  to  remain 
quiet  where  he  is,  it  is  my  intention,  provided  the  army 
could  be  supplied  with  clothing  again,  to  advance  and 
threaten  his  position.  Nothing  prevented  my  continu 
ing  in  his  front  but  the  destitute  condition  of  the  men, 
thousands  of  whom  are  barefooted,  a  greater  number 
partly  shod,  and  nearly  all  without  overcoats,  blankets, 
or  warm  clothing.  .  .  . 

"  Very  respectfully 
"  Your  obt.  svt, 
"R.  E.  LEE." 


200  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

This  means,  of  course,  that  Lee  was  deprived  of  the 
only  advantage  he  ever  had,  that  of  threatening  Wash 
ington.  It  was  the  turning  point  in  the  war,  and  was 
reached  before  Grant  came  to  Virginia,  as  the  date  of 
this  letter  shows. 

Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan  without  opposition.  Lee 
thought  he  might  repeat  the  miracle  of  Chancellor sville 
and  determined  to  hazard  an  attack.  On  the  morning 
of  the  5th  of  May  he  advanced  in  two  columns,  Ewell 
on  the  Orange  Court  House  road,  and  Hill  on  the  Plank 
Road.  Ewell  soon  struck  the  enemy's  outposts  and,  while 
forming  his  line  of  battle,  Jones's  brigade  in  making 
a  change  of  position  was  attacked  by  a  large  Federal 
force,  which  advanced  through  the  dense  undergrowth. 
General  Jones  was  killed,  with  a  loss  of  several  hundred 
of  his  men.  The  next  fight  was  about  4  p.  m.,  when 
the  Federals  attacked  the  Confederate  position  and  were 
repulsed.  The  next  morning  Hill  was  heavily  attacked, 
Heth  and  Wilcox  being  driven  back  and  thrown  into 
confusion. 

Things  were  looking  very  blue  for  the  Confederates 
when  Longstreet  came  swinging  down  the  plank  road  in 
double  column  at  a  double-quick.  The  Texans  led,  800 
strong,  and  half  of  them  went  down,  but  the  battle  was 
restored  and  the  enemy  driven  to  his  position  of  the 
previous  night.  Longstreet  now  advanced  three  brigades 
against  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  he  himself  attacked 
in  front.  Hancock  was  badly  beaten  and  thrown  back 
toward  the  Brock  road,  which  Lee  desired  to  secure, 
but  just  at  the  critical  moment  Longstreet  was  wounded 
by  his  own  men.  The  resulting  disorder  and  delay  en 
abled  the  enemy  to  form  a  strong  line  of  breastworks 
built  of  logs. 

About  4  p.  m.  Lee  attacked.     The  battle  raged  furi- 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         201 

ously,  the  woods  on  fire.  The  Confederates  broke  into 
the  Federal  breastworks  in  places  but  were  quickly  driven 
out.  This  attack  ended  the  battle.  The  game  was 
blocked,  and  Grant  on  the  night  of  the  7th  resumed  his 
march  toward  Spottsylvania.  Warren  led  the  Federal 
army,  and  Anderson  the  Confederate.  Stuart  worried 
Warren  and  enabled  Anderson  to  reach  Spottsylvania 
ahead  of  him.  Both  armies  intrenched  and  nothing  of 
importance  happened  on  the  gth,  but  on  the  loth  Grant 
sent  Hancock,  Warren,  and  Burnside  against  Lee's  left 
center.  The  first  charge  was  made  about  10  a.  m.,  an 
other  about  3  p.  m.,  but  both  were  repulsed  with  the 
slaughter  that  Grant  became  familiar  with  in  Virginia. 
About  5  p.  m.  another,  more  reckless  than  the  others, 
was  made  and  repulsed  with  terrible  loss,  while  the  Con 
federates  suffered  very  little.  Ewell's  left  was  also  as 
saulted  late  in  the  day,  and  his  line,  held  by  Dole's  bri 
gade,  broken;  but  Daniel,  Stewart,  and  Gordon  came  to 
the  rescue,  and  the  Federals  were  driven  out  with  great 
loss. 

That  Grant  was  surprised  and  scared  by  the  resistance 
he  encountered  is  manifest  in  the  following  dispatch  to 
Washington : 

"  May  10.  The  enemy  hold  our  front  in  very 
strong  force  and  evince  a  strong  determination  to  inter 
pose  between  us  and  Richmond  to  the  last.  I  shall  take 
no  backward  step.  .  .  .  We  can  maintain  ourselves  at 
least  and  in  the  end  beat  Lee's  army,  I  believe.  Send 
to  Belle  Plain  all  the  infantry  you  can  rake  and  scrape. 
With  present  position  of  the  armies,  ten  thousand  men 
can  be  spared  from  the  defenses  of  Washington,  besides 
all  the  troops  that  have  reached  there  since  Burnside's 
departure." 


202  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

He  thinks  he  can  "  maintain  "  himself  at  least  and  in 
the  end  beat  Lee's  army,  provided  he  gets  all  the  infantry 
"  you  can  rake  and  scrape." 

"  NEAR  SPOTTSYLVANIA,  C.  H., 

"May  n,  1864,  8.30  a.  m. 
"  MAJ.  GEN.  HALLECK, 

"  Chief  of  staff,  Washington,  D.  C. 
"  We  have  now  ended  the  6th  day  of  very  hard  fight 
ing.  The  result  up  to  this  time  is  much  in  our  favor. 
But  our  losses  have  been  heavy,  as  well  as  those  of  the 
enemy.  We  have  lost  up  to  this  time  eleven  general 
officers  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  and  probably  20,- 
ooo  men.  ...  I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line,  if 
it  takes  all  summer.  The  arrival  of  reinforcements  here 
will  be  very  encouraging  to  the  men,  and  I  hope  they 
will  be  sent  as  fast  as  possible,  and  in  as  great  numbers. 
...  I  am  satisfied  the  enemy  is  very  shaky,  and  are  only 
kept  up  to  the  mark  by  the  greatest  exertion  on  the  part 
of  their  officers,  and  by  keeping  them  intrenched  in  every 
position  they  take. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant  General/' 

This  is  the  celebrated  "  Fight  it  out  on  this  line,  if  it 
takes  all  summer  "  letter,  but  as  any  one  can  see  it  is 
above  all  else  a  plea  for  help. 

He  wanted  reinforcements  "  to  encourage  the  army," 
though  "  the  result  up  to  this  time  is  much  in  our  favor." 
He  is  "  satisfied  the  enemy  is  very  shaky,"  but  he  wants 
reinforcements  "  as  fast  as  possible  and  in  as  great  num 
bers."  It  is  not  true  that  the  Confederate  officers  made 
any  special  effort  to  keep  the  men  "  up  to  the  mark." 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         203 

Lee  was  now  in  an  unenviable  position.  Outnumbered 
two  to  one,  he  held  a  line  of  no  natural  strength.  Both 
flanks  were  open  to  attack  and  if  his  opponent  had  been 
a  strategist  the  war  would  have  ended  at  Spottsylvania 
instead  of  at  Appomattox.  Lee  was  on  his  guard  against 
a  flank  movement,  and  ordered  two  batteries  out  of  an 
angle  on  Ewell's  front,  as  it  would  have  been  difficult 
to  extricate  them  in  an  emergency.  Johnson's  division 
occupied  the  angle,  and  on  the  night  of  the  nth  he  be 
came  alarmed  at  the  enemy's  movements  in  his  front 
and  sent  couriers  to  Lee  requesting  the  return  of  the 
guns.  They  were  ordered  back,  but  before  they  got  into 
position  Hancock,  at  daylight  on  the  I2th,  overwhelmed 
Johnson  and  caught  the  guns  harmless  in  the  road. 
The  Federal  troops  poured  into  the  breach.  They  came 
en  masse.  Lee  rushed  Gordon's,  Rodes's,  and  Ram- 
seur's  divisions,  and  some  of  Long's  artillery  in  to  stop 
the  advance,  and  wanted  to  lead  the  troops,  but  he  was 
turned  back  by  the  men. 

Of  the  fight  that  ensued  G.  N.  Galloway,  historian 
of  the  Sixth  corps,  says : 

"  Just  as  the  day  was  breaking,  Barlow's  and  Birney's 
divisions  of  Hancock's  corps  pressed  forward  upon  the 
unsuspecting  foe,  and  leaping  the  works,  after  a  hand 
to  hand  conflict  with  the  bewildered  enemy  in  which  guns 
were  used  as  clubs,  possessed  themselves  of  the  intrench- 
ments.  .  .  .  The  rain  was  falling  in  torrents,  and  held 
the  country  about  in  obscurity.  .  .  .  Under  cover  of  the 
smoke-laden  rain  the  enemy  was  pushing  large  bodies 
of  troops  forward,  determined  at  all  hazards  to  regain 
the  ground.  .  .  .  The  smoke,  which  was  dense  at  first, 
was  intensified  by  each  discharge  of  artillery  to  such  an 


204  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

extent  that  the  accuracy  of  our  aim  became  very  un 
certain,  but  nevertheless  we  kept  up  the  fire  in  the  sup 
posed  direction  of  the  enemy.  Meanwhile  they  were 
crawling  forward  under  cover  of  the  smoke,  until,  reach 
ing  a  certain  point,  and  raising  their  usual  yell,  they 
charged  gallantly  up  to  the  very  muzzles  of  our  pieces, 
and  reoccupied  the  angle.  Upon  reaching  the  works, 
the  Confederates  for  a  few  moments  had  the  advantage, 
and  made  good  use  of  their  rifles.  Our  men  went  down 
by  the  score;  all  the  artillery  horses  were  down;  the 
gallant  Upton  was  the  only  mounted  officer  in  sight. 
Hat  in  hand,  he  cheered  his  men,  and  begged  them  to 
hold  '  this  point/  All  his  staff  had  been  killed,  wounded, 
or  dismounted.  At  this  moment,  and  while  the  open 
ground  in  rear  of  the  works  was  choked  with  troops, 
a  section  of  Battery  C,  5th  U.  S.  artillery,  was  brought 
into  action  and  increased  the  carnage  by  opening  at 
short  range  with  double  charges  of  canister.  This  stag 
gered  the  apparently  exultant  enemy.  These  guns  were 
run  up  by  hand  close  to  the  angle,  fired  again  and  again, 
and  were  only  abandoned  when  all  the  drivers  and  can 
noneers  had  fallen.  ...  In  a  few  moments  the  two 
brass  pieces  of  the  5th  artillery,  cut  and  hacked  by  the 
bullets  of  both  antagonists,  lay  unworked  with  their  muz 
zles  projecting  over  the  enemy's  works  and  their  wheels 
half  sunk  in  the  mud.  Between  the  lines,  and  near  at 
hand,  lay  the  horses  of  these  guns  completely  riddled. 
The  dead  and  wounded  were  torn  to  pieces  by  the  canister 
as  it  swept  the  ground  where  they  had  fallen.  .  .  .  Our 
losses  were  frightful.  .  .  .  About  midnight,  after  twenty 
hours  of  constant  fighting,  Lee  withdrew  from  the  con 
flict,  leaving  the  angle  in  our  possession." 

Lee  withdrew  after  he  had  effectually  checked  the  ad- 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         205 

vance  of  the  enemy,  and  established  a  strong  line  a  little 
way  in  rear  of  the  angle. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  historian  says  "  the  open 
ground  in  rear  of  the  works  was  choked  with  troops." 
That  was  Grant's  method  of  fighting, —  main  strength 
and  awkwardness.  While  the  open  ground  in  rear  of 
the  works  was  choked  with  troops  Lee  was  alarmed  for 
the  safety  of  his  left,  for  word  kept  coming  up  the  line: 
"  All  right  on  the  center,  look  out  on  the  left."  After 
ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  Lee  had  every  man  he  could 
get  on  the  center  and  could  not  have  spared  a  man  to 
reinforce  his  left. 

Senator  Grimes  wrote  on  the  i8th  of  May:  "Thus 
far  we  have  won  no  victory.  We  have  suffered  a  terrible 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  (nearly  50,000)  and  Lee  is  in 
an  impregnable  position.  .  .  ." 

Grant's  "  fight  it  out  on  this  line,  if  it  takes  all  sum 
mer  "  letter  produced  the  desired  effect,  as  he  received 
40,000  reinforcements. 

On  the  2oth  of  May  he  started  for  Hanover  Junction, 
but  Lee  was  there  ahead  of  him.  The  North  Anna 
river  was  Lee's  line  of  defense.  Warren  on  the  right 
and  Hancock  on  the  left  crossed  the  river.  Burnside 
tried  to  cross  at  a  point  intermediate  between  Warren 
and  Hancock,  but  was  driven  back.  Grant  was  now  in 
the  position  Lincoln  advised  Hooker  against  when  he 
said :  "  I  would  not  take  any  risk  of  being  entangled 
upon  the  river,  like  an  ox  jumped  half  over  a  fence  and 
liable  to  be  torn  by  dogs  front  and  rear,  without  a  fair 
chance  to  gore  one  way  or  kick  the  other." 

Hancock  and  Warren  had  been  worsted  in  the  fight 
ing,  and  Burnside  had  been  prevented  from  crossing  at 
all.  "  Grant,"  write  Nicolay  and  Hay,  "  was  completely 
checkmated."  Yet  he  sent  the  following  dispatch : 


206  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  QUARLES  MILL,  VA. 

"  May  26,  1864. 
"  MAJOR  GENERAL  HALLECK, 

"  Washington,  D.  C. 

".  .  .  Lee's  army  is  whipped  ...  A  battle  with  them 
outside  intrenchments  cannot  be  had. 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant  General." 

On  the  same  night,  the  26th,  he  withdrew  Warren  and 
Hancock  back  across  the  river,  otherwise  he  might  have 
had  a  fight  with  the  Confederates  outside  of  the  breast 
works. 

Grant  now  marched  down  the  North  Anna  to  the 
Pamunkey  and  crossed  that  river  on  the  28th. 

His  next  effort  to  beat  Lee  was  to  be  made  at  Cold 
Harbor.  The  fight  began  on  the  afternoon  of  the  ist 
of  June  by  an  attack  on  Kershaw's  and  Hoke's  divisions. 
The  Confederates  were  driven  in,  but  fell  back  only  a 
little  way  and  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  The 
2d  was  passed  by  both  armies  in  preparation  for  the 
coming  battle,  of  which  we  have  the  following  accounts. 

General  McMahon,  U.  S.  V.,  chief  of  staff  to  General 
Wright,  Sixth  corps,  says : 

"Before  daylight  (2d  June)  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  stood  together  once  more  almost  within  sight  of  the 
spires  of  Richmond,  and  on  the  very  ground  where, 
under  McClellan,  they  had  defended  the  passage  of  the 
river  they  were  now  endeavoring  to  force.  .  .  .  Every 
one  felt  that  this  was  to  be  the  final  struggle.  No 
further  flanking  marches  were  possible.  Richmond  was 
dead  in  front.  No  further  wheeling  of  corps  from  right 
to  left  by  the  rear,  no  further  dusty  marches  possi- 


Facing  page   207 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         207 

ble  on  that  line  even  if  it  '  took  all  summer.'  The 
general  attack  was  fixed  for  the  afternoon  of  the 
2d,  and  all  preparations  had  been  made  when  the 
order  was  countermanded  and  the  attack  postponed  un 
til  half-past  four  the  following  morning.  Promptly  at 
the  hour  named  on  the  3d  of  June  the  men  moved  from 
the  slight  cover  of  the  rifle-pits,  thrown  up  during  the 
night,  with  steady,  determined  advance,  and  there  rang 
out  suddenly  on  the  summer  air  such  a  crash  of  artil 
lery  and  musketry  as  is  seldom  heard  in  war.  No  great 
portion  of  the  advance  could  be  seen  from  any  particular 
point,  but  those  of  the  three  corps  that  passed  through 
the  clearings  were  feeling  the  fire  terribly.  Not  much 
return  was  made  at  first  from  our  infantry,  although 
the  fire  of  our  batteries  was  incessant.  The  time  of 
actual  advance  was  not  over  eight  minutes.  In  that 
little  period  more  men  fell  bleeding  as  they  advanced 
than  in  any  other  like  period  of  time  throughout  the 
war.  A  strange  and  terrible  feature  of  this  battle  was 
that  as  the  three  gallant  corps  moved  on,  each  was  en 
filaded  while  receiving  the  full  force  of  the  enemy's 
direct  fire  in  front.  The  enemy's  shell  and  shot  were 
plunging  through  Hancock's  battalions  from  his  right. 
From  the  left  a  similarly  destructive  fire  was  poured  in 
upon  Smith,  and  from  both  flanks  on  the  Sixth  corps 
in  the  center. 

"  At  some  points  the  slashings  and  obstructions  in 
the  enemy's  front  were  reached.  Barlow,  of  Hancock's 
corps,  drove  the  enemy  from  an  advance  position,  but 
was  himself  driven  out  by  the  fire  of  their  second  line. 
R.  O.  Tyler's  brigade  (the  Corcoran  Legion)  of  the 
same  corps  swept  over  an  advance  work,  capturing 
several  hundred  prisoners.  One  officer  alone,  the  colonel 
of  the  1 64th  New  York  (James  P.  McMahon),  seizing 


208  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

the  colors  of  his  regiment  from  the  dying  color- 
bearer  as  he  fell,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  para 
pet  of  the  enemy's  main  works,  where  he  planted 
his  colors  and  fell  dead  near  the  ditch,  bleeding  from 
many  wounds.  Seven  other  colonels  of  Hancock's  com 
mand  died  within  those  few  minutes.  No  troops  could 
stand  against  such  a  fire,  and  the  order  to  lie  down  was 
given  all  along  the  line.  At  points  where  no  shelter 
was  afforded  the  men  were  withdrawn  to  such  cover  as 
could  be  found,  and  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  as  to 
its  result  at  least,  was  over.  Each  corps  commander 
reported  and  complained  to  General  Meade  that  the  other 
corps  commanders,  right  or  left,  as  the  case  might  be, 
failed  to  protect  him  from  enfilading  fire  by  silencing 
batteries  in  their  respective  fronts;  Smith,  that  he  could 
go  no  farther  until  Wright  advanced  upon  his  left ;  Han 
cock,  that  it  was  useless  for  him  to  attempt  a  further 
advance  until  Wright  advanced  upon  his  right;  Wright, 
that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  move  until  Smith  and 
Hancock  advanced  to  his  support  on  the  right  and  left 
to  shield  him  from  the  enemy's  enfilade.  Shortly  after 
midday  came  the  order  to  suspend  for  the  present  all 
further  operations,  and  directing  corps  commanders  to 
intrench,  '  including  their  advance  positions/  and  direct 
ing  also  that  reconnaissances  be  made,  '  with  a  view  to 
moving  against  the  enemy's  works  by  regular  ap 
proaches/ 

"  The  field  in  front  of  us,  after  the  repulse  of  the 
main  attack,  was  indeed  a  sad  sight.  I  remember  at  one 
point  a  mute  and  pathetic  evidence  of  sterling  valor. 
The  2d  Connecticut  Heavy  Artillery,  a  new  regiment 
eighteen  hundred  strong,  had  joined  us  but  a  few  days 
before  the  battle.  Its  uniform  was  bright  and  fresh, 
therefore  its  dead  were  easily  distinguished  where 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         209 

they  lay.  They  marked  in  a  dotted  line  an  ob 
tuse  angle,  covering  a  wide  front,  with  its  apex 
toward  the  enemy,  and  there  upon  his  face,  still  in  death, 
with  his  head  to  the  works,  lay  the  colonel,  the  brave 
and  genial  Col.  Elisha  S.  Kellogg. 

"  When  night  came  on,  the  groans  and  moaning  of 
the  wounded,  all  our  own,  wrho  were  lying  between  the 
lines,  were  heartrending.  Some  were  brought  in  by 
volunteers  from  our  intrenchments,  but  many  remained 
for  three  days  uncared  for  beneath  the  hot  summer  suns 
and  the  unre freshing  dews  of  the  sultry  summer  nights. 
The  men  in  the  works  grew  impatient,  yet  it  was  against 
orders  and  was  almost  certain  death  to  go  beyond  out4 
earthworks.  An  impression  prevails  in  the  popular 
mind,  and  with  some  reason  perhaps,  that  a  commander 
who  sends  a  flag  of  truce  asking  permission  to  bury  his 
dead  and  bring  in  his  wounded  has  lost  the  field  of  bat 
tle.  Hence  the  reluctance  upon  our  part  to  ask  a  flag 
of  truce.  In  effect  it  was  done  at  last  on  the  evening 
of  the  third  day  after  the  battle,  when,  for  the  most  part, 
the  wounded  needed  no  further  care,  and  our  dead  had 
to  be  buried  almost  where  they  fell. 

"  The  work  of  intrenching  could  only  be  done  at  night. 
The  fire  of  sharpshooters  was  incessant,  and  no  man 
upon  all  that  line  could  stand  erect  and  live  an  instant. 
This  condition  of  things  continued  for  twelve  days  and 
nights;  sharpshooters'  fire  from  both  sides  went  on  all 
day;  all  night  the  zigzags  and  parallels  nearer  to  the 
enemy's  works  were  being  constructed.  In  none  of  its 
marches  by  day  or  night  did  that  army  suffer  more  than 
during  those  twelve  days.  Rations  and  ammunition 
were  brought  forward  from  parallel  to  parallel  through 
the  zigzag  trenches,  and  in  some  instances  where  reg 
iments  whose  term  of  service  had  expired  were  ordered 


210  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

home,  they  had  to  leave  the  field  crawling  on  hands  and 
knees  through  the  trenches  to  the  rear.  At  nine  o'clock 
every  night  the  enemy  opened  fire  with  artillery  and  mus 
ketry  along  his  whole  line.  This  was  undoubtedly  done 
under  suspicion  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  seen 
the  hopelessness  of  the  task  before  it  and  would  with 
draw  in  the  night-time  for  another  movement  by  the 
flank,  and,  if  engaged  in  such  a  movement,  would  be 
thrown  into  confusion  by  this  threat  of  a  night  attack. 
However,  no  advance  was  made  by  the  enemy. 

"Another  strange  order  came  about  this  time.  It 
opened  with  a  preamble  that  inasmuch  as  the  enemy  had 
without  provocation  repeatedly  opened  fire  during  the 
night  upon  our  lines,  therefore,  at  midnight  of  that  day, 
the  corps  commanders  were  directed  to  open  fire  from  all 
their  batteries  generally  upon  the  enemy's  position  and 
continue  it  until  daylight.  This  was  coupled  with  the 
proviso  that  if  in  the  opinion  of  a  corps  commander  the 
fire  would  provoke  a  return  from  the  enemy  which  would 
inflict  severe  damage  upon  his  troops,  then  he  was  ex 
empted  from  the  operation  of  the  order.  The  com 
manders  of  the  three  corps  holding  the  front  communi 
cated  with  one  another  by  telegraph  with  this  result: 
Smith  was  satisfied  that  the  fire  which  he  would  pro 
voke  would  inflict  upon  him  disproportionate  damage. 
Hancock  for  the  same  reason  did  not  intend  to  open 
fire  unless  the  fire  provoked  by  the  other  corps  reached 
his  lines.  Wright  adopted  the  same  rules  of  action. 
Twelve  o'clock  came  and  the  summer  night  continued 
undisturbed.  .  .  ." 

General  Law  describes  the  battle  in  his  front  at  the 
point  of  attack  on  the  afternoon  of  the  ist: 

"  The  line  here  had  been  straightened,  leaving  the  old 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         211 

line,  a  salient,  open  to  the  enemy.  Our  troops  were 
under  arms  and  waiting  when  with  misty  light  of  open 
morning  the  scattering  fire  of  our  pickets  announced  the 
beginning  of  the  attack.  As  the  assaulting  column  swept 
over  the  old  works  a  loud  cheer  was  given,  and  it  rushed 
on  into  the  marshy  ground  in  the  angle.  Its  front 
covered  little  more  than  the  line  of  my  own  brigade  of 
less  than  a  thousand  men;  but  line  followed  line  until 
the  space  enclosed  in  the  old  salient  became  a  mass  of 
writhing  humanity  upon  which  our  artillery  and  musketry 
played  with  cruel  effect.  ...  On  reaching  the  trenches 
I  found  the  men  in  fine  spirits,  laughing  and  talking  as 
they  fired.  Then,  too,  I  could  see  more  plainly  the 
terrible  havoc  made  in  the  ranks  of  the  assaulting  column. 
I  had  seen  the  dreadful  carnage  in  front  of  Marye's 
Hill  at  Fredericksburg,  and  on  the  old  railroad  cut  which 
Jackson's  men  held  at  Second  Manassas,  but  I  had  seen 
nothing  to  exceed  this.  It  was  not  war,  it  was  murder. 
When  the  fight  ended  more  than  a  thousand  men  lay 
in  front  of  our  works,  either  killed  or  too  badly  wounded 
to  leave  the  field.  The  loss  of  my  command  was  fifteen 
or  twenty,  mostly  wounded  about  the  head  or  shoulders, 
myself  among  the  number.  .  .  .  The  result  of  the  action 
in  the  center,  which  has  been  described,  presents  a 
fair  picture  of  the  result  along  the  line  —  a  grand  ad 
vance,  a  desperate  struggle,  a  bloody  and  crushing 
repulse. 

"  COLD  HARBOR,  June  5,   1864. 
"  MAJOR  GENERAL  HALLECK, 

"  Chief  of  staff  of  the  Army, 
"  Washington. 

"...  I  now  find,  after  over  thirty  days  of  trial,  the 
enemy  deems  it  of  the  first  importance  to  run  no  risk 
with  the  armies  they  now  have.  They  act  purely  on 


212  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

the  defensive,  behind  breastworks,  or  feebly  on  the  of 
fensive  immediately  in  front  of  them,  and  where,  in  case 
of  repulse,  they  can  instantly  retire  behind  them. 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant  General." 

This  dispatch  must  have  been  a  great  surprise  to 
Lincoln,  because  Grant  says  in  his  "  Memoirs "  that 
"  Lee's  army  was  the  first  great  object  —  with  the  cap 
ture  of  his  army  Richmond  would  necessarily  follow." 
Lincoln  had  also  declared  that  Lee's  army  was  the  "  true 
objective."  Lee's  army  was  Grant's  "  true  objective," 
and,  strange  to  say,  the  "  true  objective  "  did  not  come 
out  of  its  breastworks  to  attack  Grant  in  his.  Lincoln 
probably  thought  that  as  Grant  had  started  out  in  quest 
of  the  "true  objective"  and  had  all  the  advantage  in 
initiative  and  everything  else,  and  an  army  twice  as 
large  as  the  "  true  objective,"  he  would  not  expect  any 
favors  of  the  "  true  objective."  That  he  was  in  his 
breastworks  is  proven  by  the  following  excerpt  from  his 
memoirs : 

"It  may  be  as  well  here  as  elsewhere  to  state  two 
things  connected  with  all  the  movements  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac;  first,  in  every  change  of  position,  or  halt 
for  the  night,  whether  confronting  the  enemy  or  not, 
the  moment  arms  were  stacked  the  men  intrenched 
themselves.  ...  It  was  wonderful  how  quickly  they 
could  in  this  way  construct  defenses  of  considerable 
strength.  .  .  ." 

"  COLD  HARBOR, 
"June  3,  1864,  12.30  p.  m. 
"  MAJOR  GENERAL  MEADE, 

"  Commanding  A.  P. 
"  The  opinion  of  corps  commanders  not  being  san- 


THE  RAPID  AN  TO  THE  JAMES         213 

guine  of  success  in  case  an  assault  is  ordered,  you  may 
direct  a  suspension  of  farther  advance  for  the  present. 
Hold  our  most  advanced  positions  and  strengthen  them. 
Whilst  on  the  defensive  our  line  may  be  contracted  from 
the  right  if  practicable.  .  .  . 

"  Wright  and  Hancock  should  be  ready  to  assault  in 
case  the  enemy  should  break  through  General  Smith's 
lines,  and  all  should  be  ready  to  resist  an  assault. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant  General." 

On  the  26th  of  May  Lee's  army  was  "  whipped,"  and 
would  not  fight  out  of  its  intrenchments ;  and  on  the  3d 
of  June,  eight  days  later,  Grant  is  on  the  defensive  be 
hind  breastworks  against  that  army.  So  it  looks  very 
much  as  if  the  dispatch  of  the  26th  of  May  was  as  ap 
plicable  to  his  own  army  as  to  Lee's. 

Grant  was  now  in  an  awkward  position,  but  the  James 
river  that  saved  McClellan  from  destruction  in  1862 
offered  him  the  means  of  escape  and  an  opportunity  to 
capture  Petersburg. 

On  the  1 2th  he  commenced  the  movement  and  on  the 
1 6th  had  crossed  the  James  river. 

On  the  I4th  of  June  he  telegraphed  to  Halleck: 

"  The  enemy  show  no  signs  yet  of  having  brought 
troops  to  the  south  side  of  Richmond.  I  will  have 
Petersburg  secured,  if  possible,  before  they  get  there  in 
much  force.  .  .  ." 

Some  of  Grant's  admirers  say  that  he  outgeneraled  Lee 
in  getting  away  and  across  the  river.  It  was  a  very 
easy  thing  to  do.  The  country  in  Grant's  rear  and  the 
James  river  were  in  his  possession.  The  country  was 


214  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

flat  and  wooded,  and  there  was  no  possible  way  for  Lee 
to  know  that  he  was  moving  on  Petersburg.  The  first 
intimation  came  from  Beauregard,  who  was  in  command 
at  Petersburg;  but  even  then  Lee  could  not  take  the 
chances.  He  had  to  be  certain  that  the  move  across  the 
river  was  a  bona  fide  one  before  he  could  uncover  Rich 
mond  on  the  north  side.  Grant's  army  was  large  enough 
to  leave  a  strong  rear-guard  in  his  elaborate  fortifications, 
so  that  there  was  no  appearance  of  change  on  Lee's  front 
until  the  movement  was  completed.  Grant's  "  fight  it 
out  on  this  line,  if  it  takes  all  summer  "  came  to  an 
inglorious  end  at  Cold  Harbor  before  the  summer  had 
fairly  commenced. 
Rhodes  says : 

"  It  is  said  that  the  hurling  of  his  men  against  Lee 
in  chosen  and  fortified  positions  was  unnecessary,  as 
the  roads  in  number  and  in  direction  lent  themselves  to 
the  operation  of  turning  either  flank  of  the  Confederate 
army.  .  .  ." 

".  .  .To  assault  all  along  the  line,"  writes  General 
Walker,  "  as  was  so  often  done  in  the  summer  of  1864, 
is  the  very  abdication  of  leadership."  See  "  Life  of  Gen 
eral  Hancock." 

Rhodes  says: 

".  .  .The  loss  of  Grant  from  May  4  to  June  12  in  the 
campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James  was  54,929, 
a  number  nearly  equal  to  Lee's  whole  army  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  Union  advance ;  that  of  the  Confeder 
ates  is  not  known,  but  it  was  certainly  very  much  less. 
Nor  do  the  bare  figures  tell  the  whole  story.  Of  this 
enormous  loss  the  flower  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         215 

contributed  a  disproportionate  share.  Fighting  against 
such  odds  of  position  and  strategy,  the  high-spirited  and 
capable  officers  were  in  the  thick  of  danger,  and  of  the 
rank  and  file  the  veterans  were  always  at  the  front ;  they 
were  the  forlorn  hope.  The  bounty  jumpers  and  mer 
cenaries  skulked  to  the  rear.  The  morale  of  the  soldiers 
was  much  lower  than  on  the  day  when,  in  high  spirits, 
they  had  crossed  the  Rapidan.  The  confidence  in  Grant 
of  many  of  the  officers  and  of  most  of  the  men  had  been 
shaken.  In  the  judgment  of  many  military  critics,  Grant 
had  not  been  equal  to  his  opportunities,  had  not  made  the 
best  use  of  his  advantages,  and  had  secured  no  gain  com 
mensurate  with  his  loss." 

H.  Thurston  Peck,  in  his  "  Twenty  years  of  the  Re 
public,"  says : 

"  Placed  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he 
fought  the  useless  and  bloody  battle  of  the  Wilderness, 
that  name  of  horror,  from  which  he  was  forced  back 
with  a  loss  of  20,000  men.  At  Spottsylvania  he  made 
three  desperate  frontal  attacks  upon  a  strongly  fortified 
position,  with  no  result  except  a  lavish  loss  of  life.  Then 
came  the  crowning  blunder  of  Cold  Harbor,  when  again 
the  Confederates'  intrenchments  were  assaulted  from  the 
front,  and  when  within  an  hour  12,000  Union  soldiers 
fell.  It  was  here  that  Grant,  unmoved  by  the  frightful 
loss  of  life,  ordered  a  third  charge,  and  the  army  re 
mained  motionless,  refusing  to  obey.  Even  Grant  him 
self  in  after  years  spoke  of  Cold  Harbor  with  remorse. 
In  this  one  campaign,  which  earned  for  him  the  title  of 
*  The  Butcher,'  he  lost  more  men  than  Lee  had  in  his 
entire  army.  .  .  ." 

The  lines  at  Petersburg  were  held  by  Beauregard  with 


2i6  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

2500  men.  On  the  I5th  Grant's  advance,  16,000  strong, 
came  up  at  9  a.  m.,  but  did  not  attack  until  7  p.  m. 
Beauregard  lost  about  one  and  a  half  miles  of  intrench- 
ments  and  sixteen  guns.  Hancock  came  up  at  night. 
During  the  night  Beauregard  built  a  temporary  line, 
throwing  out  the  part  that  had  been  captured.  The  next 
morning  he  had  14,000  men  against  Hancock's  48,000. 
Hancock  captured  four  of  Beauregard's  redans.  On  the 
1 7th  he  captured  another  redan,  four  guns,  and  600  pris 
oners,  and  the  Confederates  recaptured  one  redan  and 
1000  prisoners.  The  Fifth  corps  and  one  division  of  the 
Sixth  now  came  up.  At  night  Beauregard  withdrew  to 
a  line  that  had  been  in  preparation  forty-eight  hours.  At 
4  a.  m.  on  the  i8th  the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Ninth  corps 
attacked,  with  the  Sixth  in  reserve.  The  whole  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  up,  while  reinforcements  on  the  way 
to  Beauregard  were  only  12,000  and  were  from  three 
to  five  hours  away.  Meade's  orders  were  to  "  assault 
by  all  the  corps  with  their  whole  force,  and  at  all  haz 
ards  and  as  soon  as  possible." 

Rhodes  says : 

".  .  .Grant  and  Meade  were  now  on  the  ground,  and 
on  June  16,  17,  and  18  ordered  successive  assaults,  which 
failed  to  take  Petersburg,  and  resulted  in  a  loss  of  about 
10,000  men.  Owing  to  the  much  greater  number  of  the 
Union  soldiers,  the  attempt  on  the  first  two  days  was 
feasible ;  but  the  work,  according  to  one  of  Grant's  staff, 
was  not  '  equal  to  our  previous  fighting,  owing  to  our 
heavy  loss  in  superior  officers.'.  .  ." 

On  the  I9th  Grant  ordered  the  army  to  rest  under 
cover. 

Rhodes  says : 


THE  RAPID  AN  TO  THE  JAMES         217 

"  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  worn  out.  The  con 
tinual  fighting  for  forty-five  days  at  a  disadvantage  and 
without  success,  and  the  frequent  marches  by  night,  had 
exhausted  and  disheartened  the  men.  .  .  .  Indeed,  a 
reconstruction  and  reorganization  of  the  Army  were 
necessary;  these  were  made  during  the  many  weeks  of 
inaction  from  June  18  to  the  spring  of  1865,  covered  by 
the  siege  of  Petersburg,  which  now  commenced.  .  .  ." 

Senator  Grimes  wrote: 

"June  19.  Grant's  campaign  is  regarded  by  mili 
tary  critics  as  being  thus  far  a  failure.  He  has  lost  a 
vast  number  of  men,  and  is  compelled  to  abandon  his 
attempt  to  capture  Richmond  on  the  North  side  and  cross 
the  James  river.  The  question  is  asked  significantly, 
*  Why  did  he  not  take  his  army  south  of  the  James  river 
at  once,  and  thus  save  seventy-five  thousand  men  ? ' 

On  the  2  ist  Grant  sent  the  Second  and  the  Sixth  corps 
to  extend  his  left,  and  Wilson,  with  6000  cavalry,  to  de 
stroy  the  Weldon,  and  to  cut  the  Southside  and  Danville 
railroads.  Lee  attacked  and  defeated  the  two  corps,  and 
captured  1740  prisoners,  four  guns,  a  large  quantity  of 
small  arms,  and  eight  flags.  Wilson  fared  still  worse. 
His  trains  were  fired  and  abandoned  and  his  artillery 
and  a  large  number  of  prisoners  captured.  He  was  glad 
to  get  back  to  the  Union  lines,  with  the  remnant  of  his 
command  hotly  pursued  by  the  Confederate  cavalry. 

On  the  2d  of  July  Congress  passed  a  resolution  re 
questing  the  President  to  appoint  a  day  of  "  humiliation 
and  prayer,"  that  the  people  may  "  confess  and  repent 
of  their  manifold  sins,  implore  the  compassion  and  for 
giveness  of  the  Almighty,  that,  if  consistent  with  His 


218  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

will,  the  existing  rebellion  may  be  suppressed,"  and  "  im 
plore  Him  as  the  Supreme  Ruler  of  the  world  not  to 
destroy  us  as  a  people."  The  President  "  cordially  " 
concurred,  and  the  first  Thursday  in  August  was  the  ap 
pointed  day. 

"  From  "  Chattanooga  to  Petersburg,"  by  General 
"  Baldy  "  Smith  : 

"  July  10.  In  a  confidential  conversation  with  Gen 
eral  Grant  I  tried  to  show  him  the  blunders  of  the  late 
campaign  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  terrible 
waste  of  life  that  had  resulted  from  what  I  considered 
a  want  of  generalship  in  its  present  commander.  Among 
other  instances,  I  referred  to  the  fearful  slaughter  at 
Cold  Harbor  on  the  3d  of  June.  General  Grant  went 
into  the  discussion,  defending  General  Meade  stoutly, 
but  finally  acknowledged,  to  use  his  own  words,  '  that 
there  had  been  a  butchery  at  Cold  Harbor,  but  that  he 
had  said  nothing  about  it  because  it  could  do  no  good/  ' 

Rhodes  says: 

"  Hardly  any  one  now,  I  think,  would  speak  of  this 
campaign  and  its  blunders  as  Meade's ;  they  were  Grant's. 
Neither  is  it  clear  why  Smith,  July  10,  1864,  should  have 
imputed  the  responsibility  for  them  to  Meade,  unless  he 
was  hitting  Grant  over  Meade's  shoulders." 

Lee's  ruling  passion  was  strong  in  death,  and  so  he 
ordered  Early  to  threaten  Washington. 
Rhodes  says: 

"  If  Early  had  profited  by  the  moment  of  consterna 
tion,  he  could  have  gone  into  Washington  early  on 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         219 

July  n.     He  says  there  were  only  20,400  men  in  the 
defenses,  nearly  all  raw  troops." 

If  Early  had  been  alone,  no  doubt  he  could  have  gone 
in  and  put  up  at  Willard's.  But  as  he  had  a  tired  army 
strung  out  on  the  roads  it  would  have  taken  time  to 
change  from  the  line  of  march  to  the  line  of  battle,  and 
two  divisions  of  the  Sixth  corps  arrived  from  City  Point 
at  noon,  long  before  Early  could  have  made  his  dispo 
sition  for  attack. 

Lee's  tangible  reason  for  sending  Early  to  threaten 
Washington  was  to  induce  Grant  to  repeat  Cold  Harbor. 
He  said :  "  It  is  so  repugnant  to  Grant's  principles  and 
practice  to  send  troops  from  him  that  I  had  hoped,  be 
fore  resorting  to  it,  he  would  have  preferred  attacking 
me." 

Another  Cold  Harbor  at  that  time  might  have  resulted 
in  the  triumph  of  the  peace  party,  and  Lee  was  mindful 
of  the  necessity  of  doing  anything  "  honorable  to  aid 
that  party." 

The  fact  is  that  Early  had  no  thought  of  taking  Wash 
ington,  and  made  no  disposition  of  his  forces  with  that 
intention,  nor  was  Washington  at  that  or  any  other 
time  in  danger  of  capture. 

Rhodes  says: 

"  Despondency  and  discouragement  are  words  which 
portray  the  state  of  feeling  at  the  North  during  the 
month  of  July,  1864,  and  the  closer  one's  knowledge  of 
affairs  the  gloomier  was  his  view;  but  the  salient  facts 
put  into  every  one's  mind  the  pertinent  question,  Who 
shall  revive  the  withered  hopes  that  bloomed  on  the  open 
ing  of  Grant's  campaign?  See  New  York  World,  July 
12.  Yet  this  journal  was  fair  in  its  treatment  of  Grant." 


220  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Referring  to  Grant's  dispatch  to  Sherman  in  which 
he  said,  "  I  shall  make  a  desperate  effort  to  get  a  position 
which  will  hold  the  enemy  without  the  necessity  of  so 
many  men,"  Lincoln  telegraphed  to  Grant  on  the  I7th  of 
July :  "  Pressed  as  we  are,  by  lapse  of  time,  I  am  glad 
to  hear  you  say  this ;  and  yet  I  do  hope  you  may  find  a 
way  that  the  effort  shall  not  be  desperate  in  the  loss  of 


The  next  day  he  called  for  500,000  men,  and  ordered 
a  draft  after  September  5  for  the  unfilled  quotas. 

In  the  latter  part  of  July,  Lieut.  Col.  Henry  Pleasants, 
of  the  48th  Pennsylvania  regiment,  conceived  the  idea 
of  blowing  up  a  Confederate  salient  that  was  only  about 
500  feet  from  his  position.  By  the  23d  his  mine  wras 
completed  and  charged  with  8000  pounds  of  powder. 
On  the  28th  Grant  sent  Hancock  and  Sherman  with  the 
second  corps  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry  to  the  north 
of  the  river  to  cause  Lee  to  send  troops  to  oppose  them. 
Hancock  had  orders  to  return  secretly  in  the  night  by 
the  2Qth. 

The  mine  was  exploded  on  the  morning  of  the  3Oth. 
The  Confederate  line  wras  blown  up,  leaving  a  hole,  or 
crater  as  it  is  called,  135  feet  long,  90  feet  wide,  and 
30  feet  deep.  Two  hundred  Confederates  were  killed. 
Burnside's  troops  were  massed  immediately  in  front  of 
the  crater,  then  the  Ninth  and  the  Eighteenth  corps; 
Hancock  with  the  Second  corps  was  to  support  the  at 
tack.  The  Confederate  force  holding  the  lines  at  Peters 
burg  was  13,000,  while  Grant  had  65,000  for  the  assault. 
The  assault  was  led  by  Ledlie's  division  of  the  Ninth 
corps,  followed  by  Ferrero's  negro  division.  Some  idea 
of  the  demoralization  Grant  had  wrought  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  may  be  had  from  the  following  receipts 


THE  RAPID  AN  TO  THE  JAMES         221 

from  articles  written  by  soldiers  of  Ledlie's  division  who 
were  in  the  crater: 

George  L.  Kilmer,  of  the  Ninth  corps,  in  the  Century, 
September,  1887,  says: 

"  First,  there  was  a  feeling  that  the  soldiers  had  been 
pushed  persistently  into  slaughter  pens  from  the  Wilder 
ness  down,  and  needlessly  sacrificed  by  such  methods. 
Second,  there  was  a  determination  to  rebel  against  fur 
ther  slap-dash  assaults.  .  .  ." 

Major  William  H.  Powell,  of  the  Ninth  corps,  in  the 
Century,  September,  1887: 

".  .  .  With  the  notable  exception  of  Gen.  Robert  B. 
Potter,  not  a  division  commander  was  in  the  crater  or 
connecting  lines,  nor  was  there  a  corps  commander  on 
the  immediate  scene  of  action.  .  .  . 

"  There  was  no  means  of  getting  food  or  water  to 
them  (the  men),  for  which  they  were  suffering.  The 
midsummer  sun  shone  upon  their  heads  until  waves  of 
moisture  produced  by  the  exhalations  from  this  mass 
slowly  arose  in  perceptible  horizontal  layers;  wounded 
men  died  there  begging  piteously  for  a  drink  of  water, 
a  drop  of  which  was  not  to  be  had,  for  the  men  had  long 
since  drained  their  canteens.  Soldiers  extended  their 
tongues  to  dampen  their  parched  lips  until  they  seemed 
to  hang  from  their  mouths  like  those  of  thirsty  dogs,  and 
yet  they  were  kept  waiting  in  those  almost  boiling  caul 
drons,  suffering  with  thirst  and  worse,  and  with  their  all 
night  preparations  and  their  fearful  morning  work.  .  .  . 
"  Previous  to  this  last  movement  I  had  again  left  the 
crater  and  gone  to  General  Ledlie,  and  had  urged  him  to 
try  to  have  something  done  to  the  right  and  left  of  the 


222  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

crater,  saying  that  every  man  who  got  into  the  trenches 
to  the  right  or  left  of  it  used  them  as  a  means  of  escape 
to  the  crater,  and  the  enemy  was  re-occupying  them  as 
fast  as  our  men  left.  All  the  satisfaction  I  received  was 
an  order  to  go  back  and  tell  the  brigade  commanders  to 
get  their  men  out  and  press  forward  to  Cemetery  Hill. 
This  talk  and  these  orders,  coming  from  a  commander 
sitting  in  a  bomb-proof  inside  the  Union  lines  was  dis 
gusting.  .  .  ." 

George  L.  Kilmer  says: 

".  .  .  Then  the  colored  troops  broke  and  scattered, 
and  pandemonium  reigned.  The  bravest  lost  heart,  and 
the  men  who  distrusted  the  negroes  vented  their  feelings 
freely.  Some  colored  men  came  into  the  crater,  and 
there  they  found  worse  fate  than  death  in  the  charges. 
It  was  believed  among  the  whites  that  the  enemy  would 
give  no  quarter  to  negroes  or  to  the  whites  taken  with 
them,  and  so  to  be  shut  up  with  blacks  in  the  crater  was 
equal  to  a  doom  of  death.  .  .  ." 

Major  Powell  says: 

".  .  .  It  was  now  evident  that  the  enemy  did  not  fear 
a  demonstration  from  any  other  quarter,  as  they  began 
to  collect  troops  for  a  decisive  assault.  On  observing 
this,  I  left  the  crater  and  reported  to  General  Ledlie, 
whom  I  found  seated  in  a  bomb-proof  with  General 
Ferrero,  that  some  means  ought  to  be  devised  for  with 
drawing  the  mass  of  men  from  the  crater,  without  ex 
posing  them  to  the  terrible  fire  which  was  kept  up  by  the 
enemy;  that  if  some  picks  and  shovels  could  be  found, 
the  men  in  an  hour  could  open  a  covered  way  by  which 
they  could  be  withdrawn;  that  the  enemy  was  making 


JOHN  C.  FREMONT 


Facing-  page  223 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         223 

every  preparation  for  a  determined  assault  on  the  crater, 
and,  disorganized  as  the  troops  were,  they  could  make 
no  permanent  resistance.  Not  one  implement  of  any 
kind  could  be  found;  instead,  the  proposition  was  re 
ceived  with  disfavor." 

About  2  p.  m.  the  Confederates  charged  and  put  an 
end  to  the  suffering.  They  found  nearly  2000  men  alive 
and  dead  in  the  crater. 

The  military  court  censured  Ledlie,  Burnside,  Wilcox, 
Ferrero,  and  Colonel  Bliss,  and  expressed  their  judg 
ment  to  the  effect  that  in  the  absence  of  the  commanding 
general  the  whole  force  should  have  been  under  the  com 
mand  of  one  officer. 

But  the  commanding  general  was  not  absent.  At  10 
a.  m.  Grant  telegraphed  to  Halleck  that  he  was  just  from 
the  front.  He  had  left  his  cowardly  generals  in  bomb- 
proofs  and  his  men  in  the  crater,  and  ridden  leisurely 
to  his  comfortable  headquarters  at  City  Point. 

Rhodes  says: 

"  There  is  little  or  no  evidence,  so  far  as  I  know,  ex 
hibiting  the  dejection  of  Grant  at  the  failure  of  the  high 
hopes  and  expectations  which  filled  his  soul  when  he 
crossed  the  Rapidan.  His  sturdy  disposition  and  strong 
will,  the  determination  that  he  must  succeed,  prevented 
probably  the  admission  to  himself  of  failure,  and  even 
if  they  had  not,  his  stolid  countenance  would  have  con 
cealed  it.  Yet  two  circumstances  seem  to  indicate  that 
the  bitterness  of  disappointment  was  his  share.  It  was 
commonly  believed  in  the  army  that  his  misfortunes  had 
driven  him  again  to  drink,  and  on  this  account  and  others, 
Butler,  with  crafty  method,  acquired  a  hold  on  him  which 
prevented  him  from  acting  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
service. 


224  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

".  .  .  The  intense  gloom  displayed  itself  in  two  forms, 
in  eagerness  for  peace  and  in  dissatisfaction  with  Lin 
coln.  '  I  know,'  wrote  Greeley  to  Lincoln,  August  9, 
'  that  nine-tenths  of  the  American  people,  North  and 
South,  are  anxious  for  peace,  peace  on  almost  any  terms, 
and  utterly  sick  of  human  slaughter  and  devastation. 
...  I  beg  you,  implore  you,  to  inaugurate  or  invite  pro 
posals  for  peace  forthwith.  And  in  case  peace  cannot 
now  be  made,  consent  to  an  armistice  for  one  year,  each 
party  to  retain  unmolested  all  it  now  holds,  but  the  rebel 
ports  to  be  opened.  Meantime  let  a  national  convention 
be  held,  and  there  will  surely  be  no  more  war  at  all 
events/ 

".  .  .  Thomas  A.  Scott,  who  was  always  ready  to 
help  efficiently  the  government  in  a  time  of  trouble,  and 
who  now  offered  the  services  of  himself  and  his  railroad, 
telegraphed  from  Philadelphia  to  Stanton :  *  The  apathy 
in  the  public  mind  is  fearful.  It  might  well  be  doubted 
whether  men  in  sufficient  numbers  and  money  in  a  suffi 
cient  amount  would  be  forthcoming  to  complete  the  work 
of  conquering  the  South/  ' 

Among  many  absurdities  in  Grant's  "  Memoirs "  is 
the  following: 

"  Criticism  has  been  made  by  writers  on  the  campaign 
from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James  river  that  all  the  loss  of 
life  could  have  been  obviated  by  moving  the  army  there 
on  transports.  Richmond  was  fortified  and  intrenched 
so  perfectly  that  one  man  inside  to  defend  was  more  than 
equal  to  five  outside  besieging  or  assaulting.  To  get 
possession  of  Lee's  army  was  the  first  great  object. 
With  the  capture  of  his  army,  Richmond  would  neces 
sarily  follow.  It  was  better  to  fight  him  outside  of  his 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         225 

stronghold  than  in  it.  If  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had 
been  moved  bodily  to  the  James  river  by  water,  Lee 
could  have  moved  a  part  of  his  forces  back  to  Richmond, 
called  Beauregard  from  the  South  to  reinforce  it,  and 
with  the  balance  moved  on  to  Washington.  Then,  too, 
I  ordered  a  move,  simultaneously  with  that  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  up  the  James  river  by  a  formidable  army 
already  collected  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  .  .  ." 

Lee's  strategy  all  through  the  war  was  designed  to 
keep  his  army  out  of  "  his  stronghold,"  because  he  knew 
he  did  not  have  men  enough,  and  could  not  get  supplies 
enough,  to  hold  it. 

McClellan  moved  his  army  by  water  to  the  White 
House  on  the  Pamunkey  river  in  1862,  and  no  attempt 
to  take  Washington  was  made.  At  his  best  Lee  never 
attempted  to  take  Washington,  for  it,  too,  was  fortified, 
and  stronger  than  Richmond  ever  was.  It  is  not  likely 
he  would  have  attempted  it  when  the  Confederacy  was 
on  its  last  legs  and  a  "  formidable  army  moving  up  the 
James  river." 

Grant  had  three  alternatives.  First,  he  could  trans 
port  his  army  to  City  Point  by  water.  Second,  he  could 
march  by  his  left  flank  to  that  point,  avoiding  battle  un 
less  attacked,  in  which  event  he  would  have  had  what  he 
so  much  desired, — 'the  enemy  in  the  open.  Third,  he 
could  move  directly  on  Lee's  army,  with  his  object  to 
get  possession  of  it  and  end  the  war.  He  chose 
the  third  alternative.  He  made  no  mistake.  It  was 
sound  military  sense,  for  there  was  no  reason  to  sup 
pose  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  its  worn 
and  tattered  condition  could  longer  resist  the  magnificent 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  double  its  strength  in  numbers. 
This,  then,  was  Grant's  real  reason  for  his  direct  march 


226  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

on  Lee.     He  thought,  and  had  every  reason  to  think,  he 
could  beat  Lee  in  a  pitched  battle  and  end  the  war. 

He  admits  his  disappointment.  He  admits  that  he 
expected  "  to  get  possession  of  Lee's  army  "  in  the  fol 
lowing  dispatch : 

"  COLD  HARBOR,  June  5,  1864. 
"  MAJOR  GENERAL  HALLECK, 

"  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army. 

".  .  .  Without  a  greater  sacrifice  of  human  life  than 
I  am  willing  to  make,  all  cannot  be  accomplished  that  I 
had  designed.  .  .  . 

"  U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  Lieutenant  General." 

Rhodes  says: 

"  Grant  had  hoped  to  destroy  or  defeat  totally  Lee's 
army  north  of  Richmond,  and,  failing  to  do  either,  had 
decided  to  transfer  his  troops  to  the  south  of  the  James, 
and  from  that  quarter  besiege  the  Confederates  in  their 
capital.  .  .  ." 

When  Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan  he  expected  to  gain 
a  decisive  victory  and  end  the  war.  In  that  he  made  a 
most  disastrous  failure,  so  when  he  comes  to  write  his 
report  he  says :  "  Second,  to  hammer  continuously 
against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy  and  his  resources, 
until  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way,  there  should 
be  nothing  left  to  him  but  an  equal  submission  with  the 
loyal  section  of  our  common  country  to  the  constitution 
and  the  laws  of  the  land." 

It  will  be  seen  that  he  substitutes  for  the  original  ob 
ject,  the  "  capture  of  Lee's  army,"  attrition,  which  had 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         227 

become  a  condition  in  his  army  at  any  rate  before  it  was 
a  theory  in  his  reports. 

The  campaign  of  1864  was  the  last  of  Lee's  campaigns, 
the  end  of  the  war,  and  of  his  career. 

Steam  and  electricity  had  accelerated  military  oper 
ations,  and  consequently  all  modern  wars  have  been  of 
short  duration;  but  Lee  in  his  last  campaign,  though 
overwhelmed  with  numbers  and  resources,  succeeded  in 
prolonging  the  war  another  year,  making  it  the  longest 
of  modern  wars. 

Any  one  who  studies  the  campaign  of  1864  will  be 
puzzled.  He  will  not  know  whether  to  pronounce  Lee 
the  greatest  general  that  ever  lived,  or  Grant  the  poorest. 

Lee's  staff  officers,  Fitz  Lee,  and  other  friends  of  Lee 
wrote  books  in  which  they  charged  Longstreet  with  being 
slow  at  Gettysburg  and  in  the  Wilderness ;  so  when  Long- 
street  came  to  write  his  book  he  was  not  content  to  con 
fine  himself  to  a  refutation  of  these  charges,  but  furiously 
assailed  their  authors  and  General  Lee  himself.  His 
criticisms  of  Lee  are  intemperate  and  in  some  cases 
ridiculous;  but  they  and  the  stupidity  of  the  books  of 
Lee's  staff  officers  and  generals,  together  with  the  fact 
that  he  failed  to  conquer  Confederate  independence  in  the 
Maryland  or  Pennsylvania  campaign,  cause  historians  to 
form  an  estimate  of  him  of  which  the  following  quota 
tion  from  Rhodes  is  a  fair  example : 

"  His  victories  on  his  own  soil  were  extraordinary ; 
but  if  we  compare  his  campaigns  of  invasion  with  those 
of  Napoleon,  we  shall  see  how  far  he  fell  short  when 
he  undertook  operations  in  an  unfriendly  country,  al 
though  the  troops  that  followed  him  were  in  fighting 
qualities  unsurpassed.  '  Except  in  equipment/  writes 


228  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

General  Alexander,  '  I  think  a  better  army,  better  nerved 
up  to  its  work,  never  marched  upon  a  battle-field/  With 
such  soldiers,  if  Lee  had  been  as  great  a  general  as  Na 
poleon,  Gettysburg  had  been  an  Austerlitz,  Washington 
and  the  Union  had  fallen.  .  .  ." 

Creasy,  in  his  "  Decisive  Battles  of  the  World,"  says : 

".  .  .  The  strength  of  the  army  under  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  at  Waterloo  was  49,608  infantry,  12,402 
cavalry,  and  5645  artillerymen  with  156  guns.  But  of 
this  total  of  67,655  men  scarcely  24,000  were  British,  a 
circumstance  of  very  serious  importance,  if  Napoleon's 
own  estimate  of  the  relative  value  of  the  troops  of  differ 
ent  nations  is  to  be  taken.  In  the  Emperor's  own  words, 
speaking  of  this  campaign:  'A  French  soldier  would 
not  be  equal  to  more  than  one  English  soldier,  but  he 
would  not  be  afraid  to  meet  two  Dutchmen,  Prussians, 
or  soldiers  of  the  Confederation.'  There  were  about 
6000  men  of  the  old  German  Legion  with  the  Duke; 
these  were  veteran  troops,  and  of  good  quality.  Of  the 
rest  of  the  army  the  Hanoverians  and  Brunswickers 
proved  themselves  worthy  of  confidence  and  praise.  But 
the  Nassauers,  Dutch,  and  Belgians  were  almost  worth 
less;  and  not  a  few  of  them  were  justly  suspected  of  a 
strong  wish  to  fight,  if  they  fought  at  all,  under  the 
French  eagles  rather  than  against  them.  .  .  . 

"  Napoleon's  army  at  Waterloo  consisted  of  48,950 
infantry,  15,765  cavalry,  7232  artillerymen,  being  a  total 
of  71,947  men,  and  246  guns.  They  were  the  flower 
of  the  National  forces  of  France ;  and  of  all  the  numer 
ous  gallant  armies  which  that  martial  land  has  poured 
forth,  never  was  one  braver,  or  better  disciplined,  or 
better  led  than  the  host  that  took  up  its  position  at 
Waterloo  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th  of  June,  1815.  .  .  ." 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES          229 

Napoleon,  according  to  his  own  statement,  had  the 
advantage  over  Wellington  in  numbers,  while  Lee  was 
at  least  22,200  men  weaker  than  Meade.  Napoleon's 
arms,  ammunition,  equipment,  etc.,  were  fully  equal  to 
or  superior  to  Wellington's,  as  France  was  the  great 
military  nation  of  the  age,  while  Lee's  were  very  much 
inferior  to  Meade's.  Meade's  position  at  Gettysburg 
was  far  stronger  than  Wellington's  at  Waterloo.  Na 
poleon's  line  of  communication  was  safe;  Lee's  in  immi 
nent  peril.  So  that  before  arriving  at  the  conclusion 
that  had  Lee  been  a  Napoleon,  "  Gettysburg  had  been  an 
Austerlitz,  Washington  and  the  Union  had  fallen,"  it 
would  be  well  to  inquire  why  Napoleon  did  not  make  an 
Austerlitz  of  Waterloo. 

Napoleon  lost  his  army  and  himself.  His  retreat  was 
the  most  disgraceful  and  disastrous  on  record. 

Of  it  Colonel  Lemonnier-Delaposse  says: 

"  What  a  hideous  spectacle !  The  mountain  torrent, 
that  uproots  and  whirls  along  with  it  every  momentary 
obstacle,  is  a  feeble  image  of  that  heap  of  men,  of  horses, 
of  equipages,  rushing  one  upon  another;  gathering  be 
fore  the  least  obstacle  which  dams  up  their  way  for  a 
few  seconds,  only  to  form  a  mass  which  overthrows 
everything  in  the  path  which  it  forces  for  itself.  Woe 
to  him  whose  footing  failed  in  that  deluge !  He  was 
crushed,  trampled  to  death!  .  .  . 

"  We  drew  near  Beaumont,  when  suddenly  a  regiment 
of  horse  was  seen  debouching  from  a  wood  on  our  left. 
The  column  that  we  followed  shouted  out,  '  The  Prus 
sians  !  The  Prussians ! '  and  galloped  off  in  utter  dis 
order.  The  troops  that  thus  alarmed  them  were  not  a 
tenth  part  of  their  number,  and  were  in  reality  our  own 
8th  Hussars,  who  wore  green  uniforms.  But  the  panic 


230  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

had  been  brought  even  this  far  from  the  battle-field  and 
the  disorganized  column  galloped  into  Beaumont,  which 
was  already  crowded  with  our  infantry.  .  .  . 

"  Being  still  anxious  to  procure  some  food  for  the 
general  and  ourselves,  even  if  it  were  but  a  loaf  of  am 
munition  bread,  I  left  the  house  and  rode  into  the  town. 
I  saw  pillage  going  on  in  every  direction;  open  caissons, 
stripped  and  half  broken,  blocked  up  the  streets.  The 
pavement  was  covered  with  plundered  and  torn  baggage. 
Pillagers  and  runaways,  such  were  all  the  comrades  I 
met  with.  Disgusted  at  them,  I  strove,  sword  in  hand, 
to  stop  one  of  the  plunderers;  but  more  active  than  I, 
he  gave  me  a  bayonet  stab  in  my  left  arm,  in  which  I 
fortunately  caught  his  thrust,  which  had  been  aimed  full 
at  my  body.  He  disappeared  among  the  crowd  through 
which  I  could  not  force  my  horse.  My  spirit  of  disci 
pline  had  made  me  forget  that  in  such  circumstances  the 
soldier  is  a  mere  wild  beast.  But  to  be  wounded  by 
a  fellow  countryman  after  having  passed  unharmed 
through  all  the  perils  of  Quatre  Bras  and  Waterloo! 
This  did  seem  hard  indeed.  .  .  ." 

Lee  stood  in  front  of  Meade  all  day  on  the  4th,  and 
then  retreated  slowly  to  the  Potomac,  where  he  con 
fronted  him  until  the  I3th. 

Lee  never  expected  to  capture  Washington  and  con 
quer  Confederate  independence.  We  have  it  in  his  own 
words  : 

("  Confidential) 
"  HEADQUARTERS  ORANGE  COUNTY, 

"  February  3,  1864. 
"  His  EXCELLENCY  JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 

"  President  Confederate  States. 
"  MR.  PRESIDENT  :     The  approach  of   spring  causes 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         231 

me  to  consider  with  great  anxiety  the  probable  action  of 
the  enemy's  army  and  the  possible  operations  of  ours  in 
the  ensuing  campaign.  If  we  could  take  the  initiative 
and  fall  upon  them  unexpectedly,  we  might  derange  their 
plans  and  embarrass  them  the  whole  summer.  ...  If 
I  could  draw  Longstreet  secretly  and  rapidly  to  me,  I 
might  succeed  in  forcing  General  Meade  back  to  Wash 
ington,  and  exciting  sufficient  apprehension  at  least  for 
their  position  to  weaken  any  movement  against  ours. 
.  .  .  We  are  not  in  condition,  and  never  have  been,  in 
my  opinion,  to  invade  the  enemy's  country  with  a  pros 
pect  of  permanent  benefit.  But  we  can  alarm  and  em 
barrass  him  to  some  extent,  and  thus  prevent  him  from 
undertaking  anything  of  magnitude  against  us.  .  .  . 
"  I  am,  with  great  respect, 

;<  Your  obedient  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General/' 

This  letter  also  shows  that  if  Lee  had  been  strong 
enough  he  would  have  repeated  his  strategy  of  1862  and 
1863,  and  would  have  prolonged  the  war  another  year. 

Grant  says : 

".  .  .  Anything  that  could  have  prolonged  the  war  a 
year  beyond  the  time  that  it  did  finally  close  would  prob 
ably  have  exhausted  the  North  to  such  an  extent  that 
they  might  then  have  abandoned  the  contest  and  agreed 
to  a  separation.  .  .  ." 

"  Frederick  the  Great,"  says  Carlyle,  "  always  got  to 
know  his  man,  after  fighting  him  a  month  or  two,  and 
took  liberties  with  him  or  did  not  take  them  accordingly." 
The  same  thing  has  been  said  of  Lee,  but  without  reason. 


232  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Lee  took  liberties  with  Lincoln's  generals  before  he  had 
fought  them  a  month  or  two,  because  he  knew  that  they 
carried  Washington,  "  the  old  man  of  the  sea,"  on  their 
backs. 

Rhodes,  in  speaking  of  Lee's  operations  against  Pope, 
says :  "  He  devised  a  plan  contrary,  the  military  critics 
say,  '  to  the  recognized  principles  of  strategy.' '  Macau- 
lay  expresses  the  same  idea  regarding  Peterborough's 
generalship  in  Spain. 

Sir  Edward  Hamley  says : 

"  Nothing  is  more  common  than  to  find  in  writings  on 
military  matters  reference  to  the  '  rules  of  war/  and 
assertions  such  as  that  some  general  t  violated  every  prin 
ciple  of  war/  or  that  some  other  general  owed  his  success 
to  '  knowing  when  to  dispense  with  the  rules  of  war.' 
It  would  be  difficult  to  say  what  these  rules  are,  or  in 
what  code  they  are  embodied.  .  .  .  Jomini  expresses  vir 
tually  the  same  view. 

".  .  .  Clausewitz  has  declared  that  the  theory  of  the 
art  of  war  is  valuable  just  in  so  far  as  it  assists  to  guide 
a  man  through  the  vast  labyrinth  of  military  experience, 
and  to  prepare  his  mind  to  be  ready  to  act  for  itself  under 
the  emergencies  of  actual  war;  but  he  adds,  it  must  re 
nounce  all  pretensions  to  accompany  him  on  to  the  field 
of  battle.  .  .  ." 

From  all  of  which  it  would  appear  that  there  are  no 
"  rules  of  war  "  nor  "  recognized  principles  of  strategy," 
and  that  even  the  theory  of  the  art  of  war  should  be  left 
at  home,  and  brains  and  energy  substituted. 

Lee's  apparent  recklessness  and  his  disregard  of  the 
"  rules  of  war  "  and  "  recognized  principles  of  strategy  " 
are  easily  accounted  for. 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         233 

He  realized  from  the  first  that  the  only  hope  of  suc 
cess  was  in  prolonging  the  war,  and  that  the  only  way 
to  prolong  it  was  to  threaten  Washington. 

If  he  had  lost  Richmond,  he  could  not  have  threatened 
Washington.  Not  only  that,  but  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  would  have  been  relieved  of  the  defense  of  Wash 
ington,  and  would  have  been  free  to  operate  against  the 
armies  in  the  South. 

Then,  too,  Lee's  army,  deprived  of  the  support  of 
Richmond  and  Virginia,  would  have  grown  weaker  every 
day.  Therefore,  his  whole  object  during  the  entire  war 
was  to  keep  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  away  from  Rich 
mond;  and  in  doing  that  he  had  to  resort  to  strategy 
which  appeared  reckless  in  the  extreme,  but  which  was 
nevertheless  absolutely  necessary. 

Now,  if  we  consider  in  addition  his  natural  disposition, 
we  can  easily  account  for  all  his  reckless  strategy  and 
tactics. 

Longstreet  says  of  it : 

"  As  a  commander  he  was  much  of  the  Wellington  '  up 
and  at  'em  '  style.  He  found  it  hard,  the  enemy  in  sight, 
to  withhold  his  blows.  .  .  .  When  the  hunt  was  up,  his 
combativeness  was  overruling." 

The  absurd  fear  that  he  would  capture  Washington 
was  his  main  stay.  But  for  it  the  war  would  have  been 
fought  on  other  lines.  Some  of  the  scares  of  the  Wash 
ington  authorities  were  really  ludicrous. 

In  General  Hooker's  testimony  on  the  conduct  of  the 
war  he  says : 

"  I  may  here  state  that  while  at  Fairfax  Court  House 
my  cavalry  was  reinforced  by  that  of  Major  General 


234  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Stahel.  The  latter  numbered  6100  sabres,  and  had  been 
engaged  in  picketing  a  line  from  Occoguan  river  to 
Goose  creek.  This  line  was  concentric  to,  and  a  portion 
of  it  within,  the  line  held  by  my  army. 

'  The  force  opposed  to  them  was  Mosby's  guerillas, 
numbering  about  200  (Mosby  says  30)  ;  and,  if  the  re 
ports  of  the  newspapers  were  to  be  believed,  this  whole 
party  was  killed  two  or  three  times  during  the  winter. 

"  From  the  time  I  took  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  there  was  no  evidence  that  any  force  of  the 
enemy,  other  than  that  above  named,  was  within  one 
hundred  miles  of  Washington;  and  yet  the  planks  on 
the  chain  bridge  were  taken  up  at  night  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  winter  and  spring." 

Mosby  was  perched  in  the  mountains,  and  Washington 
was  as  scared  of  him  as  an  old  hen  would  have  been 
had  he  been  a  chicken  hawk. 

But  the  old  Merrimac  gave  them  the  scare  of  their 
lives. 

Rhodes  says: 

".  .  .  The  next  morning,  in  Washington,  Seward, 
Chase,  Stanton,  and  Wells  hastened  to  the  White  House 
to  confer  with  the  President.  .  .  .  Stanton  was  especially 
excited.  '  I  have  no  doubt,'  he  said,  '  that  the  monster 
is  at  this  moment  on  her  way  to  Washington/  Looking 
out  of  the  wrindow,  which  commanded  a  view  of  the  Po 
tomac  for  many  miles,  he  continued,  '  Not  unlikely  we 
shall  have  from  one  of  her  guns  a  shell  or  cannon  ball 
in  the  White  House  before  we  leave  this  room.'  .  .  ." 

Creasy  says: 

".  .  .  Niebuhr,  after  referring  to  the  military  '  blun- 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         235 

ders '  of  Mithridates,  Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon, 
Pyrrhus,  and  Hannibal,  uses  these  remarkable  words: 
'  The  Duke  of  Wellington  is,  I  believe,  the  only  general 
in  whose  conduct  of  war  we  cannot  discover  any  im 
portant  mistakes.'  .  .  ." 

Artemus  Ward,  in  explaining  the  failure  of  an  enter 
prise,  said :  "  I  tried  to  do  too  much  —  and  did  it." 
So  it  was  with  Mithridates,  Frederick,  Napoleon,  Pyr 
rhus,  Hannibal,  and  Lee.  In  Lee's  Maryland  campaign 
he  might  have  been  content  to  let  Antietam  go.  The 
capture  of  Harper's  Ferry  alone  would  have  been  a  splen 
did  climax  of  the  glorious  campaign  which  had  raised 
the  siege  of  Richmond,  driven  Pope  into  Washington, 
and  thrown  McClellan's  splendid  army  from  the  James 
river  to  Maryland,  and  prolonged  the  war  a  year.  The 
Gettysburg  campaign  commenced  with  the  miracle  of 
Chancellorsville,  followed  by  the  miracle  of  throwing 
Hooker's  army  from  Fredericksburg  to  Pennsylvania. 
It  prolonged  the  war  another  year,  and  Lee  could  have 
contented  himself  with  the  victory  of  the  first  day  as 
the  grand  climax  of  the  campaign. 

Jackson  was  probably  as  pugnacious  as  Lee,  but  he 
had  the  will  power  to  suppress  his  inclinations. 

"  God  blessed  our  arms  with  victory  at  McDowell 
yesterday." 

"  Through  the  blessing  of  an  ever  kind  Providence  I 
passed  Strasburg  before  the  Federal  armies  under  Gen 
eral  Shields  and  Fremont  effected  the  contemplated  junc 
tion  in  my  rear." 

Jackson  could  thank  God  for  helping  him  run  away 
as  heartily  as  for  a  victory. 


236  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

Creasy  says,  speaking  of  Napoleon's  opinion  of  Han 
nibal  : 

".  .  .  Napoleon  said  at  St.  Helena  that  Caesar  was  a 
great  soldier,  but  he  had  Roman  veterans  against  the 
barbarian  Gauls;  Alexander  was  a  great  soldier,  but  he 
conquered  the  Persian  hordes  with  the  trained  troops  of 
Greece;  while  Hannibal  created  an  army  from  hetero 
geneous  material,  and  led  it  successfully  against  the 
trained  veterans  of  Rome.  He  therefore  considered 
Hannibal  the  greatest  military  genius  of  ancient  times. 
He  places  Frederick  the  Great  first  in  rank  of  modern 
generals,  because  he  held  out  for  seven  years  against  the 
armies  of  Austria,  Russia,  France,  and  Sweden.  It  will 
be  seen  that  Napoleon  formed  his  estimate  of  soldiers 
largely  on  the  odds  against  them,  rather  than  on  success 
in  the  abstract.  .  .  ." 

It  is  doubtful  if  any  general  ever  fought  under  such 
disadvantages  as  Lee.  Always  inferior  in  numbers, 
arms,  ammunition,  supplies  of  subsistence  and  transpor 
tation,  he  had  six  rivers  on  his  flank  all  in  possession  of 
the  enemy's  powerful  navy,  which  accomplished  more 
in  the  subjugation  of  the  Confederacy  than  did  the 
armies.  But  for  the  James  river  McClellan's  army  would 
have  been  destroyed  in  1862;  and  had  there  been  no 
James,  Pamunkey,  and  York  rivers,  and  no  Chesapeake 
bay,  Grant  would  have  found  himself  in  an  awkward 
position  in  1864. 

After  Gettysburg,  in  September,  Longstreet  was  or 
dered  to  Tennessee.  He  wrote  to  Lee  as  follows : 

"  If  I  did  not  think  our  move  a  necessary  one,  my 
regrets  at  leaving  you  would  be  distressing  to  me,  as 
it  seems  to  be  with  the  officers  and  men  of  my  command. 


THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES         237 

Believing  it  to  be  necessary,  I  hope  to  accept  it  and  my 
other  personal  inconveniences  cheerfully  and  hopefully. 
All  that  we  have  to  be  proud  of  has  been  accomplished 
under  your  eye  and  under  your  orders.  Our  affections 
for  you  are  stronger,  if  it  is  possible  for  them  to  be 
stronger,  than  our  admiration  for  you." 

This  was  written  of  course  before  Longstreet  wrote 
his  book,  and  it  would  be  better  for  his  reputation  if  he 
had  never  written  anything  else. 

From  Harper's  Weekly: 

"  As  we  have  several  times  pointed  out,  there  was  no 
a  priori  ground  for  supposing  that  Mr.  Roosevelt,  being 
the  son  of  a  Southern  woman,  would  share  the  antipathy 
with  which  Southerners  used  to  be  regarded  by  some  of 
the  Northern  abolitionists;  while,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
he  has  made  no  secret  of  his  admiration  for  the  incom 
parable  gallantry  displayed  by  the  Confederates  in  their 
struggle  for  separate  political  existence.  He  has  re 
corded  in  print  his  conviction  that  ROBERT  E.  LEE 
was  the  greatest  military  genius  ever  produced  by  the 
English-speaking  race.  In  other  words,  the  President 
has  ranked  the  Confederate  commander-in-chief  above 
Cromwell,  Marlborough,  and  Wellington,  whom  he 
would  place  in  the  same  category  with  Grant.  The  cir 
cumstance  that  Grant  beat  Lee  in  the  end  no  more  proves 
the  former  to  have  been  the  greater  general  than  the 
superiority  of  Scipio  Africanus  to  Hannibal  is  shown 
by  the  outcome  of  the  battle  of  Zama,  or  than  that  of 
Wellington  to  Napoleon  is  attested  by  the  latter's  defeat 
at  Waterloo." 

Creasy  says: 


238  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

'  Twice/  says  Arnold,  *  has  there  been  witnessed  the 
struggle  of  the  highest  individual  genius  against  the  re 
sources  and  institutions  of  a  great  nation;  and  in  both 
cases  the  nation  has  been  victorious.  For  seventeen 
years  Hannibal  strove  against  Rome;  for  sixteen  years 
Napoleon  strove  against  England;  the  efforts  of  the  first 
ended  at  Zama,  those  of  the  second  at  Waterloo.'  ..." 

Now  we  may  add  a  third.  Lee  strove  against  the 
United  States,  and  his  effort  ended  at  Appomattox. 
Hannibal,  Napoleon,  and  Lee,  the  greatest  military 
geniuses,  all  suffered  defeat  in  the  end,  because  even 
genius  itself  is  not  proof  against  main  strength  and 
awkwardness. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    SIEGE    OF    RICHMOND 

CITY  POINT  was  an  ideal  base.  At  the  confluence 
of  the  James  and  the  Appomattox,  just  below  Rich 
mond  and  Petersburg, —  a  harbor  which  accommodated 
Grant's  fleet,  a  forest  of  masts, —  within  a  few  hours  of 
Fortress  Monroe,  Baltimore,  Washington,  and  New 
York,  it  was,  with  all  navigable  waters  in  possession  of 
the  United  States  navy,  absolutely  safe  against  a  power 
with  no  navy.  But  its  superlative  preeminence  lay  in 
the  fact  that  it  was  within  easy  reach  of  the  arteries,  the 
railroads,  that  were  vital  to  Lee's  army  and  Richmond. 
Nicolay  and  Hay  say: 

".  .  .  Grant  was  every  day  pushing  his  formidable 
left  wing  nearer  the  only  roads  by  which  Lee  could  es 
cape  ;  Thomas  was  threatening  the  Confederate  communi 
cation  with  Tennessee;  Sheridan  was  moving  for  the 
last  time  up  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah  to  abolish 
Early ;  while  from  the  South  the  redoubtable  column  of 
Sherman, —  the  men  who  had  taken  Vicksburg,  who  had 
scaled  the  heights  of  Chattanooga,  and  having  marched 
through  Georgia  had  left  Savannah  loyal  and  Charleston 
evacuated, —  were  moving  Northward  with  the  steady 
pace  and  irresistible  progress  of  a  tragic  fate.  .  .  ." 

As  Grant  extended  his  left  wing  Lee  extended  his 
right  until  his  "  stronghold,"  as  Grant  called  it,  was 
thirty  miles  long  and  across  two  rivers,  and  so  weak  that 

239 


240  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

in  places  in  the  woods  where  it  could  not  be  seen  it  was 
held  with  a  picket  line. 

Nicolay  and  Hay  say  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac: 

".  .  .  It  was  a  great  army;  it  was  the  result  of  all 
the  power  and  wisdom  of  the  Government.  .  .  ." 

To  oppose  this  "  great  army  "  Lee  had  about  50,000 
men,  and  they  were  deserting  by  the  hundred  every 
night,  partly  because  of  hunger,  but  more  generally  be 
cause  their  homes  in  the  South  were  now  in  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  they  were  anxious  as  to  the  fate  of  their 
families  at  the  hands  of  the  negroes  and  such  barbarians 
as  Sherman. 

An  idea  of  the  condition  of  Lee's  army  may  be  had 
from  the  following  correspondence : 

"  HEADQUARTERS 
"  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"  September  2,   1864. 
"  His  EXCELLENCY  JEFFERSON  DAVIS, 

"  President  Confederate  States. 

"  As  matters  now  stand  we  have  no  troops  available 
to  meet  movements  of  the  enemy,  or  strike  when  oppor 
tunity  presents,  without  taking  them  from  the  trenches 
and  exposing  some  point.  The  enemy's  position  enables 
him  to  move  his  troops  to  the  right  or  left  without  our 
knowledge  until  he  has  reached  the  point  at  which  he 
aims,  and  we  are  then  compelled  to  hurry  our  men  to 
meet  him,  incurring  the  risk  of  being  too  late  to  check 
his  progress,  and  the  additional  risk  of  the  advantage  he 
may  derive  from  their  absence.  This  was  fully  illus 
trated  in  the  late  demonstration  north  of  the  James  river, 
which  called  troops  from  our  line  there,  who,  if  present, 
might  have  prevented  the  occupation  of  the  Weldon  rail- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  RICHMOND  241 

road.  These  rapid  and  distant  movements  also  fatigue 
and  exhaust  our  men,  greatly  impairing  their  efficiency 
in  battle.  .  .  .  Our  ranks  are  constantly  diminishing  by 
battle  and  disease,  and  few  recruits  are  received.  The 
consequences  are  inevitable,  and  I  feel  confident  that  the 
time  has  come  when  no  man  capable  of  bearing  arms 
should  be  excused. 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General/' 

F.  G.  Ruffin,  Subsistence  Department,  C.  S.  A.,  says: 

".  ..  On  the  5th  of  December,  1864,  I  brought  the 
condition  of  things  to  the  attention  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  appending  a  statement  of  the  subsistence  on  hand, 
which  showed  that  we  had  nine  days'  rations  for  General 
Lee's  army.  I  quoted  General  Lee's  letter  to  the  com 
missary  general,  that  day  received,  in  which  he  stated 
his  men  were  deserting  on  account  of  short  rations. 
But  no  action  was  taken.  On  December  14,  nine  days 
afterward,  General  Lee  telegraphed  to  Mr.  Davis  that 
his  army  was  without  meat.  Fortunately  disaster  was 
momentarily  averted  by  the  timely  arrival  of  supplies  at 
Wilmington." 

General  Lee  sent  the  following  telegram  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  the  Hon.  James  A.  Seddon : 

"  HEADQUARTERS 
"  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"January  n,  1865. 

"  There  is  nothing  within  reach  of  this  army  to  be  im 
pressed.  The  country  is  swept  clean.  Our  only  reliance 
is  on  the  railroad.  We  have  but  two  days'  supplies.  .  .  . 

"  R.  E.  LEE." 


242  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

On  the  1 5th  of  January  a  combined  naval  and  land 
force  captured  Fort  Fisher  and  closed  the  port  of  Wil 
mington.  For  nearly  three  years  after  all  other  ports 
were  closed  an  occasional  blockade  runner,  loaded  with 
cotton,  got  away  from  \Vilmington,  and  one  occasionally 
got  in  with  supplies  of  subsistence,  arms,  and  munitions 
of  war.  The  loss  of  Wilmington  was  a  greater  disaster 
than  the  loss  of  Vicksburg  or  Atlanta,  for,  little  as  the 
commerce  was,  it  was  vital  to  the  Confederacy. 

General  Lee  issued  the  following  circular : 

"  HEADQUARTERS 
"  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"  January  25,  1865. 

"  To  arm  and  equip  an  additional  force  of  cavalry 
then  in  need  of  carbines,  revolvers,  pistols,  saddles,  and 
other  accouterments  of  mounted  men.  ...  I  therefore 
urge  all  persons  not  in  the  service  to  deliver  promptly 
to  some  of  the  officers  designated  below  such  arms  and 
equipment  (especially  those  suitable  for  cavalry)  as  they 
have,  and  to  report  to  those  officers  the  names  of  such 
persons  as  neglect  to  surrender  those  in  their  posses 
sion.  .  .  . 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

Grant  says: 

".  .  .  It  was  my  belief  that  while  the  enemy  could 
get  no  more  recruits,  they  were  losing  at  least  a  regiment 
a  day,  taking  it  throughout  the  entire  army,  by  deser 
tions  alone.  Then  by  casualties  of  war,  sickness,  and 
other  natural  causes  their  losses  were  much  heavier.  It 
was  a  mere  question  of  arithmetic  to  calculate  how  long 
they  could  hold  out  while  that  rate  of  depletion  was  going 


THE  SIEGE  OF  RICHMOND  243 

on.  Of  course  long  before  their  army  would  be  thus 
reduced  to  nothing,  the  army  which  we  had  in  the  field 
would  have  been  able  to  capture  theirs.  .  .  ." 

Notwithstanding  Grant  was  assured  of  success  in  the 
spring,  he  was  anxious  for  immediate  peace  and  it  was 
through  his  influence  that  Lincoln  came  to  Fortress  Mon 
roe  to  meet  the  Confederate  Commission  in  the  Hampton 
Roads  Conference. 

From  the  message,  in  cipher,  of  President  Lincoln  to 
the  House  of  Representatives  on  the  Hampton  Roads 
Conference : 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

'''  The  following  telegram,  received  at  Washington  at 
4.25   a.  m.,   February  2,    1865,   from  City  Point,  Va., 
February  i,  1865: 
"  '  To  Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton, 
"  *  Secretary  of  War. 

'  Now  that  the  interview  between  Major  Eckert, 
under  his  written  instructions,  and  Mr.  Stephens  and 
party  has  ended,  I  will  state  confidentially,  but  not  offi 
cially,  to  become  a  matter  of  record,  that  I  am  convinced, 
upon  conversation  with  Messrs.  Stephens  and  Hunter, 
that  their  intentions  are  good  and  their  desire  sincere  to 
restore  peace  and  Union.  I  have  not  felt  at  liberty  to 
express  even  views  of  my  own,  or  to  account  for  my 
reticence.  This  has  placed  me  in  an  awkward  position, 
which  I  could  have  avoided  by  not  seeing  them  in  the 
first  instance.  I  fear  now  their  going  back  without  any 
expression  to  any  one  in  authority  will  have  a  bad  influ 
ence.  At  the  same  time  I  recognize  the  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  receiving  these  informal  commissioners  at 
this  time,  and  I  do  not  know  what  to  recommend.  I  am 
sorry,  however,  that  Mr.  Lincoln  cannot  have  an  inter- 


244  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

view  with  the  two  named  in  this  dispatch,  if  not  all  three 
now  within  our  lines.  .  .  . 

"  '  U.  S.  GRANT, 
"  '  Lieutenant  General.'  " 

"  This  dispatch  of  General  Grant  changed  my  purpose, 
and  accordingly  I  telegraphed  to  him  and  the  Secretary 
of  War  as  follows : 

"  '  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON, 

"  '  February  2,  1865. 
"  '  To  LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  GRANT, 

"  '  City  Point,  Va. 

"  '  Say  to  the  gentlemen  that  I  will  meet  them  per 
sonally  at  Fortress  Monroe  as  soon  as  I  can  get  there. 
(Sent  in  cipher  9  a.  m.) 

" '  LINCOLN.'  ' 

Grant  was  tired  of  "  the  job."  Unlike  Lee,  he  never 
had  any  love  for  a  military  life.  Finance  was  more  con 
genial,  but  he  was  not  as  lucky  in  Wall  street  as  he  had 
been  in  the  field. 

The  Hampton  Roads  conference  was  the  result  of 
two  visits  of  Mr.  Francis  P.  Blair,  the  "  Warwick  "  of 
the  Republican  party,  to  Richmond.  His  object  was  to 
oppose  the  French  occupation  of  Mexico,  and  in  that 
way  end  the  Lincoln  war.  While  disclaiming  any  au 
thority,  he  gave  Mr.  Davis  to  understand  that  the 
Washington  Government  was  in  accord  with  his  plan. 
Accordingly,  Judge  Campbell,  Mr.  Stephens,  and  Mr. 
Hunter  were  designated  to  attend  the  conference,  which 
amounted  to  nothing. 

Stephens  says : 

".  .  .  He  (Lincoln)  persisted  in  asserting  that  he 
could  not  enter  into  any  agreement  upon  this  subject, 
nor  upon  any  other  matters  of  that  sort,  with  parties  in 


THE  SIEGE  OF  RICHMOND  245 

arms  against  the  Government.  Mr.  Hunter  interposed, 
and,  in  illustration  of  the  propriety  of  the  Executive  en 
tering  into  agreements  with  persons  in  arms  against  the 
acknowledged  rightful  authority  referred  to,  repeated 
instances  of  this  character  between  Charles  I,  of  Eng 
land,  and  the  people  in  arms  against  him.  Mr.  Lincoln 
in  reply  to  this  said :  '  I  do  not  profess  to  be  posted  in 
history.  On  all  such  matters  I  will  turn  you  over  to 
Seward.  All  I  distinctly  remember  about  the  case  of 
Charles  I  is  that  he  lost  his  head  in  the  end.' ' 

Mr.  Davis  was  very  much  disappointed,  and  thought 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  been  influenced  by  the  fall  of  Fort 
Fisher. 

When  Stephens  returned  from  the  Hampton  Roads 
conference  Davis  called  a  public  meeting  at  the  African 
church.  Stephens  says  of  Davis's  speech : 

"  The  occasion  and  the  effect  of  his  speech,  as  well  as 
the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  made,  caused  the 
minds  of  not  a  few  to  revert  to  like  appeals  by  Rienzi  and 
Demosthenes.  While  it  was  well  calculated  to  awaken 
associations  and  suggest  comparisons  of  that  sort,  it, 
nevertheless,  by  the  character  of  its  policy,  equally  re 
minded  me  of  the  famous  charge  of  the  '  Six  Hundred  ' 
at  Balaklava,  of  which  some  one  —  I  forget  who  —  in 
witnessing  it,  said,  in  substance :  '  It  is  brilliant ;  it  is 
grand ;  but  it  is  not  war/  However  much  I  admired  the 
heroism  of  the  sentiments  expressed,  yet  in  his  general 
views  of  policy  to  be  pursued  in  the  then  situation  I 
could  not  concur.  I  saw  nothing  to  prevent  Sherman 
himself  from  proceeding  right  on  to  Richmond  and  at 
tacking  Lee  in  rear,  to  say  nothing  of  any  movements 
by  Grant,  who  then  had  an  army  in  front,  of  not  much, 
if  any,  under  200,000  men.  Lee's  forces  were  not  over 


246  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

one- fourth  that  number.  Sherman's  army  when  united 
with  Schofield's  and  Terry's,  which  were  joining  him 
from  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  would  be  swelled  to 
near  100,000.  .  .  .  When  the  program  of  action,  thus 
indicated  by  Mr.  Davis  in  our  interviews  as  well  as  in 
his  message  and  the  speech  referred  to,  was  clearly  re 
solved  upon,  I  then,  for  the  first  time,  in  view  of  all  the 
surroundings,  consideied  the  cause  as  utterly  hope 
less.  .  .  ." 

Stephens  refused  to  speak  at  the  African  church  meet 
ing  and  also  at  one  in  the  Capitol  Square  a  few  days 
later.  He  says: 

"  I  declined  because  I  could  not  undertake  to  impress 
upon  the  minds  of  the  people  the  idea  that  they  could 
do  what  I  believed  to  be  impossible,  or  to  inspire  in  them 
hopes  which  I  did  not  believe  could  ever  be  realized. 
...  It  was  then  I  withdrew  from  Richmond.  ...  I 
left  Richmond  in  no  ill  humor  with  Mr.  Davis.  (Qth  of 
February.)" 

Stephens  was  solitary  and  alone  in  his  opinion.  The 
Government,  the  soldiers  in  the  army,  and  the  people  in 
Richmond  were  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  the  war  would 
go  on  indefinitely  and  ultimately  result  in  independence. 
It  was  an  unaccountable  hallucination. 

"  HEADQUARTERS 
"  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"February  8,  1865. 
"  HON.  JAS.  A.  SEDDON,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR, 

"  Richmond,  Va, 

"  SIR:  All  the  disposable  force  of  the  right  wing  of 
the  army  has  been  operating  against  the  enemy  beyond 
Hatcher's  Run  since  Sunday.  Yesterday,  the  most  in- 


Facing  page  247 


THE  SIEGE  OF  RICHMOND  247 

clement  day  of  the  winter,  they  had  to  be  retained  in  line 
of  battle,  having  been  in  the  same  condition  the  two 
previous  days  and  nights.  I  regret  to  be  obliged  to  state 
that  under  these  circumstances,  heightened  by  assaults  and 
fire  of  the  enemy,  some  of  the  men  had  been  without  meat 
for  three  days,  and  all  were  suffering  from  reduced  ra 
tions  and  scant  clothing,  exposed  to  battle,  cold,  hail  and 
sleet.  I  have  directed  Colonel  Cole,  chief  commissary, 
who  reports  he  has  not  a  pound  of  meat  at  his  disposal, 
to  visit  Richmond  and  see  if  nothing  can  be  done.  If 
some  change  is  not  made  and  the  Commissary  Depart 
ment  reorganized,  I  apprehend  dire  results.  .  .  .  Our 
cavalry  has  to  be  dispersed  for  want  of  forage.  Fitz 
Lee's  and  Lomax's  divisions  are  scattered  because  sup 
plies  cannot  be  transported  where  their  services  are  re 
quired.  I  had  to  bring  W.  F.  Lee's  division  forty  miles 
Sunday  night  to  get  him  in  position.  .  .  . 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General/' 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  PETERSBURG, 

"  February  22,  1865. 
"  HON.  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE, 

"  Secretary  of  War,  Richmond. 

".  .  .  The  cavalry  and  artillery  of  the  army  are  still 
scattered  for  want  of  provender,  and  our  supply  and 
ammunition  trains,  which  ought  to  be  with  the  army  in 
case  of  a  sudden  movement,  are  absent  collecting  sup 
plies  in  West  Virginia  and  North  Carolina.  You  will 
see  to  what  straits  we  are  reduced.  But  I  trust  to  work 
out.  "  With  great  respect, 

"  Your  obt.  servant, 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 


248  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  PETERSBURG, 

"March  17,  1865. 
"  HON.  J.  C.  BRECKINRIDGE, 

"  Secretary  of  War,  Richmond. 
".  .  .  Now  I  do  not  see  how  I  can  sustain  even  our 
small  force  of  cavalry  around  Richmond.  I  have  had 
this  morning  to  send  Gen.  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division  back 
to  Stony  Creek,  whence  I  had  called  it  in  the  last  few 
days,  because  I  cannot  provide  it  with  forage.  .  .  . 

"R.  E.  LEE, 
"  General." 

There  was  at  least  one  pleasant  incident  in  the  siege 
of  Richmond. 

Nicolay  and  Hay  say: 

"  We  may  assume  that  it  was  the  anticipated  important 
military  events  rather  than  the  presence  of  Capt.  Robert 
T.  Lincoln  at  Grant's  headquarters  which  induced  the 
general  on  the  2Oth  of  March,  1865,  to  invite  the  Presi 
dent  and  Mrs.  Lincoln  to  make  a  visit  to  the  camp  near 
Richmond;  and  on  the  22d  they  and  their  younger  son, 
Thomas,  nicknamed  '  Tad/  proceeded  in  the  steamer 
River  Queen  from  Washington  to  City  Point,  where 
General  Grant  with  his  family  and  staff  were  occupying 
a  pretty  group  of  huts  on  the  bank  of  the  James  river, 
overlooking  the  harbor,  which  was  full  of  vessels  of  all 
classes,  both  war  and  merchant,  with  wharves  and  ware 
houses  on  an  extensive  scale.  Here,  making  his  home 
on  the  steamer  that  brought  him,  the  President  remained 
ten  days,  enjoying  what  was  probably  the  most  satisfac 
tory  relaxation  in  which  he  had  been  able  to  indulge 
during  his  whole  presidential  service.  .  .  ." 

City  Point  was  not  only  an  ideal  base,  but  a  convenient 
pleasure  resort  for  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  family. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   RETREAT 

ENERAL  LONG  says: 

".  .  .  The  success  of  the  Federal  army  in  breaking 
the  lines  of  Petersburg  had  rendered  the  retreat  of  the 
Confederate  force  imperative.  An  effort  to  hold  Rich 
mond,  with  every  line  of  communication  with  the  South 
broken  or  in  imminent  peril,  would  have  been  madness. 
But  by  abandoning  his  works  and  concentrating  his 
army,  which  still  amounted  to  about  30,000  men,  Gen 
eral  Lee  might  retire  to  some  natural  stronghold  in  the 
interior,  where  the  defensible  features  of  the  country 
would  enable  him  to  oppose  Grant's  formidable  host 
until  he  could  rally  strength  to  strike  an  effective 
blow.  .  .  ." 

Lee  was  not  strong  enough  to  hold  Grant  with  a  rear 
guard,  so  his  only  hope  was  to  make  a  run  for  it,  and 
that  is  what  he  attempted.  Lee  had  four  broken-down 
half-starved  horses  to  a  gun;  Grant,  six  splendid  well-fed 
ones. 

Mrs.  Mary  A.  Fontaine,  describing  the  burning  of 
Richmond,  says : 

"  May  7.  I  was  just  trying  to  describe  the  scenes  on 
the  3d  of  April.  About  eight  o'clock,  after  some  thirty 
cavalrymen  had  taken  possession  of  Richmond,  hoisted 

249 


2$o  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

their  flag1,  etc.,  the  artillery  came  dashing  up  Broad  street; 
positively  the  fat  horses  came  trotting  up  that  heavy 
hill,  dragging  the  cannon  as  though  they  were  light  car 
riages.  The  trappings  were  gay,  and  I  commenced  to 
realize  the  fearful  odds  against  which  our  gallant  little 
army  had  contended.  .  .  ." 

If  these  "  fearful  odds  "  were  so  apparent  to  a  woman, 
it  does  appear  that  Davis  and  Lee  should  have  taken 
them  into  consideration. 

Then  Lee  was  encumbered  with  his  wagon  train,  while 
Grant  could  leave  his  to  follow.  Grant's  overwhelming 
force  and  superior  mobility  enabled  him  not  only  to 
pound  Lee's  flank  and  rear,  but  to  march  around  him 
and  intrench  in  his  front.  Sheridan,  with  his  13,000 
mounted  riflemen,  easily  rode  ahead  and  intrenched  on 
his  line  of  retreat.  Thirteen  thousand  breech-loaders 
were  more  than  a  match  for  Lee's  army,  wasted  as  it 
was;  but  the  infantry  was  also  up  in  time  to  oppose  a 
continuation  of  the  retreat. 

Then  if  Lee  had  reached  General  Long's  "  natural 
stronghold  in  the  interior "  with  the  remnants  of  his 
30,000  men,  he  would  have  found  himself  surrounded  by 
Federal  armies. 

Grant  says : 

"...  I  expected,  with  Sherman  coming  up  from  the 
South,  Meade  south  of  Petersburg  and  around  Rich 
mond,  and  Thomas's  command  in  Tennessee  with  depots 
of  supplies  established  in  the  eastern  part  of  that  state, 
to  move  from  the  direction  of  Washington  or  the  Valley 
towards  Lynchburg.  We  would  then  have  Lee  so  sur 
rounded  that  his  supplies  would  be  cut  off  entirely,  mak 
ing  it  impossible  for  him  to  support  his  army." 


THE  RETREAT  251 

These  armies  could  have  surrounded  Lee  in  General 
Long's  "  natural  stronghold  "  as  well  as  at  Richmond, 
and  with  better  results,  because  at  Richmond  Lee  could 
get  ammunition  at  any  rate,  whereas  in  General  Long's 
"  natural  stronghold "  it  would  have  been  impossible. 
Neither  could  he  have  gotten  supplies,  because  natural 
strongholds  never  produce  them  —  they  have  to  be 
brought  in  from  the  outside. 

Nicolay  and  Hay  say : 

".  .  .  General  Lee  after  the  first  shock  of  the  breaking 
of  his  lines  soon  recovered  his  usual  sang-froid,  and  bent 
all  his  energies  to  saving  his  army  and  leading  it  out 
of  its  untenable  position  on  the  James  to  a  point  from 
which  he  could  affect  a  junction  with  Johnston  in  North 
Carolina.  .  .  .  Even  in  the  ruin  of  the  Confederacy, 
when  the  organized  revolt  which  he  had  sustained  so 
long,  with  the  bayonets  of  his  soldiers,  was  crashing 
about  his  ears,  he  was  able  still  to  cradle  himself  in  the 
illusion  that  it  was  only  a  campaign  that  had  failed ;  that 
he  might  withdraw  his  troops,  form  a  junction  with 
Johnston,  and  continue  the  war  indefinitely  in  another 
field.  Whatever  we  may  think  of  his  judgment,  it  is 
impossible  not  to  admire  the  coolness  of  a  general,  who, 
in  the  midst  of  irremediable  disaster  such  as  encompassed 
Lee  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  of  April,  could  write 
such  a  letter  as  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  Davis  under  date 
of  three  o'clock.  He  began  it  by  a  quiet  and  calm  dis 
cussion  of  the  question  of  negro  recruitment;  promised 
to  give  his  attention  to  the  business  of  finding  suitable 
officers  for  the  black  regiments;  hoped  the  appeal  Mr. 
Davis  had  made  to  the  governors  would  have  a  good 
effect;  and  altogether  wrote  as  if  years  of  struggle  and 
effort  were  before  him  and  his  chief.  He  then  went  on 


252  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

to  narrate  the  story  of  the  day's  catastrophe  and  to  give 
his  plans  for  the  future.  He  closed  by  apologizing  for 
'  writing  such  a  hurried  letter  to  your  Excellency  '  on  the 
ground  that  he  was  '  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  en 
deavoring  to  resist  his  advance/  At  nightfall  his  prepa 
rations  were  completed.  He  mounted  his  horse  and  rid 
ing  out  of  the  town  dismounted  at  the  mouth  of  the  road 
leading  to  Amelia  Court  House,  the  first  point  of  rendez 
vous  where  he  had  directed  supplies  to  be  sent,  and  stand 
ing  beside  his  horse,  the  bridle  reins  in  his  hand,  he 
watched  his  troops  file  noiselessly  by  in  the  darkness " 

A  junction  with  Johnston  was  as  impossible  as  a  re 
treat  to  General  Long's  "  stronghold,"  and  even  if  it  had 
been  accomplished,  the  result  would  have  been  equally 
disastrous.  Johnston  and  Lee,  with  their  little  half- 
starved  armies,  would  have  been  between  the  hosts  of 
Grant  and  Sherman,  and  without  supplies  or  ammunition. 

General  Gibbon  wrote  from  Appomattox: 

".  .  .  We  have  had  to  supply  Lee's  army  with  rations, 
they  being  entirely  without  any.  As  for  the  poor  horses 
and  mules,  many  of  them  will  die  for  want  of  forage. 
They  look  terribly  thin  and  worn  down.  Some  of  the 
men  have  had  nothing  to  eat  for  three  days  but  parched 
corn,  and  I  cannot  help  respecting  men  who  have  fought 
so  long  and  so  well  in  support  of  their  opinions,  however 
wrong  I  may  think  them.  .  .  ." 

General  Johnston,  writing  in  his  "  Narrative  of  Mili 
tary  Operations  "  of  his  conference  with  Dr.  Davis  at 
Greensboro,  N.  C,  after  the  surrender  of  Lee,  says : 

".  .  .  Being  desired  by  the  President  to  do  it,  we  com- 


THE  RETREAT  253 

pared  the  military  forces  of  the  two  parties  to  the  war. 
Ours,  an  army  of  about  20,000  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  5000  mounted  troops ;  those  of  the  United  States, 
three  armies  that  could  be  combined  against  ours,  which 
was  insignificant  compared  with  either  Grant's  of  180,000 
men,  Sherman's  of  110,000  at  least,  and  Canby's  of 
60,000,  odds  of  seventeen  or  eighteen  to  one,  which  in 
a  few  weeks  could  be  more  than  doubled.  I  represented 
that,  under  such  circumstances,  it  would  be  the  greatest 
of  human  crimes  for  us  to  attempt  to  continue  this  war; 
for,  having  neither  money  nor  credit,  nor  arms  but  those 
in  the  hands  of  our  soldiers,  nor  ammunition  but  that  in 
their  cartridge  boxes,  nor  shops  for  repairing  arms  or 
fixing  ammunition,  the  effect  of  our  keeping  the  field 
would  be,  not  to  harm  the  enemy,  but  to  complete  the 
devastation  of  our  country  and  the  ruin  of  its  peo- 
pie.  .  .  ." 

Of  Mr.  Davis,  General  Basil  W.  Duke  writes  as  fol 
lows,  and  this  was  of  course  after  the  surrender  of  Lee 
and  Joe  Johnston : 

".  .  .  At  Abbeville,  South  Carolina,  Mr.  Davis  held  a 
conference  with  the  officers  in  command  of  the  troops 
composing  his  escort,  which  he  himself  characterized  as 
a  '  Council  of  War.'  ...  I  had  never  seen  Mr.  Davis 
look  better  or  show  to  better  advantage.  He  seemed  in 
excellent  spirits  and  humor;  and  the  union  of  dignity, 
graceful  affability,  and  decision  which  made  his  manner 
usually  so  striking  was  very  marked  in  his  reception  of 
us.  After  some  conversation  of  a  general  nature,  he 
said :  '  It  is  time  that  we  adopt  some  definite  plan  upon 
which  the  further  prosecution  of  our  struggle  shall  be 
conducted.  I  have  summoned  you  for  consultation.  I 


254  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

feel  that  I  ought  to  do  nothing  now  without  the  advice 
of  my  military  chiefs/  He  smiled  rather  archly  as  he 
used  this  expression,  and  we  could  not  help  thinking  that 
such  a  term  addressed  to  a  handful  of  brigadiers,  com 
manding  altogether  about  three  thousand  men,  by  one 
who  had  been  so  recently  master  of  legions,  was  a  pleas 
antry  :  yet  he  said  it  in  a  way  that  made  it  a  compliment. 

"  After  we  had  each  given  at  his  request  a  statement 
of  the  equipment  and  condition  of  our  respective  com 
mands,  Mr.  Davis  proceeded  to  declare  his  conviction 
that  the  cause  was  not  lost  any  more  than  hope  of  Ameri 
can  liberty  was  gone  amid  the  sorest  trials  and  most  dis 
heartening  reverses  of  the  Revolutionary  struggle;  but 
that  energy,  courage,  and  constancy  might  yet  save  all. 
'  Even/  he  said,  '  if  the  troops  now  with  me  be  all  that 
I  can  for  the  present  rely  on,  three  thousand  brave  men 
are  enough  for  a  nucleus  around  which  the  whole  people 
will  rally  when  the  panic  which  now  afflicts  them  has 
passed  away/ 

"  He  then  asked  that  we  should  make  suggestions  in 
regard  to  the  future  conduct  of  the  war.  We  looked  at 
one  another  in  amazement,  and  with  a  feeling  alike  to 
trepidation,  for  we  hardly  knew  how  we  should  give  ex 
pression  to  views  diametrically  opposed  to  those  he 
uttered.  Our  respect  for  Mr.  Davis  approached  venera 
tion,  and  notwithstanding  the  total  dissent  we  felt  and 
were  obliged  to  announce  to  the  program  he  had  indi 
cated,  that  respect  was  rather  increased  than  diminished 
by  what  he  said.  I  do  not  remember  who  spoke  first, 
but  we  all  expressed  the  same  opinion.  We  told  him 
frankly  that  the  events  of  the  last  four  days  had  removed 
from  our  minds  all  idea  or  hope  that  a  prolongation  of 
the  contest  was  possible.  The  people  were  not  panic- 
stricken,  but  broken  down  and  worn  out.  We  said  that 


THE  RETREAT  255 

an  attempt  to  continue  the  war  after  all  means  of  sup 
porting  warfare  were  gone  would  be  a  cruel  injustice  to 
the  people  of  the  South.  We  would  be  compelled  to  live 
on  a  country  already  impoverished,  and  would  invite  its 
further  devastation.  We  urged  that  we  would  be  doing 
a  wrong  to  our  men  if  we  persuaded  them  to  such  a 
course,  for  if  they  persisted  in  a  conflict  so  hopeless  they 
would  be  treated  as  brigands  and  would  forfeit  all  chance 
of  returning  to  their  homes. 

"  He  asked  why  then  were  we  in  the  field  ?  We 
answered  we  were  desirous  of  affording  him  an  oppor 
tunity  of  escaping  the  degradation  of  capture,  and  per 
haps  a  fate  that  would  be  direr  to  the  people  than  even 
to  himself,  in  still  more  embittering  the  feeling  between 
the  North  and  the  South.  We  said  we  would  ask  our 
men  to  follow  us  until  his  safety  was  assured,  and  would 
risk  them  in  battle  for  that  purpose,  but  would  not  fire 
another  shot  in  an  effort  to  continue  hostilities.  He  de 
clared  abruptly  that  he  would  listen  to  no  suggestion 
which  regarded  only  his  own  safety.  He  appealed 
eloquently  to  every  sentiment  and  reminiscence  that 
might  be  supposed  to  move  a  Southern  soldier,  and  urged 
us  to  accept  his  views.  We  remained  silent,  for  our  con 
victions  were  unshaken;  we  felt  responsibility  for  the 
men  who  had  so  heroically  followed  us ;  and  the  painful 
point  had  been  reached  when  to  speak  again  in  opposition 
to  all  that  he  had  urged  would  have  approached  alterca 
tion.  For  some  minutes  not  a  word  was  spoken.  Then 
Mr.  Davis  arose  and  ejaculated  bitterly  that  all  was  in 
deed  lost.  He  had  become  very  pallid,  and  he  walked 
so  feebly  as  he  proceeded  to  leave  the  room  that  Gen 
eral  Breckinridge  stepped  hastily  up  and  offered  his  arm." 

Of  all  the  hallucinations  of  the  Confederate  leaders, 


256  THE  STRATEGY  OF  ROBERT  E.  LEE 

the  most  miraculous  of  all  was  that  they  could  retreat 
from  Richmond  and  continue  the  war  indefinitely.  To 
account  for  it,  we  must  abandon  the  theory  of  free  agency 
and  accept  something  like  the  following  ideas  from  Dr. 
Draper's  "  Intellectual  Development  of  Europe " : 
".  .  .  He  sees  that  a  Supreme  power  has  been  using 
him  for  unknown  ends,  that  he  was  brought  into  the 
world  without  his  own  knowledge,  and  is  departing  from 
it  against  his  own  will.  .  .  ." 

And  Shakespeare  says :  "  All  the  world's  a  stage,  and 
all  the  men  and  women  merely  players/' 

If  Davis  and  Lee  were  actors,  and  the  Supreme  power 
an  evil  power,  stage  manager,  and  prompter,  we  can 
understand  the  attempted  retreat. 

It  is  well  to  remember,  however,  that  Lee  was  not  a 
statesman,  nor  a  man  of  affairs.  He  was  a  soldier  pure 
and  simple,  and,  like  the  "  good  knight "  Bayard,  "  sans 
peur  et  sans  reproche" 


—"J&i 


LD  21A-50m-3,'62 
(07097slO)476B 


37769 


